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A July 1960 declaration listed the military systems to be developed in 1966 to 1970. Military research programs of 1962 to 1964 code-named Shchit (space systems), Osnova (space equipment), and Ediniy KIK (ground systems) defined the first generation of Soviet operational space systems, deployed in 1966-1975. First generation systems were often developed by Korolev, then spun off to other design bureaux for production. At the beginning of the 1960's an unwieldy total of thirty space systems were in development.

In the early 1960's Russian strategic nuclear forces on land, sea, and air were already in place. The military wished to integrate military space forces with these in a systematic manner as soon as possible. These requirements resulted in definition of an SKV - Space Military System. The SKV would exploit the global range of orbital systems; determine the precise location of mobile and fixed targets for strike by strategic forces, precisely hit such targets, and quickly and securely transmit targeting information.

A hallmark of the early 1960's was militarisation of space under the shadow of Kennedy's policy of massive retaliation. Both the US and USSR deployed unmanned and developed manned systems to identify, track, and destroy the enemy's satellites. ABM systems could also be used to hit satellites in orbits up to 200 km. This process of militarisation of space was only averted, in the Soviet view, by actions taken by Nixon in the 1970's (the SALT-I treaty, the ABM treaty, and secret understandings to stop development of anti-satellite systems).

The period 1966-1970 featured the first practical use of space systems of the first generation.

First generation satellites were very unreliable. One problem was unrealistic specifications, another a lack of proven space-worthy components. The first solution was redundant systems, and these were tried on an experimental basis in the Meteor, Strela, and Tsiklon satellites. Flight demonstrations proved use of better construction methods would allow guaranteed satellite lifetimes of two to three years. Meanwhile the operational situation reached a crisis point. The USA had faced the same problem, and developed a strong reliable component basis for spacecraft. This had increased individual American satellite lifetimes to 3 to 5 years and system operational lives to 5 to 7 years (through use of on-orbit reserve spacecraft). But in the Soviet Union, due to the urgency to deploy, there was no time to develop such a technical basis for first generation systems. Only in the 1970's were reliability problems solved through use of qualified standard components, standard means of documentation, and quality assurance.

While the reliability of first generation systems was poor, they still met the needs of the Rocket Forces and General Staff. Quick reaction (10 to 12 day) launch times were achieved, and the new systems allowed precise targeting of long range rockets and naval forces. The Korund space communications system provided reliable command and control of the strategic forces.

Military space operations began in 1961 with the 'Provisional Rocket-Engineering Auxiliary' VNIRS-61. This initially developed military operational plans for launch sites and command and control activities, including regularly scheduled maintenance operations. This first phase, which prepared the military to execute space operations and conduct trials of systems, was completed by 1965. The first military space operations plans were prepared for the Zenit reconnaissance satellite system in 1964 to 1965, and subsequently used by the General Staff in the operation of that system.

The following lists the missions identified in Shchit/Osnova and the subsequent history of first-generation systems used to fulfil these missions.

Target Identification and Location

• Photo reconnaissance / cartography: While Korolev had designed the first such satellite, the Zenit-2, detailed design of the Zenit-4 high-resolution model and production of all follow-on spacecraft was handled by Kozlov. In mid-1967 plans were approved for further development of these models through 1975, taking into account work then underway. The results were the improved Zenit 2M and Zenit 4M satellites, taken into military service in 1970 and 1971.

• Yantar follow-on reconnaissance satellite: Originally Yangel was to handle Yantar, but his design bureau was too busy building higher-priority ICBM's for the RSVN Rocket Forces. So Kozlov took up the project in 1969. Yantar-1KF and Yantar-2K test-construction work began in 1970, but the new series of satellites would be completed only as second and third generations systems.

