Crews are in training for Voskhod, Soyuz, Lunar L-1, Almaz, and 7K-VI missions. There will be 100 cosmonauts in training by February. Meanwhile the Americans have conducted 10 manned flights since the last Soviet manned flight in March 1965. The cosmonauts want Kamanin to be training 8 crews for L-1 translunar flights, but he only has 4 in training. He doesn't think it is worth to train more, since if one successful L-1 flight is conducted before the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Union in November 1957, all subsequent flights will be cancelled.

The cosmonauts are also pressing for a meeting with Brezhnev to discuss planned military experiments, the role of the pilot in spacecraft, and the mistakes of OKB-1 in spacecraft design. Kamanin thinks this would be too risky - unforeseen results could occur. Titov is assigned to the Spiral spaceplane programme. Kamanin thinks the project is risky and likely to be cancelled. But Titov enjoys being able to fly high performance MiG-21 aircraft, and has wanted out of the main cosmonaut program for a long time. There is constant high level pressure on Kamanin to assign OKB-1 engineer cosmonaut candidates to crews and fly them.

At a meeting of the VPK Military-Industrial Commission and Chief Designers current manned space plans are reviewed.

The cosmonauts are currently organised in the following training groups:

- 7K-OK Soyuz: Commanders: Gagarin, Nikolayev, Komarov, Bykovskiy, Beregovoi, Shatalov; EVA teams: Khrunov-Yeliseyev, Gorbatko-Kubasov, Kolodin-Volkov
- L1 missions with 'embarkation' in low earth orbit profile: Commanders: Leonov, Popovich, Belyayev, Volynov, Klimuk; Engineer-cosmonauts: Makarov, Voronov, Rukavishnikov, Artyukhin
- L1 with single-launch direct flight to the moon misison profile: Gagarin, Nikolayev, Komarov, Bykovskiy, Khrunov; Engineer-Cosmonauts: Gorbatko, Grechko, Sevastyanov, Kubasov, Volkov

It is proposed at the meeting that the L1 fly with only one cosmonaut aboard. A bitter argument ensues.

The following is the schedule set be decree for the L1 and L3 projects:

Serial # Mission               Date
2P       Develop Block D stage Feb or Mar 67
3P       same                  Mar 67
4L       Unmanned lunar flyby  May 67
5L       Unmanned lunar flyby  Jun 67
6L       Manned lunar flyby    Jun or Jul 67
7L&8L    Manned lunar flybys   Aug 67
9L&10L   Manned lunar flybys   Sep 67
11L&12L  Manned lunar flybys   Oct 67
13L      Reserve spacecraft
 
N1-3L
Serial # Mission                  Date
3L       Develop LV & Blocks G&D  Sep 67
4L       Reserve
5L       LOK/LK unmanned          Dec 67
6L       LOK/LK unmanned          Feb 68
7L       Manned LOK/unmanned LK   Apr 68
8L       Manned LOK/unmanned LK   Jun 68
9L       Piloted LOK/unmanned LK 
         with LK landing on moon  Aug 68
10L      First men land on moon   Sep 68
11L      Reserve
12L      Reserve

Titov visits Kamanin on leave from test pilot duties at Vladimirovka. Titov will spend a year training as a test pilot on MiG-21, Su-7, and Su-9 aircraft. He flies well, and has matured and changed for the better over the last two years. Kamanin has talked to him 3 or 4 times about his future plans. Titov has bound his future with the Spiral spaceplane programme.

Kamanin cannot convince him to work on the manned lunar landing programme instead. Kamanin cannot understand why Titov is not interested in landing on the moon. Kamanin was 60 and could not qualify for spaceflight, but would have jumped at the chance to walk on the moon if younger. Titov's position seemed to be based on his belief that the space programme managers would have no faith on his ability to make another spaceflight after the problems he had with space sickness on Vostok 2.

Meanwhile Nikolayev has injured himself when trying to close the BO airlock hatch on the Soyuz mock-up, removing 20-25 mm of scalp in the process. Things are going badly with Soyuz training at Baikonur. The flight spacecraft has no crew seats, and is lacking the orientation system and other equipment. Therefore the cosmonauts have to occupy themselves with basic classroom training. Their time would have been more productively used in Moscow.

UR-500K/L1 project will consist of three phases. Phase I will be dedicated to development of the Block D translunar stage, using prototype, incomplete L1 spacecraft. Phase II will conduct lunar flybys with complete but unmanned L1 spacecraft. Phase III will fly Soviet cosmonauts around the moon. The N1/L3 project will consist of five phases. Phase I will use the N1 and the 7K-L1A spacecraft. This will be used primarily to test out the Block G translunar and Block D lunar orbit insertion stages, but will also conduct lunar flybys, returning photographs of the lunar surface to the earth. Phase II will use N1's to fly L3 spacecraft with an unpiloted LOK lunar orbiter and an unpiloted LK lunar lander. Phase III, the first manned missions, will use N1's to fly L3 spacecraft with a piloted LOK lunar orbiter and an unpiloted LK lunar lander. Phase IV will fly a piloted LOK lunar orbiter and an unpiloted LK lunar lander, that will be landed on the lunar surface. In Phase V N1-L3 number 10L is to launch the first manned landing on the moon in September 1968. N1-L3 numbers 11L and 12L were back-ups, in the event any of the planned earlier missions failed.

The detailed schedule was as follows:

UR-500/L1 flights

Phase I:
Vehicle 2P - Complete manufacture: 1966 December; Launch: 1967 February (delayed to March 10)
Vehicle 3P - Complete manufacture: 1967 February; Launch: 1967 March
Phase II:
Vehicle 4L - Complete manufacture: 1967 February; Launch: 1967 May
Vehicle 5L - Complete manufacture: 1967 March; Launch: 1967 June
Phase III:
Vehicle 6L - Complete manufacture: 1967 April; Launch: 1967 July
Vehicle 7L - Complete manufacture: 1967 May; Launch: 1967 August
Vehicle 8L - Complete manufacture: 1967 June; Launch: 1967 August
Vehicle 9L - Complete manufacture: 1967 July; Launch: 1967 September
Vehicle 10L - Complete manufacture: 1967 August; Launch: 1967 September
Vehicle 11L - Complete manufacture: 1967 August; Launch: 1967 October
Vehicle 12L - Complete manufacture: 1967 September; Launch: 1967 October
Vehicle 13L - Complete manufacture: 1967 September (back-up)

N1 flights

Phase I:
Vehicle 3L - Complete manufacture: 1967 June; Launch: 1967 September
Vehicle 4L - Complete manufacture: 1967 December (back-up)
Phase II:
Vehicle 5L - Complete manufacture: 1967 October; Launch: 1967 December
Vehicle 6L - Complete manufacture: 1967 December; Launch: 1968 February
Phase III:
Vehicle 7L - Complete manufacture: 1968 February; Launch: 1968 April
Vehicle 8L - Complete manufacture: 1968 April; Launch: 1968 June
Phase IV:
Vehicle 9L - Complete manufacture: 1968 June; Launch: 1968 August
Phase V:
Vehicle 10L - Complete manufacture: 1968 August; Launch: 1968 Sep
Vehicle 11L - Complete manufacture: 1968 October (back-up)
Vehicle 12L - Complete manufacture: 1968 December (back-up)

The Soyuz 1/2 crews had planned to depart for Baikonur on 30 March, but Mishin wants to push this forward to the night of 17/18 March. This disrupts all of Kamanin's training plans and shows the poor planning and work of Mishin and his followers. A Soyuz state commission is held. Kamanin doesn't trust Mishin. The spacecraft is unreliable and incompletely tested. But it is decided all the conditions exist for a launch of the mission on 20-25 April. The question of Gagarin flying on the mission is brought up. The Communist Party says he is too valuable to risk on further spaceflights. Kamanin is against making him a living 'museum exhibit'. Smirnov agrees to raise the matter with the Politburo.

