N1 Predecessors

Before the N1 - 1955 to 1960

Before the N1 there was an attempt to develop launchers and ICBM's to put large payloads into orbit using nuclear thermal propulsion. The first official plan for future Soviet spaceflight was contained in a decree of 30 January 1956. This set forth the following objectives:

• Orbiting of satellites of 1.8 to 2.5 tonnes mass by 1958
• One week flight of a manned spacecraft by 1964
• Unmanned reconnaissance satellite by 1970
• Rocket capable of 12 tonne escape velocity payload by 1970
• Rocket with 100 tonne low earth orbit payload, capable of placing 2 to 3 men on the moon (no date set)

The first approach to the rather vague last objective was the use of nuclear power. Korolev's OKB-1 began work on nuclear launchers and missiles on 30 June 1958. Competing engine designs were in development by Glushko's OKB-456 and Bondaryuk's OKB-670. The draft project designs of both bureaux used nuclear reactors in cylindrical housings, with the reactors operating at 3000 degrees K. The propellant was heated in the reactor and exhausted through four expansion nozzles. The Glushko engine operated with ammonia, while the Bondaryuk engine used a mixture of ammonia and alcohol. With such propellants a specific impulse of 430 seconds at launch was expected. Three rockets were designed by OKB-1 utilising these engines:

• The first variant, YaKhR-2, followed the layout of the R-7 ICBM. With a length of 48 m, it had six strap-ons using 36 conventional LOX/Kerosene Kuznetsov engines. The core of the missile used the nuclear engine. This ignited at altitude after burnout of the strap-ons with a thrust of 140 to 170 tonnes. Lift-off mass of the booster was to be from 850 to 880 tonnes, with an orbital payload of 35 to 40 tonnes.

• The second variant was an ICBM with a range of 14,000 km. Using the Bondaryuk engine this would have had a lift-off mass of 87 tonnes and a payload of 2.6 tonnes. With the Glushko engine the figures would have been 100 tonnes and 4 tonnes. Obviously testing of such a missile with a nuclear reactor being delivered to the impact zone together with the test warhead would have grave ecological consequences (even though it was anticipated that tests would impact into an artificial reservoir). Interestingly the existence of such a project was mentioned by the American spy Oleg Penkovskiy in 1961 - but considered absurd by Western experts until revealed by RKK Energia in 1996.

• The third variant designed was a 'Super Rocket' with a lift-off mass of 2,000 tonnes and a payload of 150 tonnes. This was a true antecedent of the N1. The first and second stages were in the conical 'raketov' form later adopted for the N1. The first stage used a massive cluster of Kuznetsov NK-9 engines each with a thrust of 52 tonnes. The second stage used four nuclear engines with a total thrust of 850 tonnes. Operating at an elevated temperature of 3500 degrees K a higher specific impulse of 550 seconds in vacuum was expected. Although ideal for use in nuclear rockets, use of liquid hydrogen as a propellant was not contemplated. A mixture of liquid hydrogen and methane was considered as a better-performance propellant at a later date.

Work on this form of nuclear propulsion was abandoned at the end of 1959 when it became apparent that conventional chemical propulsion could provide nearly equivalent performance with less development, safety, and environmental risk.

Birth of the N-I

The space race with the Americans had heated up considerably since the casual program laid out in the plan of 1956 was issued. A decree of 10 December 1959 added a number of new programs, but for Korolev this was not enough. In a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Part in January 1960 he proposed an aggressive program for Communist conquest of space. He declared:

• That the design bureaux of the Soviet Union must make a broad swift assault on space research
• That a new rocket of 1,000 to 2,000 tonnes gross lift-off mass with a 60 to 80 tonne payload must be developed at the earliest possible date
• That advanced propulsion systems - nuclear, Lox/LH2, low thrust liquid, ion, and plasma engines and correction rockets - be developed as quickly as possible
• That new automatic and radio guidance systems be developed to support these objectives

The heavy rocket would be developed in two phases:

• N-I, with a 40 to 50 tonne payload, to be developed as quickly as possible in 1960 to 1963
• N-II, with a 60 to 80 tonne payload, using nuclear second and upper stages, to be developed in 1964 to 1965