• Manned Photo-reconnaissance: Draft projects for two such designs, Kozlov's Soyuz-R and Chelomei's Almaz APOS, were authorised in 1964. Soyuz-R was cancelled when it became too heavy for the planned launch vehicle. The Almaz, a dedicated platform for manned high-resolution multispectral study of specific targets, continued. The flight trials were intended to prove the effectiveness of manned orbital reconnaissance operations. The program was to take place in two phases. Phase 1 would man the space station using crews shuttled by Korolev's Soyuz 7K-T/A9 spacecraft. Phase 2 would be the operational system, serviced by Chelomei's much larger TKS manned resupply spacecraft. The program was delayed for two years when Almaz hulls were diverted for the Salyut 1 DOS crash programme to launch a space station before the American Skylab. Finally the first Almaz was launched in April 1973. It depressurised and was abandoned before a crew could be launched. Salyut 3 in 1974 and Salyut 5 in 1975 to 1976 were successfully manned. But the results of the flights showed that manned reconnaissance was not worth the expense. There was minimal time to operate the equipment after the crew took the necessary time for maintenance of station housekeeping and environmental control systems.

• ELINT (Electronic and Signals Intelligence): An initial capability was provided by the Zenit-2, which carried the Kust ELINT apparatus. From 1965 to 1967 two dedicated ELINT systems were tested: the Tselina and the Navy's US. Both reached service, since the Ministry of Defence could not force a single system on the military services.

  Tselina was developed by Yuzhnoye and consisted of two satellites: Tselina-O for general observations and Tselina-D for detailed observations. ELINT systems for Tselina were first tested under the Cosmos designation in 1962 to 1965. The first Tselina-O was launched in 1970. The Tselina-D took a long time to enter service due to delays in payload development and weight growth.

  The Navy's US radio intelligence satellites were built in US-P (passive detection) and US-A (nuclear powered active radar) variants. Development was begun in 1960. They were descended from Chelomei's Kosmoplan modular spacecraft design, and were part of an integrated naval war-fighting system, feeding locations of enemy naval forces to Chelomei-built ship-launched cruise missiles. Both satellites were designed for launch by Chelomei's UR-200 rocket. On October 13, 1964, Khrushchev, Chelomei's patron, was ousted from power. The new leadership decided to assign the US project to Savin, with Chelomei in the sub-contractor role, to be launched by Yuzhnoye's Tsiklon-2 rocket. Delays resulted in the US being implemented as a second generation systems in the 1970's.

• Television reconnaissance: Chelomei began project work in 1963 on the Space Television Reconnaissance System (TGR). Savin had developed the original concept. But it was found that the technology did not yet exist for even a draft project to be completed. The concept would not enter operation until the Yantar series in the 1980's.

• Navigation: Tsiklon, the first Soviet navigation satellite system, was designed by Reshetnev. Experimental flights began in 1967 in order to develop a system meeting the required tactical and operational characteristics. The Tsiklon-B operational system provided not only navigation information but also store-dump radio communications for Soviet naval forces. The system was accepted into military service in 1976.

• Meteorology: The Meteor satellites were developed as per a decree of 30 October 1960. Work began in 1961 at Yuzhnoye; in 1962 it was transferred to VNIIEM. Final development was completed in 1964. The system went into operation in 1969.

• Geodesy: Reshetnev's Sfera geodetic spacecraft allowed measurement of geodetic points leading to improved accuracy of long range weapons. Flight tests were from 1968 to 1972, and operational flights were from 1973 to 1980. The Kosmos 3M launcher was used.

• Strategic Communications: The strategic communications requirement was met by the Molniya-1, developed by Korolev. This used an elliptical 12 hour orbit that could be reached by existing launch vehicles and was better suited than geosynchronous orbit for communication with polar areas of the Soviet Union. The experimental version of the spacecraft proved so successful that it was put into service. Reshetnev was responsible for production and follow-on models. The entire system, designated Korund, using existing Gorizont military tropospheric communication ground stations, went into partial operation in 1968. The Molniya-2 model was developed to accommodate the Orbita television system, and was operational by 1972. The Ruchey Command and Control System communications stations for the Rocket Forces, Air Force, and Navy were completely in place by 1975. Korund allowed strategic communications and telephony with military units in Siberia and the Far East. The system finally included 8 spacecraft, replaced at increasing intervals as reliability improved over the 20 year life of the system.