The cosmonauts have given up on further training at Baikonur due to the incomplete state of the spacecraft and returned to Moscow. Kamanin wanted to confront Mishin on the issue - this was all his fault, six days wasted - but Mishin never even showed up on the plane for the flight to Baikonur.

Kerimov argued with Mishin that without any logical reason his demand that the cosmonauts go to the cosmodrome for training has disrupted their preparation schedule. Later Kamanin met with Gagarin, Leonov, Volynov, and Makarov, all selected as pilots for L1 lunar flybys. The L1 flight scenario was still open. Variant 1 would involve launch of two spacecraft, with transfer of one to two crew to the translunar spacecraft in earth orbit. Variant 2 would be a direct flight to the moon.

No flightworthy lunar spacecraft or trainers have been completed yet, making it impossible to solve many questions of how to equip the spacecraft. Kamanin continues to argue with Mishin and OKB-1 over the background of the lunar lander pilot for L3 missions. Mishin wants him to be an engineer instead of an Air Force pilot. But it would take two to three years to train an engineer, and they have only 15 months until the planned date for the lunar landing.

A State Commission is held on the impending L1 translunar flights. A major issue is the L1 tracking/recovery radio beacon and the Zarya-3 deep space communications system. Launches of prototype L1P spacecraft are planned for April and May, with the first all-up L1 in June. All commission members are confident a Soviet man will the first around the moon by the end of the year. The State Commission also considers the pending Soyuz 1 / Soyuz 2 flight.

Kamanin examines maps of the moon, executed at scales of 1:5,000,000 and 1:10,000,000. 2000 are to be printed for use by the cosmonauts in preparation for the Soviet lunar landings. Mishin doesn't see the point - he is very aggressively anti-pilot for his lunar spacecraft.

Ustinov reviews the cosmonauts. Kamanin urges that a manual docking be allowed on the Soyuz 1/2 mission - he had argued the same point with Korolev before his death. Komarov say he can accomplish a manual docking from 350 km range (once the Igla automatic system has brought him there from 23 km range). There follows a discussion of an all-female flight. Four female cosmonauts would be assigned to the mission, and Kamanin would need 5 to 6 months to complete there training. The mission is designated 'Voskhod-6'.

Protoype Soyuz 7K-L1 manned circumlunar spacecraft. There are high winds for the L1 launch, 15-17 m/s. The official limit is 20 m/s, but Chelomei wants to scrub the launch if winds go over 15 m/s. Nevertheless the launch proceeds in 17-18 m/s winds and the L1 reached earth orbit. However the Block D translunar injection stage failed to fire (ullage rockets, which had to fire to settle propellants in tanks before main engine fired, were jettisoned prematurely). The failure is blamed on Mishin and has Tsybin seething in anger. Mishin is disorganised and has made many mistakes. Spacecraft burned up two days later when orbit decayed. Later in the day comes the news the RTS has to be replaced on one of the Soyuz 1/2 spacecraft. This will have a 3 to 4 day schedule impact, and push the launch back to 15-20 April. The crews arrive the same day for the upcoming Soyuz launch.

The cosmonauts began work at 10:30 in the morning, and didn't complete work until 23:30 at night. They spent 16 hours working on Cosmonaut's Day, due to the criminally chaotic performance of TsKBEM. The cosmonauts have to train simultaneously for the Soyuz and L1 missions. Kamanin warns Kerimov about the unacceptable situation. Grechko arrives to head the state commission. The launch of Soyuz 1 is set for 24-25 April - there will be only eight days to fix all of the problems. The energy and optimism of Korolev is sorely missed. Mishin was a poor deputy, and a worse leader - his constant mistakes and stupidity delay work and aggravate people. The cosmonauts have to keep in shape by playing tennis, but there is only one court at Tyuratam - a second court is to be built eventually (!)

The cosmonauts are completely trained, ready for launch at any time with four hours notice. Then Mishin calls Ustinov and tells him that their training is what is holding up the Soyuz 1 launch! From the point of view of the military quality assurance inspectors, there are 100 unresolved discrepancies on Soyuz 1 - the spacecraft is a piece of shit.

The Soyuz 2 crew trains from 15:00 to 20:00 - they had to wait due to problems with the spacecraft, but then the training went all right. The argument continues on whether to do an automatic or a manual docking. The design bureau wants to use the Igla automatic system; the cosmonauts want to do it manually. They have done 800 dockings in the simulator, so they should know best, in Kamanin's opinion. They want to let the automatic system take the spacecraft up to 50 to 70 m from the target, then use manual maneuvering to proceed to dock. The number two valve on the Soyuz 1 spacecraft's nitrogen tank was inadvertently opened during preparation. It was said not to be serious, but the problems are getting on everyone's nerves.

150 people attend. The readiness of the spacecraft and launch vehicles are confirmed. The final responsibilities and schedule are approved. Everything is go. Afterwards there is a meeting with Mishin. He is mainly worried about two things that could cause them to scrub the launch of the second Soyuz: a failure of the Igla automatic docking system or the solar panels on Soyuz 1.

Space disaster that put back Soviet lunar program 18 months. Soyuz 1 as active spacecraft was launched first. Soyuz 2, with a 3 man crew would launch the following day, with 2 cosmonauts spacewalking to Soyuz 1. However immediately after orbital insertion Komarov's problems started. One of the solar panels failed to deploy, staying wrapped around the service module. Although only receiving half of the planned solar power, an attempt was made to manoeuvre the spacecraft. This failed because of interference of the reaction control system exhaust with the ion flow sensors that were one of the Soyuz' main methods of orientation.

Kamanin' account: Before the launch, the cosmonauts have a special meeting with VVS Marshals, and confirm the technical readiness and reliability of the spacecraft. The launch proceeded normally. On the second orbit, Komarov reported: 'Conditions are poor. The cabin parameters are normal, but the left solar panel didn't deploy. The electrical bus is at only 13 to 14 amps. The HF communications are not working. I cannot orient the spacecraft to the sun. I tried orienting the spacecraft manually using the DO-1 orientation engines, but the pressure remaining on the DO-1 has gone down to 180.' Komarov was ordered to continue orienting to the sun using the DO-1, as this would still be the most economical use of fuel and energy. A few minurtes later two 3-channel telemetry signals were received. Yegorov said these showed cabin pressure 560 mm and zero pressure in the DO-1 - obviously incorrect values. Komarov was asked what his cockpit readings were - '760 mm pressure in the cabin, 180 on DO-1, and 14 amps on the power bus. Solar batteries not deployed, cannot orient to the sun' was the reply. It was clear that the spacecraft could not fly for three days in these conditions. After five hours of trying, Komarov still could not orient to the sun. The ion sensors were not working, and manual orientation was difficult. Between the 7th and 13th revolutions there were no communications with the capsule. It was not within the radius of UHF ground stations and the HF communications were not working. The time was allocated to crew rest, and Komarov in any case had to convserve his use of electricity.

The decision was made to bring Komarov back due to an undeployed solar panel which reduced electrical power and blocked orientation sensors. Re-entry was successful and the drag chute deployed. However due to a flaw during manufacture, the parachute compartment housing was too rough and the main parachute would not deploy. Komarov released the reserve chute, but it became tangled with the drag chute. The descent module crashed into a field near Orenburg at 03:24 GMT.

Kamanin' account: Kamanin flew to the Command Point at Yevpatoriya to join Gagarin. Meanwhile the decision had been taken to return the spacecraft to earth. Keldysh, Kerimov, and Tyulin wanted to terminate the flight on the 17th revolution, but Mishin wanted to proceed with the full flight program. A decision needed to be taken by revolution 13 to allow landing on revolutions 17, 18, or 19. On orbit 13 Komarov was requested to orient the spacecraft using the ion sensors and manually. Repeated attempts were unsuccessful. The situation was clear. The Soyuz 2 launch would have to be cancelled, and all efforts had to concentrate on the successful landing of Soyuz 1.

There were three orientation systems on the Soyuz: the astro-inertial system (which was blocked by the unfolded left solar panel), the ion system (which was unreliable due to ion holes), and the manual system using the Vzor device. The problem with the manual system was that it could only be used on the dayside of the planet, and for a 05:30 retrofire on the 17th revolution the earth would be in shadow. Therefore it was decided to make a first landing attempt on the 17th revolution using the ion system. It seemed clear to Kamanin that this was a mistake. Nevertheless on revolutions 15 and 16 Komarov prepared for landing using the ion system. In the event, it did not function. There was no time left to set up for a manual retrofire on revolution 18.

Kamanin had no choice but to inform Marshal Rudenko that a landing on the 18th revolution was not possible due to Mishin's mismanagement. Komarov would have to wait until the 19th revolution and then attempt a manual orientation for retrofire with landing near Orsk. A method was worked out to accomplish this. Komarov was to orient the spacecraft manually on the dayside, spin up the gyro platform, and then use this to orient on the night side for retrofire. Telemetry showed that this was successful -- the TDU engine functioned normally, and a signal of parachute deployment was received from the capsule 65 km east of Orsk. However the main parachute did not fully deploy and the reserve parachute did not fully inflate. The capsule crashed into the ground at 30-40 m/s. Kamanin departed Yevpatoriya and arrived at 06:45 in Orsk. What was left of Komarov's body was an irregular lump 30 cm in diameter and 80 cm long. Three hours later Keldysh, Tyulin, Rudenko, and other State Commission members visited the site. At 21:45 Kamanin accompanied Komarov's body to the Orsk aerordorme, where it was loaded on an Il-18. Ten minutes before departure an An-12 landed with Kuznetsov and several cosmonauts. Kamanin landed in Moscow in the wee hours of the morning. The aircraft had to divert to Sheremetovo since all the other airfields around Moscow were socked in. Then he had to wait 90 minutes on the ground until the ground transportation showed up. The orders were that Komarov's remains were to be photographed, then immediately cremated so that a state burial in the Kremlin wall could take place. The remains underwent a quick autopsy that morning, then were cremated.

Komarov's ashes are interred in the wall of the Kremlin.

Ustinov convened the commission at noon. The work was to be completed by 15 May, and the final report issued by 25 May. The members of the commission would be Ustinov, Smirnov, Serbin, Afanasyev, the Chief Designers, and Gagarin. 22 members would work in seven subcommittees that would:

• Investigate design and test of the spacecraft structures
• Investigate design and test of the landing and parachute systems
• Investigate design and test of the orientation and guidance systems
• Study the performance of the tracking, communications, and flight ground control systems
• Investigate design and test of the launch system
• Analyse the contents of the Mir-3 flight data recorder, telemetry, and space-to-earth communications
• Review the design and as-built documentation for the spacecraft, subsystems, training program, flight plan, and the on-board flight log

Review of progress on the L1 trainer MN-17, consisting of the SA and NO of the spacecraft It was built by the Factory Brigade headed by Darevskiy and was finished three to four weeks ago. But there is still the question of the cosmonauts conducting autonomous navigation. Tyulin and Mishin promised a solution long ago, but nothing has been delivered to date.

According to a Tass report, 11 cosmonauts have died - Dolgov, Mikhailov, Grachev, etc. However these men were not cosmonauts, though Kamanin notes that they did work in 1961-1963 at the Institute of Aviation and Space Medicine.

Gagarin and Leonov meet with Kamanin. They discuss the complete inadequacy of Mishin - his excitability, poor knowledge of the Soyuz spacecraft and the details of its operation, his lack of cooperation in working with the cosmonauts in flight and training activities. They urge that these facts be documented in the Komarov crash commission report. Problems are discussed with getting an additional Tu-104 for zero-G/one sixth-G training. Three are needed, and only two have been made available. Even these two can only be used for 23 flights up to 10 August, after which they must be sent away for ejection seat modifications.

Tyulin calls Kamanin. He reports that all of the Chief Designers are in favour of direct L1 flight to the moon instead of the earth orbit rendezvous method. However the Central Committee wants to see four consecutive successful unmanned flights, rather than two, before a manned L1 flight can be made.

Aboard Mishin's aircraft, he discusses his plans with Kamanin. He plans to launch two unmanned Soyuz spacecraft in the second half of July. An automated docking will be attempted, but the mission will be considered successful if the spacecraft rendezvous in space and approach to within 50 to 70 m of each other. He expects to follow this in August with a manned rendezvous, docking, and crew transfer mission. Two further pairs of spacecraft will be available by November 1967. This means a total of eight crews, including back-up crews, will have to be trained. He wants Feoktistov to fly on one of these missions. Kamanin tells Mishin that it will take two to three months to prepare Feoktistov for flight and will be too disruptive to flight training. After arriving at Fedosiya they attend a Soyuz 1 State Commission meeting from 10:00 to 13:00. Tests of the Soyuz parachute system are to be conducted beginning 14 May, on two mass models and one Soyuz mock-up.