• Tactical Communications: Reshetnev's Strela medium earth-orbit store-dump survivable communications system was developed experimentally in the 1960's, with flight tests from 1964 to 1965. Production system flight tests began in 1970. In 1973 and 1974 the Strela 1M and Strela 2M systems were accepted by the military. This system proved the basic concepts used in the Iridium and Globalstar commercial satellite constellations decades later.

• Fractional Orbital Bombing System (OGCh): In the early 1960's the Soviet planners pursued the concept of a 'global rocket' - a missile that would place nuclear warheads into low earth orbit, where they could approach the enemy from any direction, under the existing ballistic missile detection radars, and strike with little warning. Competitors for the single-warhead GR-1 requirement were Chelomei's UR-200, Korolev's GR-1, and Yangels' R-36-O. Only Yangel's design went into production and was in service until 1992. For the GR-2 multiple warhead requirement Yangel's R-56 and Korolev's N-11GR / N-11 1963 designs were rejected in favour of Chelomei's Proton 8K82. The Chelomei design was tested but never went into service. American development of orbiting infrared warning systems that could detect missiles on launch negated the surprise attack element at the core of the concept.

• Anti-Satellite: The original IS anti-satellite design was to be a Kosmoplan built by Chelomei and launched by his UR-200 booster. It was tested by him as Polyot. After the fall of Khrushchev the satellite project was handed to Savin with the launcher changed to Yuzhnoye's Tsyklon 2. The first test series of the IS-A ASAT was conducted in 1968-1972 using two different targets ( IS-P, DS-P1-M). These tests were wholly inconclusive, and a second test series in 1972-1975 was necessary to complete the state trials. The system was finally accepted into military service in February 1973 as the IS system. In connection with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty further operational trials were discontinued.

• Training/target objects: These were designed by Kovtunenko at Yuzhnoye as part of the 'DS' light satellite series and first tested under the Cosmos designation in 1962 to 1965. The DS-P1-Yu and DS-P1-I spacecraft were for radar tests of the PVO Air Defence and ABM systems. They were accepted into the military in 1968 and 1970 as the 'Raduga' complex and remained in service until 1978. The DS-P1-M 'Lira' target for PKO Antisatellite Forces systems was designed for both anti-ballistic missile and anti-satellite testing. It was more than a passive target, including an impact registration system that returned data on the elements of the hit (direction, velocity, etc.). First flight trials began in August 1970 and the target was in service from 1973 to 1983.

• Manned combat spacecraft: An initial draft project for the Soyuz-P manned interceptor was approved in 1964. Studies showed the complexity and danger of such an approach. But American military experiments aboard Gemini flights and pursuit of the military Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) lead to work being resumed on a crash program of a new design in 1965. This Soyuz VI was to conduct space military research not covered by Almaz - manned earth observation, orbital inspection and destruction of enemy satellites. Soyuz VI was supposed to fly quickly, but fell victim to defects in the basic Soyuz design and internal politics at Korolev's design bureau. By 1970 the American MOL had been cancelled and Soviet flight tests had provided convincing evidence that near-earth manned operations were better suited to solution of national economic problems than military ones. So Soyuz VI was cancelled.

• Manned Spaceplane: Chelomei's Raketoplan manned spaceplane interceptor was cancelled in 1965 and replaced by the Mikoyan Spiral OS. This reached flight test status (MiG 105-11 and BOR-4) in the 1970's before being replaced by the Buran space shuttle.