In the first drop, the reserve parachute didn't open. In the second test, it did inflate, but only after a delay of twenty seconds. TsAGI studies show the drogue chute is creating an area of turbulence in the wake of the capsule, and the reserve chute is deploying right into that zone of chaotic air, preventing it from inflating. Tests on the parachute show that while it was designed to deploy with 1.8 tonnes of drag force from the drogue chute, it actually requires 3-4 tonnes of force to pull the packed parachute out of the container and allow parachute deployment. The parachute fails at 8 tonne load. The Soyuz parachute system is supposed to have a reliability of 95% ... and this essential problem was unknown...

The drop of the Soyuz 1 mock-up at Fedosiya was cancelled due to the great likelihood of loss of the spacecraft and the low likelihood of obtaining any new data as a result. The LII assessment of the parachute system has been completed:

• The likely cause of non-deployment of the primary parachute on Soyuz 1 was insufficient drag force created by the drogue chute to pull it out of the container (the drogue needs to produce 3 tonnes of force, but tests show only 1.1 to 1.8 tonnes of force are being produced at an ambient pressure of 0.67 atmospheres)
• The reliable operation of the reserve parachute and the drogue parachute at the same time was never demonstrated in trials. The chance of them getting tangled was actually very likely.

• Remove the reserve parachute and have a system of two main parachutes, with landing possible even if one of the main chutes does not deploy
• Develop through extensive actual testing reliable inflation of the drogue chute
• Add controls to allow manual parachute deployment by the crew, with appropriate cockpit instruments
• Increase the jettison time of the heat shield from 60.7 seconds to 100 seconds after parachute deployment to allow the full interval for operation of the automatic landing system.

The conclusions of the LII study are found to be sound, but it would take months or even years to implement such an extensive spacecraft redesign. Mishin is still under orders to fly a manned mission around the moon by the 50th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution in October.

Afanasyev, Kerimov, and Tyulin object to Kamanin's conclusion that problems exist with the automated landing system and that a manual backup is needed. They want to find fault only with the parachute. The findings of VVS LII, and TsAGI are discussed. Later Kamanin has an unpleasant conversation with Gagarin. He wants to remove control of the manned flight control centre away from the MOM. Kamanin believes this is contrary to the interests of the Ministry of Defence.

Tkachev, chief designer of parachute systems, rejects the findings of the Soyuz 1 state commission. His objections are overruled. The final decision is to adopt the conclusions of the commission in their entirety. Two unmanned Soyuz flights will take place in August, followed by manned flight in September. However the manned flights will go ahead only if the unmanned flights are entirely 'clean' - without any deviations. Beregovoi and Volynov are to head the first two crews.

Kamanin observes in his diary that there will be no way a Soviet cosmonaut will fly in space in 1967 and blames it all on Mishin.

He faults Mishin for:

- Idiotic insistence on fully automatic manned spacecraft
- Frivolous refusal to fly 'old' spacecraft like Vostok or Voskhod
- Haste in preparation of new spacecraft of the Soyuz series
- Weakness in sticking to unrealistic schedule wishes of Communist Party and government management (notably Smirnov and Pashkov)
- Terrible lack of discipline of his staff, leading to inability to fully execute government decrees
- Complete lack of co-operation with other design bureaux and government agencies.

Kamanin observes that Mishin is trying to take Korolev's place, but lacks Korolev's authority, organisational talent, and unsurpassed ability to motivate and energise people. Mishin has no authority, no talent, and actually demotivates his subordinates. He micromanages and insists on sticking his nose into everything.

Mishin keeps pushing and pushing for Feoktistov to be named a Soyuz spacecraft commander. Kamanin believes this is impossible. The Communist Party requires years of training before a cosmonaut can be appointed to such a position. This Feoktistiov does not have, and besides his vision is far below requirements. The VVS categorically rejects Feoktistov for such duty, but Mishin will not take no for an answer.

Problems are identified with the parachutes and oxygen regeneration system which must be solved before the first manned flight.

Mishin is seen as jeopardising Soviet manned lunar plans. He has no understanding of the necessity of providing proper training simulators to prepare the cosmonauts for flight. He is coarse, rude, doesn't listen to critics, and ignores the comments of those who will have to fly aboard his spacecraft. The cosmonauts agree they should request a meeting with Brezhnev and tell him flat out - there will be no moon landing as long as Mishin is in charge.

In his plan for using Feoktistov as a commander cosmonaut, Mishin has lied to party and government managers. Now the only ones not supporting Feoktistov's appointment as a Soyuz commander are Kamanin and the cosmonauts.

The Soyuz simulator has not been functional for three months -- entirely the fault of Mishin and Tsybin. The L1 trainer has not been finished, and the autonomous navigation system has not completed development. There are two prototype electronic computers at TsKBEM, but they are not complete and don't work. The first L1 spacecraft was to fly in May, but it is now clear it won't be ready until September at the earliest. There will be no manned lunar flyby for the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution as was ordered by the Party.

Feoktistov visits the cosmonaut centre. To meet Mishin's wishes, he must complete the 30 month cosmonaut training curriculum in two months. He is told flat out he doesn't meet the physical standards required for a pilot.

Two planning documents are discussed. The first deals with the training of civilian cosmonauts. Two phases of training are planned, the first phase at MOM institutes and Minzorar, the second at TsPK and the VVS. In addition 50 new air force pilots will be identified for space duty in three groups in 1968, 1969, and 1970. They will be ready for the planned large number of 7K-VI and Almaz flights beginning in 1972. Brezhnev would like to see more Voskhod flights. Meanwhile Titov has qualified as a test pilot third class, and will qualify as second class by the end of the year. All in all, things are looking good in the years ahead.

The Volga and Soyuz trainers are to be finally operational on 10 and 20 August respectively. The L1 trainer is not progressing and the L3 trainer exists only on paper. The lead cosmonauts have decided to boycott Feoktistov. Nikolayev and Bykovskiy simply refuse to fly with him. They feel Feoktistov's poor vision could result in a catastrophe in a docking attempt, resulting in the death of the crews of both spacecraft involved. The IMBP agrees - 'we can't put an invalid into space'....

The Soviet leadership has decided Gagarin is too important a propaganda asset to take any risks with his life. He is removed from the list of cosmonauts to be selected for space flights, and will be allowed to fly aircraft only with an instructor aboard. This ruling overrules a promise made by Kamanin to Gagarin that he would be put back on the flight rosterthat after he obtained his engineering diploma from the Zhukovskiy Academy on 1 May 1968. A vote is taken of the cosmonaut selection commission on Feoktistov's fitness for duty. The vote is 4:4, but then a quorum of at least 12 commission members is demanded. Feoktistov passes 9:8 in the final vote.

Gorbatko shows heart abnormalities in his EKG during a run on the TBK-60 centrifuge.

Cosmonaut Gulyayev has hit his head on a stone when diving in the Kholodniy River. Feoktistov continues his attempt to complete 30 months of command cosmonaut training in 75 days. The makes ten dockings in the Volga trainer - 8 of the are rated as 'bad'.