Monitoring/ Characterisation of Near-Earth Space: Two Energia spacecraft, adapted from the Zenit reconnaissance satellite, were launched in the 1970's to study high-energy cosmic rays. These were supplemented by the Lavochkin Prognoz series, launched in 1972 to 1976, for study of geomagnetic fields, radiation, and solar physics. They continued the work of the Elektron-A and Elektron-B spacecraft of 1964.

Biological studies on the effects of radiation: The Bion satellite, based on the Zenit reconnaissance satellite, was developed for this purpose. Launches began in 1973 with primary emphasis on the problems of radiation effects on human beings. Bions were launched from 1973 to 1996. Small related experiments were carried in Nauka modules on Zenit-2M reconnaissance spacecraft.

Systems tests and scientific experiments: From 1968 Nauka attached containers or free-flying sub-satellites were used on Zenit reconnaissance satellites to develop methods to study radiation belts; establish radiation standards; establish the characteristics of the earth-space interface; and develop new instruments. 23 autonomous sub-satellites conducted methodical research into geophysics, meteorology, and cosmic rays. The DS series of light satellites developed by Yangel also provided platforms for a wide range of technology equipment tests and space environment monitoring. They flew under the 'Cosmos' satellite program ('Cosmos' name was also used as the cover name for any military satellite or launch failure). This program was managed by the Third Directorate of the GURVO Rocket Forces, consisting of four sections of 36 officers and 5 civilians.

National Prestige Programs

Although they represented only 20% of launches, national prestige projects (manned and planetary missions) represented 50% of the effort of the military, which was responsible for the launch facilities and operations. This was due to their scale and use of non-standard launch vehicles and spacecraft.

• Manned Earth Orbit Rendezvous and Docking - Korolev obtained approval for development of the Soyuz 7K-OK in December 1963. The spacecraft was to prove out systems for automatic rendezvous and docking of spacecraft, extra-vehicular activity, and scientific research. The Soyuz had severe development problems during its first flight series from 1966 to 1970. The only completely successful missions were Soyuz 4/Soyuz 5 in January 1969 (first docking and crew transfer between two manned spacecraft) and Soyuz 9 in June 1970 (record 17 day mission). Versions were designed but never flown to test artificial-G in earth orbit ( Soyuz 7K-OK Tether) and to test the Kontakt docking system for the lunar landing program ( Soyuz Kontakt).

• Manned Lunar Projects - The Soviet government waited until 1964 before deciding to take on the 1961 American moon race challenge. The secret Russian program failed to beat the Americans to a landing on the moon. There were three parallel projects: the Lunar L1 (LK-1) program, assigned to Chelomei, to beat the Americans to a circumlunar flight; the Lunar L3 (Soyuz 7K-LOK / LK) program, assigned to Korolev, to land a Soviet man on the moon; and the Zvezda permanent lunar base (built from DLB Modules), assigned to Barmin. The key element of the last two projects was the N1 launch vehicle.

  It was decided in the second half of 1965 that Chelomei would no longer be responsible for high-priority projects, and the L1 project was assigned to Korolev. A month later Korolev died suddenly, a crippling blow to the entire program. Mishin was named as Korolev's successor after a long delay.

  Korolev's Soyuz 7K-L1 was flown in several versions to support the L1 and L3 projects (Soyuz 7K-L1P, Soyuz 7K-L1E, Soyuz 7K-L1A) but could not be qualified for manned flight before Apollo 8 orbited the moon and ended the first lap of the moon race. The first N1 launch was to be in 1967 but was delayed to 1969 due to serious deficiencies in organisation and co-operation. Chelomei and Glushko advocated dumping the N1/L3 design and using their UR-700 / LK-700 for a direct lunar landing. These alternates were rejected, but the first two N1 launches, in January and July 1969, resulted in the explosion of the launch vehicle. In retrospect a fatal error was made in deciding to launch a vehicle of this size from the remote Baikonur cosmodrome. Since Korolev rejected modular designs, the vehicle could not be transported by rail or water to the selected launch site; it had to be built at the site itself. Budget limitations meant that the enormous first stage was not static tested before flight.

• Lunar probes: Babakin, at the Lavochkin bureau, had been assigned development of heavy unmanned probes to support manned lunar base construction. Ten of these Luna Ye-8 probes were launched from 1969 to 1974, and they successfully returned lunar soil to earth and roved the surface. The success of these probes allowed the Soviet Union to promulgate the myth that they had never been in the moon race.

• Planetary probes: The 2MV probes were replaced first by the 3MV series. To match ambitious American plans for robot exploration of Mars in the 1970's, the four-times-heavier 4MV bus was introduced, requiring launch by a Proton rocket. This continued to be used for Soviet planetary probes, and some heavy scientific satellites (Granat, Astron, Prognoz), to the end of the century. Soviet probes to Venus were generally successful. None of the six probes sent to Mars returned any significant data.

• Intercosmos and international programs - Launches of payloads developed by countries friendly to the Soviet Union aboard DS satellites from Yuzhnoye began in April 1967. Intercosmos-1, the first dedicated launch, came in October 1969. The last launch of the first generation of the series was in 1976. Launch of similar Soviet-French Oreol satellites, code named Arkad, were made in 1971 and 1973. The Soviet Union also assisted India in development of its Aryabhata satellite, launched by a Russian rocket in 1975.

• R-7 derivatives: The original R-7A 8K74 ICBM had been adapted on a crash basis in the late 1950's with addition of third and fourth stages. The design was productionised and standardised by Kozlov in the mid-1960's, using common elements between the configurations, resulting in the following versions: two stage Polyot 11A59, with single-engine third stage Vostok 8A92, with four-engine third stage Soyuz 11A511, and four stages Molniya 8K78.

• Light launch vehicle: To provide a more economical launcher than the R-7 , Yangel developed the Kosmos 63S1, using the R-12 IRBM as the first stage, with a 300 kg payload. It had a relatively poor record of 40 launches with 12 failures. It was replaced by the Kosmos-2/Kosmos 11K63, with a 450 kg payload. From 1966 to 1977, it had a record of 123 launches with 8 failures.

• Light medium launch vehicle: In 1961 Isayev and Reshetnev developed the two stage Kosmos-1 / Kosmos 65S3 / 'Voskhod' launch system on the basis of the Yangel R-14 IRBM. Test launches were conducted from 1965 from the R-16 ICBM Launch Complex 41 at Baikonur. The serial production version was the Kosmos-3 / Kosmos 11K65, built at the Krasnoryarsk Machine Factory. After further development at NPO Polyot, work on the modified Kosmos-3M / Kosmos 11K65M began in 1967. This added a restartable second stage with an orientation system. Flight trials from the Voskhod complex at Plesetsk began in 1967 and it was accepted into military service in December 1971. This booster was launched form two Cusovaya launch complexes from Plesetsk after 1987.

• Medium Launch Vehicle: Chelomei flight tested his UR-200 booster for launch of IS and US satellites, but this was cancelled in 1965. In its place Yangel began development of a launch vehicle derived from his R-36 ICBM with an upper stage. This could put a 3 tonne payload into low earth orbit and was designated Tsyklon-2. Launches began in Baikonur in 1969, and in February 1973 the Tsyklon-2 was accepted into service.

• Heavy Launch Vehicle: Chelomei had developed the Proton 8K82 as a super-ICBM from 1962. The three stage Proton 8K82K and four stage Proton 8K82K / 11S824 versions were developed from 1964 for the manned circumlunar flight program and for launch of heavy probes to Mars and Venus. The booster was not used by the military until 1978. Development was difficult due to the high degree of automation and numerous factory mistakes. Test launches of the boosters were used to orbit the heavy N-4 and N-6 physics satellites.

Continued in Mature First Generation Soviet Space Systems.