Sterilisation and quarantine of the L3 spacecraft on its return from the moon is discussed.

Over 200 recommendations were made for revision of the parachute system, and all of these had to be made over the last two to three months. There have been 30 drops of the FAB-3000 Soyuz capsule mass simulator and two drops of capsule mock-ups. The entire series of tests is due to be completed by 20 September. This will allow flight of the first two manned spacecraft on 15 to 20 October. The commission is split over the selection of Feoktistov for the flight. It has to be referred to Smirnov and Ustinov for a final decision.

The 7K-VI military Soyuz was supposed to have been built on the basis of the 7K-OK model, with a first flight in December 1967. After all the problems with the 7K-OK, Kozlov replaced most subsystems and ended up with a basically new spacecraft, the Zvezda, which will have a mass of 6.3 to 6.6 tonnes. Officially first flight was set for the second half of 1968, but Kozlov says that even a flight in 1969 may not be possible. They simply can't meet the 21 July 1967 decree to have the spacecraft in service in 1968 - they need a further 18 to 24 months of development time. In Kamanin's opinion, this whole approach has been mismanaged. Urgent military experiments could have been flying long ago on a series of Voskhod flights. Furthermore there is no trainer yet for the 7K-VI. Kozlov says simply that he is not responsible for providing a trainer. Resort has to be made to a new design bureau set up specifically to produce simulators, headed by Darevskiy.

Mishin certifies that the spacecraft will be delivered on 13-14 September, so launch is set for the window of 25-27 September. There are two recovery zones: Baikonur is the prime, with the Indian Ocean as secondary in case of a ballistic re-entry.

The first military combat space units are to be formed - for operations with the 7K-VI and Almaz spacecraft, together with subsidiary Soyuz transport and training flights.

Vershinin writes a letter to Smirnov on the subject of Feoktistov. He tells Smirnov he is not ready to be a spacecraft commander.

The general staff's space plans are impressive - in 1968-1975 they foresee no less than 20 Almaz space stations, 50 military 7K-VI missions, 200 Soyuz training spacecraft flights and 400 Soyuz space transport flights. This is based on the assumption that the crew of the military space stations will have to be rotated every 15 days. That will require 48 transport spacecraft per year, implying not less than 30 ready crews with 3 cosmonauts in each crew (this in turn implies each each cosmonaut will fly a space mission 1.5 times per year). Since supplies will have to be delivered to the stations, that will require another 200 additional transport spacecraft launches. And all of this is aside from civilian Soyuz flights, L1, L3, and various other civilian spacecraft - implying a total of 1000 launches in the period. This will require 800 Soyuz-class launch vehicles, 100 Protons, and 10 to 12 N1 boosters. The inevitable conclusion for Kamanin is that most of the transport launches should be made by a reusable winged spacecraft, air-launched from an An-22 heavy transport. This is the goal of the Spiral project. By 1975 Kamanin sees a requirement for 400 active cosmonauts, organised in two to three aerospace brigades, supported by10 aviation regiments, and including the TsPK training centre -- altogether 20,000 to 25,000 men. 250 million roubles will be needed to build new aerodromes and facilities alone, all chargeable to the VVS. Total cost will run into tens of billions of roubles per year.

The cosmonauts are training at Area 113, and the launch will be from Area 81. The State Commission meets from 15:00 to 18:30. So far there have been six successful Proton flights and only one failure. The Proton assembly was completed in 71 working days. UR-500 s/n 7 for this launch had 138 systems requiring rework at the launch site and 120 discrepancies (an increase: Proton number 5 for the first L1 launch had 208 reworks/223 discrepancies, while Proton number 6 for the first L1 launch was down to 70 reworks/194 defects). The L1 spacecraft had 15 notable defects on delivery, but this had increased to 100 by the time of the commission. Therefore Mishin should not be certifying readiness for launch. Manned flight to the moon requires a total mission probability of 0.99 to 0.9999, and Mishin puts the current Proton/L1 system reliability at only 0.6. It certainly has to be better- this is an 'all-up mission'. It will be the world's first re-entry at parabolic velocity. On return from the moon the spacecraft has to hit a re-entry corridor only 30 km across. The range of possible touchdown points extends along a 400 km wide corridor stretching from the equator to the North Pole, and extending over the Indian Ocean, India, Central Asia, and Siberia.

The booster was supposed to be launched by 1966, but there is no way it will be finished this year, and it is highly questionable it will even get off the ground in 1968. The N1 tanks are pressurised to 2 atmospheres, and can go up to three atmospheres in an emergency. In the enormous MIK assembly hall are three N1's - one 'iron bird' ground test model and two flight vehicles. The first roll out of the mock-up will take place in 1967, and the first launch attempt is still expected in 1968 (the first launch will not be attempted until the second and third stages complete stand tests. There is no test stand for the first stage, it will be fired for the first time in flight). An explosion would destroy the pad, requiring several years of repairs. There are two pads, but even that would not be a guarantee of the availability of the rocket due to the poor expected initial reliability. The N1 project is costing 10 billion roubles, not including considerable investment required by the military. To Kamanin the whole thing is a boondoggle, showing the necessity for development of lighter air-launched boosters. He believes there are many mistakes in design and construction, but Mishin, Pashkov, Smirnov, and Ustinov support these doubtful projects of Korolev and Mishin, instead of technically sound projects such as Chelomei's UR-700 or MiG's air-launched spacecraft. If Mishin thinks the current Proton/L1 reliability is only 0.6, then that of the completely unproved N1/L3 must be even less...

The L1 in preparation at Area 31 will not be ready for the planned 20 October launch due to delays in qualification of the parachute system at Fedosiya. No launch attempt now expected until November.

Proton s/n 229 and L1 s/n 4L are ready for launch. There remain communications problems, including the 3-channel telemetry and the SAS abort system. Launch is set for 28 September, landing after return from the moon on 4 October at 19:52, 200 to 300 km north of Dzhezkazgan. At Area 31 there is a problem with the solar cells on the Soyuz. They have to be replaced, which means acceptance tests will have to start all over. At Fedosiya parachute trials are still experiencing delays.

First attempted circumlunar flight. The UR-500K failed, crashing 50 to 60 km from the launch pad. The L1 radio beacon was detected 65 km north of the Baikonur aerodrome by an Il-14 search aircraft. An Mi-6 helicopter recovered the capsule and had it back to the cosmodrome by 13:30. Mishin's record: of seven launches of the Soyuz and L1, only one has been successful. Film of the launch shows that one engine of the first stage failed. Mishin still wants to launch the next L1 by 28 October. The other chief designers oppose the move. Barmin says at least five months are needed to diagnose the cause of the failures and makes fixes to ensure they don't happen again. Nevertheless the leadership sides with Mishin, and Barmin is ordered to prepare the left Proton pad for a launch within 30 to 40 days.

The moon landing has already been delayed three to four years due to the mistakes of Mishin. Kamanin feels his mortality, the limited number of years remaining in his life, and is furious that Mishin is wasting time when life is so short for everyone.

The statues are unveiled at the space monument in Moscow, in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the launch of Sputnik. The opening also marks the first screening of a new film devoted to the Soviet space program, the first to publicly reveal the configuration of the Vostok booster and spacecraft and show actual launches from Baikonur.

They need to complete 70 drops, which normally would take five to six months. Mishin still insists that they be completed by 1 November. Three tests are made in one day, a record, including the drop of a Soyuz mock-up at 17:55 from an An-12. The parachute deployed correctly, but the soft landing system fired at 2000 m instead of 1.2 m. The spacecraft hit the ground on its side at 8 m/s. Because of the angle of impact the crew seat shock absorbers couldn't function. If any cosmonauts had been aboard, they would have suffered serious trauma.

In Moscow, Mishin heads a meeting of all the Chief Designers (including Chelomei, Mishin, and Glushko). Glushko says that the last UR-500K failure was due to errors made during manufacture of an engine in 1965 at Factory 19 at Perm. Ustinov notes that the failure has cost the state 100 million roubles and has delayed the program two to three months. He brutally attacks Dementiev, Minister of Aviation Industry, for the poor work of his factories on the space program. Another issue is continued delays in the Salyut computer for the L1. Ustinov orders an alternate technical solution to be developed in parallel with the digital computer development. The next Soyuz flight is set for the end of December, the next L1 attempt for 21-22 November.

The meeting is headed by Afanasyev. The first N1 will have a payload of only 76 tonnes, versus the 95 tonnes required for the L3 lunar landing complex. In order to land two cosmonauts on the moon, as the Americans are planning, a 105 tonne low earth orbit payload would be needed. This would require new engines in the first and second stages. Kuznetsov says that his 153 tonne engine could be uprated to 170 tonnes without any basic changes. Lox/LH2 engines would be needed for the upper stages. Keldysh questions the safety of the current plan of landing only one cosmonaut on the moon. Mishin replies that putting two cosmonauts on the moon simply is not possible with the N1. Chelomei raises a question - How is it possible that the Americans have built he Saturn V, which can put 130 tonnes in low earth orbit, in order to land two men on the moon, and Mishin says he can do the same mission with 105 tonnes? Mishin claims that this is due to the lighter design and construction of the L3. The following decisions are made:

• The first Soviet flight to he moon will use the current plan - one N1 launch, one cosmonaut on the moon.
• Special measures must be taken to ensure the safety of that single cosmonaut
• A new N1 model is to be developed to land the new L5 spacecraft (which will be able to handle 4 to 5 crew, 1.5 to 2.0 tonnes of scientific equipment, and spend three months on the lunar surface). This is to be ready two to three years after the first landing.
• The Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Defence, and MOM are to develop a program of military and scientific experiments to be carried aboard the L3
• The next meeting of the lunar soviet will be in November/December 1967

Mishin sends a letter to Afanasyev and Smirnov, proposing to cancel the Kozlov's 7K-VI military version of Soyuz. It is an unnecessary new spacecraft design, he says. As an alternative Mishin proposes to double to 8 to 10 the number of flights of the existing Soyuz design planned for 1968. Kamanin is astounded. Mishin was never opposed to Kozlov's 7K-VI before. No one had ever indicated that the VI had to be a precise copy of the Soyuz. The military is opposed to the move. On another matter, Kamanin sends a letter to Mishin, complaining about the L1 trainer provided - the simulator is not representative of the actual spacecraft. Meanwhile the second test of a Soyuz mock-up is made at the parachute trials at Fedosiya. It proceeds normally, and the test clears the way for an unmanned space flight of the redesigned Soyuz.

Attending are Kuznetsov, Gagarin, Khlebnikov. There are three training groups: Soyuz, L1, and L3. Mishin and the MOM are holding up further training of cosmonauts until the VVS agrees to accept Mishin's candidates from TsKBEM. In any case, Mishin's attitude is that 'automation in space is everything. Humans in space are only supposed to monitor the operation of automated systems'. L3 cosmonauts selected by the VVS are: Leonov, Bykovsky, Nikolayev, Popovich, Voronov, Khrunov, Gorbatko, Artyukhin, Kubasov, Makarov, and Rukavishnikov. The official requirements: balanced composition of a crew according to mass requirements (no more than 70 kg weight per cosmonaut), and the ability to monitor fully automated function of the L3. According to official documents, the crew's primary function is to guide the flight, but now Mishin intends that their primary role will be as subjects of psychological and physical observations to establish the adaptation of the human organism to space flight).

A further test of the Soyuz landing system went all right, if you don't consider the fact that the 'Tor' altimeter triggered the braking system 3.3 seconds early. One certainly couldn't say, as a result of only these two successful tests, that the system was reliable. The system uses a gamma altimeter, with redundant verification using pulses from HF and UHF antennae. The system has been approved for unmanned flights, but needs additional tests before it can be certified for manned flights. Kholdokov wants the VVS to take over not just trials, but all further development of the landing system, since Mishin and Tkachev are unable to deliver a reliable product. But such a decision can only be taken jointly by the VVS and RVSN.

There have been many improvements and additional qualification tests conducted since the Soyuz 1 crash, notably to the parachute system. MAP, TsAGI, LII, and the VVS want the L1 to have a reserve parachute as well, but Mishin rejects the recommendation -- it would cost 200 kg extra mass, and there are absolutely no reserves in the L1.

First Mishin was pushing the 60-year-old Anokhin for spaceflight, now the invalid Feoktistov. Feoktistiov suffers from gastrointestinal ulcers. Tyulin and Kerimov are of one voice in the matter - this is not even a question that can be raised - sick is sick, period. The L1 and L3 crews will have to endure eight to ten days of orbital flight. They can only be between 170 and 175 cm tall, and can have a maximum weight of 70 kg. Mishin insists that he doesn't even need military pilots for the L1 and L3, and therefore doesn't need to decide crew compositions until the middle of 1968, and then only 'his' engineer cosmonauts from TsKBEM should be considered. The Marshal interrupts Mishin, angrily reminding him that the space program is a national enterprise, not something being accomplished by 'your' spacecraft or 'your' cosmonauts. A three hour-long bitter debate ensues, with no resolution on crew selections. The final conclusions are only that the crews will consist of one pilot, and one engineer, and that Feoktistov will never be allowed to go into space.

The Soyuz launches have been delayed two to three days because of rain. In any case a membrane in an orientation system propellant tank burst during fuelling of spacecraft number 6.

Soyuz launch commission is held at Area 31 at 17:00.

Docked with Cosmos 188; first automated rendezvous and docking of two spacecraft. The dockings were timed to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution (in lieu of a succession of manned space feats that all had to be cancelled due to schedule delays). Achieved automatic rendezvous on second attempt. Capture achieved but hard docking and electric connections unsuccessful due to misallignment of spacecraft. Star tracker failed and had to make a high-G ballistic re-entry. Recovered October 31, 1967 08:20 GMT.

The Soyuz-B ('Baikal') launch was delayed to 30 October due to problems with the celestial navigation system aboard Cosmos 186. Later that day an N1-L3 review is held. The first launch vehicle will be completed in two to three weeks, but the launch complex will not be ready until next January. The first trials of the booster on the pad will begin in February-March 1968, with the first launch in the second half of the year.

Docking target craft for Cosmos 186, which achieved world's first automatic rendezvous on second attempt. Hard docking achieved but electric connections unsuccessful due to misallignment of spacecraft. Ion flow sensor failed and Cosmos 188 had to make a high-G uncontrolled re-entry. When it deviated too far off course, it was destroyed by the on-board self-destruct system,. However officially the Soviet Union reported that it landed succesfully on November 2, 1967 at 09:10 GMT, and that its mission was 'investigation of outer space, development of new systems and elements to be used in the construction of space devices'.

Cosmos 188 / Soyuz-B (the passive spacecraft - 7K-OK(P) s/n 5) was launched and inserted into orbit 24 km from Cosmos 186 / Soyuz-A. This was the spacecraft that was to have flown the Soyuz 2 manned mission in April 1967. Cosmos 186 was ordered to attempt a first-orbit automatic rendezvous and docking. Although a docking was not planned for the flight, Mishin decided to attempt it anyway. The first docking attempt failed when the active spacecraft flew past Cosmos 188 at a distance of 900 m after the system lost contact. The spacecraft set itself up for a second attempt and achieved soft-dock. However when hard-dock was attempted an excessive lateral movement led to torquing of the directional steering of the active spacecraft. The detailed interface latches and connectors of the docking rings did not join. The spacecraft had hard docked but without full latching and electrical connections.

There was also a significant over-expenditure of propellant in the docking process. Cosmos 186's rendezvous manoeuvring engine had fired 28 times with a cumulative burning time of 200 seconds. As the spacecraft come into range of tracking station IP-16, the cameras showed mission control that the spacecraft were docked, but off-axis. The earth could be seen racing below in the television images. Kamanin had opposed the fully automatic docking approach when Korolev first advocated it three to four years ago, but this success moves Kamanin to feel that Korolev was right after all. Chief Designer Armin Sergeyevich Mnatsakanian's 'little Igla' has come through. Kamanin believes that this technology will be the death of big boosters like the Saturn V or N1. It makes it possible to assemble payloads in orbit launched by smaller rockets.

Due to failure of a star tracker a guided lifting re-entry of 3-4 G was not accomplished. A ballistic re-entry of 7-8 G however resulted in a successful soft landing in the target zone. Rudenko's recovery crews demonstrated a lack of training. Ustinov and Mishin were anxious to release a proclamation of total mission success, but they needed confirmation that the soft landing rockets had functioned correctly. It was only after 2.5 hours that the recovery teams arrived aboard an Mi-6 helicopter that the correct function of the landing system is verified and the leadership notified.

Mishin is drunk again at a critical mission phase. Afanasyev, Kerimov, and Tyulin all know about Mishin's drinking problem but do nothing. Meanwhile in orbit Soyuz-B's stellar navigation system has not functioned correctly (it hasn't worked on any Soyuz, Kamanin notes). The decision is made to use the ion orientation system. The TDU braking rocket fires at 10:03 on 2 November. But the spacecraft is not oriented correctly, and the landing will take place 2000 to 3000 km from the recovery area. The APO destruct system determines that the landing point will be 300 to 400 km east of Ulan-Ude, and automatically blows up the capsule during re-entry at an altitude of 60 to 70 km above Irkutsk. This was completely unnecessary, since the capsule would have landed on Soviet territory, or in Mongolian territory close to the border. The orientation problem is found to be due to incorrect functioning of the ion orientation system.

Discussion on the Il-18 on the way back to Moscow from Tyuratam. Mishin thinks that a manned flight aboard Soyuz will be possible by April-May of 1968; the others don't think it can happen until the second half of the year.

Kamanin meets with Rudenko. They go over the problems with the training of his recovery crews. They have three helicopters, 10 men, yet nobody could determine if a soft landing had occurred or not.

Kamanin feels there has been no event like this in a century. The celebrations were marked by clear, sunny weather. All the cosmonauts were in Moscow for the celebrations, except Popovich, who was in Rumania. Kamanin notes with disapproval Rumania's attempted alliance with Mao Tse-Tung. During November 7 demonstrations in Bucharest, there were no Russian flags to be seen.

The first Saturn V and Surveyor 6 have been launched by the Americans. Kamanin catalogues why the Americans are beating them: bad organisation, on the parts of Ustinov, Smirnov, Pashkov, Malinovskiy, and Grechko; technical errors and an undisciplined approach to the fulfilment of government decrees concerning the Soyuz and N1 on the parts of Chief Designers Korolev and Mishin; lack of coordination between the institutes and design bureaux compared to the United States; and finally, the Americans are spending several times more money than has been dedicated to the Soviet space program.

Problems on the mission included excessive firing of the manoeuvring engine during rendezvous and docking, and failure of the stellar navigation systems. The systems still need work before a man's life can be risked. It is decided to conduct another unmanned dual docking mission in March-April 1968; with a manned flight in May-June 1968. As for the L1, the simulator was still 'raw' and had many problems. Four to six successful unmanned flights are needed to prove the L1 before a manned flight can be made.

Three VVS aircraft fly to Baikonur for the L1 launch. Passengers include Leonov and the 12 cosmonauts of the L1 training group.

Bad weather at Baikonur. Low visibility and snow may delay the L1 launch. Kamanin rails against Mishin - he's a drunk, an authoritarian, etc. etc.

Glushko at Baikonur. He reports the Perm factory is under close supervision - the engine that failed on the last launch was found to have resin in the main fuel line.

The launch takes place at 00:07 local time (22:07 on 22 November Moscow time). Glushko, Chelomei, and Kamanin observe the launch from an observation point in -5 deg C weather. Three to four seconds after second stage ignition, the SAS pulls the spacecraft away from the booster. Telemetry shows that engine number 4 of stage 2 never ignited, and after 3.9 seconds the remaining three engines were shut dwon by the SBN (Booster Safety System) and the SAS abort tower fired. The capsule's radio beacon was detected and the spacecraft was found 80 km southwest of Dzhezkazgan, 285 km down range. The Proton problems are maddening. Over 100 rocket launches have used engines from this factory, with no previous failure. Of ten of the last launches under Mishin's direction (6 Soyuz and 4 L1) only two have went well - an 80% failure rate! Mishin is totally without luck. Kamanin and Leonov take an An-12 to see the L1 at its landing point. Leonov wants to see proof that the cosmonauts would be saved in any conditions. The capsule landed in -17 deg C and 12 m/s winds. The parachute pulled the capsule along the ground for 550 m, and the soft landing rockets fired somewhere above the 1.2 m design height. After safing of the APO self-destruct package, the capsule is lifted to an airfield by a Mi-4.

Titov is on tour in France. Kamanin notes that Titov used to make many mistakes, but has now reformed.

Kamanin writes a letter to the Central Committee on the need for the 7K-VI spacecraft for military research. He also complains about his problems in obtaining adequate spacecraft simulators. Later he meets with Grigoriy Nikolayevich Postukov, sculptor of cosmonaut statutes.

Kamanin attends an Almaz program review with Pashkov, Afanasyev, and Chelomei. The resolution of June 1967 required space trials to begin in 1968, and entry of the system into military service in 1969. But this schedule was flawed from the beginning. The project plan required design, qualification, and delivery of completely new complex systems from ten different ministries. The Ministry of Radio Equipment was to deliver 66 items, but the ministry refused, saying they could handle two at most. Similar responses were received from other ministries. The result is that six months into the program, the first flight schedule has already slid 24 months, to 1970. The VVS has been dealing with Chelomei for two years, and find him much better to work with than Mishin. Chelomei's deputies are highly cultured men, pleasant to work with (unlike Mishin and his circle). The VVS is to handle the following on the Almaz program:

• Development of crew safety items, cockpit indicators on the function of the landing system, and controls for manual landing by the astronaut
• Development of the HAZ complex for training of crew members
• Review and approval of station systems for water generation, medical observation of the crew, and atmosphere indicators and controls
• Development of a manned manoeuvring unit to allow the cosmonauts to manoeuvre up to 300 m from the station

A panel headed by Afanasyev and Mishin reviews the readiness of the N1. The mock-up booster is to complete pad compatibility tests by 30 March 1968. The first launch is still supposed to take place in the second half of 1968. The launch of the American Saturn V in November has reenergized the workers at Tyuratam. Kamanin is impressed - he was less sure of success, knowing all the problems of a project that requires the labour of thousands of persons. Afanasyev then turns to crew selection issues. The original resolution said that a cosmonaut was to be launched by an N1-L3 by April 1968. Mishin says he will be able to make two launches in the second half of 1968. It will take 18 to 24 months to train crews. But to date, Mishin still won't agree to crew selections, despite dozens of contacts and letters from Kamanin to Ustinov and Smirnov. There are still no simulators for the L3. Mishin wants to launch to the moon only engineers from TsKBEM. He is given an ultimatum: either the VVS will leave the space program, requiring Mishin to take over all training and crew responsibilities, or reach an agreement on crew composition in the next few days. Afansyev orders the commission to convene again in two to three days.

Mishin wants only his organisation to build L3 trainers, not the VVS. A whole series of previously-unmentioned trainers and simulators are mentioned, included the Turbolet, a V-10 helicopter with a lunar cabin, etc. For the L3 simulator Mishin wants to develop the specification documents without inputs from the VVS and have it built only to Mishin's requirements. This is rejected by Kamanin, who insists on a decision by 20 December, with issuance of the specifications for the L3 trainers with the input of VVS. If two simulators are buit, one must be installed at TsPK and the other at TsKBEM. If only one is built, it will have to be at TsPK.

Kamanin is dumbfounded. The leadership has decided to accept Mishin's recommendations, scrap the 7K-VI project, and replace it with a Soyuz variant! Mishin is an egotist, but he is supported by highly-placed leaders - Ustinov, Smirnov, Pashkov, Serbin, Stroganov, Keldysh, and others. So everyone in the space program has to dance in the service of this 'engineer-performer', who is not a credible chief designer.

Mishin is away on 'cure' for his drinking problem. A 'Podlipki Soviet' is held at TsKBEM. The issue is cancellation of Kozlov's 7K-VI military Soyuz. Bushuyev, Chertok, Okhapkin, Feoktistov are in favour of cancelling it. Opposed are Karas, Shcheulov, Kostonin, Gaidukov, and the various military representatives at the meeting. It was now six years since OKB-1 was required to put a military manned spacecraft into space - and, factually speaking, nothing has been done. Military experiments proposed for each manned flight by OKB-1 to date had been rejected on various grounds - no weight, no space aboard the spacecraft. Good progress has been made with Kozlov's VI and Chelomei's Almaz - now they've managed to kill the VI, and Mishin and Kerimov are constantly denigrating Almaz (saying it is too heavy, and unsuited for the purpose). The whole thing is a replay of the LK-1 situation. In 1963, a resolution was issued to send a Soviet man around the moon. Instead, after two years of development, Korolev managed to get Chelomei's LK-1 lunar spacecraft cancelled, and started all over with his own L1.

On 13 October 1967 Mishin began his efforts to kill the VI program. From the point of view of the 'Podpliki Mafia', Kozlov had insulted them by redesigning the Soyuz VI in light of the defects of their 7K-OK design. They were also fundamentally opposed to the use of radio-isotope power sources, and raised doubts about the 800 mm hatch cut into the heat shield (as they did in the case of Chelomei’s VA). Mishin wrote a letter to Afanasyev and Smirnov, urging them to cancel the 7K-VI program. In the place of Kozlov's VI Mishin proposed his own project for an Soyuz-derived OIS orbital station. In a November 1967 meeting between Mishin and Kozlov Mishin demanded the abandonment of Kozlov’s 7K-VI project. Kozlov rejected this and subsequently appealed to Kamanin. Through various complex machinations Mishin seized control of the project on 8 December 1967 and promised that the first OIS would be launched in 1969. Mishin’s revised project was reaffirmed in May 1968. Having won the battle, Mishin lost interest. OKB-1 would pursue it at a desultory pace until it was finally cancelled in 1969.

In the place of Kozlov's VI Mishin proposed his own project for an orbital station 11F730 Soyuz VI. This would consist of on orbital block 11F731 OB-VI and a transport spacecraft 11F732 7K-S. Through various complex machinations Mishin seized control of the project on 8 December 1967. The new Soyuz VI was designated the OIS 11F730. It would be launched into a lower-inclination 51.6 degree orbit at 250 x 270 km, and would use solar panels in the place of the nuclear power sources.

There is still no enabling resolution for the L3. Many meetings are held, discussing the L3, L3 trainers, and Feoktistov's assignment as a cosmonaut.

Kamanin receives two medical reports on Feoktistov. Kamanin's summary - Feoktistov is a 'sick man'.

Of the 18, 13 scored a '5', four scored '4', and one '3'. Belousov, Grishchenko, Skvortsov, Sharafutdinov, and Voloshin - the low scorers - are all to be dismissed from the cosmonaut corps.

Afanasyev holds meetings on the L3 lunar expedition program. Kamanin recites Mishin's failings. Afanasyev replies that he has talked to Ustinov about it, but Ustinov will leave the current management in charge until N1 flight tests begin. If they are unsuccessful, then Mishin alone will have to answer for it. Afansyev also assures Kamanin that although Feoktistov should be allowed to train for a space flight, he and Ustinov will make sure he never flies.