As payloads for his rocket, to be developed in accordance of the Central Committee decree of 10 December 1959, the following would be developed for launch in the period 1963 to 1965:

• Three to six geostationary communications satellites of 2 to 3 tonnes mass for global communications
• Heavy manned space stations with a crew of 3 to 5, orbited at 350 to 400 km altitude. The station would conduct military reconnaissance, control other spacecraft in orbit, and undertake basic space research. The N-I version of the station would have a mass of 25 to 30 tonnes and the N-II version 60 to 70 tonnes
• Heliocentric satellite for solar studies of 1 to 2 tonnes mass
• Use of the N-I to launch a spacecraft with 2 to 3 men for flyby of the moon, entry into lunar orbit, and return to earth. Payload mass 10 to 12 tonnes in lunar orbit, 2 to 3 tonnes return payload.
• Use of the N-I to launch the MK interplanetary spacecraft with 2 to 3 crew on 2 to 3 year flyby missions to Mars and Venus. Automatic probes would be landed on the planets during the flyby manoeuvres.
• Use of the N-II for group flight of 3 to 4 spacecraft on expeditions to land on Mars and Venus. Crew per spacecraft would be 2 to 3. One spacecraft would be a reserve to ensure the safe return of the crews to earth. These spacecraft would be placed by the N-II on their interplanetary trajectories at a velocity of 11.2 km/s, have a mass of 10 to 30 tonnes, with a return capsule mass of 3 to 8 tonnes.
• Global rockets that could bombard any point on earth with showers of nuclear warheads totalling 40 to 100 tonnes mass at ranges of 3,000 to 12,000 km
• Potential to establish a defensive space infrastructure that would annihilate any enemy satellites or rockets that flew over the territory of the USSR
• Photographic and electronic reconnaissance of every part of the earth
• Precision military navigation

For his part, Korolev and the other chief designers would pledge to support this overall effort by the development of draft projects and fundamental research work to validate and mature the necessary technologies. They would place before the Central Committee in the third quarter of 1960 comprehensive plans for development of the new projects. It was requested that that the Central Committee authorise the design bureaux to undertake these draft projects, an that the Ministry of Finance be directed to allow the bureaux to use reserve funds to finance the work.

Korolev also requested that a decree be issued to establish a USSR Institute of Interplanetary Studies. This would be a public body like the nuclear institute in Dubna, and would co-ordinate world-wide work on space research and technology. The decree was also to authorise publication in the USSR of an open scientific technical journal covering international exploitation of space and interplanetary research.

This letter was followed by a meeting with Khruschchev on the subject on 3 March 1960. Korolev believed it would be truly possible with backing from the very top to have a large rocket in the USSR in a very short span of time. Unfortunately at the meeting Korolev made a slip of the tongue he would always regret, admitting that his plan had not been agreed among all of the Chief Designers. This resulted in Khrushchev throwing the matter back for a consensus plan.

By 30 May 1960 Korolev was back with a plan that now included participation of his rivals, Chelomei and Yangel. Project codes were applied and some of the work Korolev had planned was now Chelomei's. The consolidated plan was as follows:

• N-I - (Korolev) - to be developed in 1960 - 1962. 40 to 50 tonnes payload to low earth orbit and 10 to 20 tonnes to Mars. Draft project to be completed by second quarter 1961.
• N-II - (Korolev) - to be completed in 1963 - 1967. 60 to 80 tonne payload to low earth orbit and 20 to 40 tonnes to Mars. Draft project to be completed in 1962.
• KS - (Korolev) - Heavy manned spacecraft, 2-3 crew, to demonstrate rendezvous, docking, and controlled flight. To be developed in 1961 to 1963 (this would become Soyuz).
• KL - (Korolev) - Manned spacecraft for lunar flyby. To be developed in 1961 to 1964 (this would become the L1).
• KMV - (Korolev) - Interplanetary manned spacecraft for 2-3 crew, flyby of Mars and Venus. To be developed in 1962 to 1965 (this was the TMK-1).
• R-7 - Four-stage version of R-7- (Korolev) - 300 tonne gross lift-off mass, available from 1960 for robotic lunar and interplanetary flights (this would be the Molniya booster)
• M - (Korolev) - Launch to Mars of 1M robot probes in September - October 1960 and 2M probes in 1962 (these Mars flights were attempted on this schedule)
• V - (Korolev) - Launch to Venus of 1V probes in January 1961 and 2V probes in 1962 (these Mars flights were attempted on this schedule)
• E - (Korolev) - Launch to the moon (as per decree of 10 December 1959) E-1 lander probes in 1960 to 1961 and E-7 orbiters in 1961 (these lunar probes would eventually succeed many years behind schedule)
• K - (Chelomei) - Development of unpiloted Kosmoplans for flight to Mars and Venus with return to earth and landing at conventional airfields. These would use new exotic chemical systems, low thrust nuclear engines (nuclear-plasma, ion, atomic hydrogen). Sub-variants with a total mass of 10 to 12 tonnes and 25 tonnes would be developed in 1965-1966. Draft project to be completed in 1962.
• UR-500 - (Chelomei) - Develop a 600 tonne gross lift-off mass rocket using new chemical propellants for sending these spacecraft to nearby planets. Draft project to be completed in 1962. (This would become the UR-500 Proton booster)
• R-7L - (Korolev) - Develop in 1960 to 1962 a 4 stage version of the R-7, utilising R-9 technology, with a 300 tonne gross lift-off mass and high specific impulse engines in the last stage. Payload 10 tonnes to low earth orbit and 3 tonnes to escape. Draft project to be completed in 1961 (this booster, later called the Molniya-L, was never developed).
• Vostok recoverable spacecraft (Korolev) :

  • Photo and electronic reconnaissance versions to be developed in 1960 to 1962 (these would be the Zenit-2 reconnaissance satellites. They would end up flying after, not before the Vostok manned flights)
  • Manned version to be developed in 1961 to 1963 (these flew on schedule)
  • Scientific research version to be developed in 1960 to 1962 (these were designed but never flown)
  • Maneuverable rendezvous and docking version to be developed in 1961 to 1963 (this was the Vostok-Zh - never flown, replaced by Soyuz)

• Elektron - (Korolev) - high apogee radiation belt research satellites, developed according to decree of 10 December 1959, to be launched in 1960 to 1961 (these flew late to schedule)
• US - (Chelomei) - Naval reconnaissance satellite using P6 nuclear reactor. To be developed in 1962 to 1964 (these flew late to schedule)
• R - (Chelomei) - Manned Raketoplan spacecraft for orbital manoeuvring flight and recovery at conventional airfields. Total mass to be 10 to 12 tonnes, total gliding range during re-entry 2,500 to 3,000 km. Unpiloted version to be developed in 1960 to 1961, followed by piloted version in 1963 to 1965. Satellite interceptor operational version to be tested in 1962 to 1964 (only suborbital subscale tests were conducted on this program before it would be cancelled)
• Meteorological satellites - (Korolev) - Meteor R-7 launched satellites to be developed in 1961 to 1963 (these would fly, but behind schedule), to be followed by heavy-rocket satellites in 1963 to 1964 (designer not decided).
• Communications satellites - (Korolev) - R-7 launched satellites to be developed in 1961 to 1963 (these would fly, behind schedule, as the Molniya series), to be followed by heavy rocket satellites in 1962 to 1964 (designer not decided).
• DS - Small satellites / launchers - (Yangel) to be developed in 1961 to 1965, together with launch vehicles derived from the R-12 and R-14 ballistic missiles (this program flew on schedule)
• OS - (Korolev) - Space stations - the Ministry of Defence was to decide by the fourth quarter of 1960 whether it can utilise military stations with multiple independent rocket-warheads
• IS - Antisatellites - the Ministry of Defence was to decide by July 1960 whether to develop an R-7 launched system for annihilation of enemy reconnaissance satellites (this project was conducted, but given to Chelomei for launch on the UR-200. Eventually flew in the late 1960's, launched by Yangel Tsiklon rockets)
• Military Communications Satellites - the Ministry of Defence was to decide by the fourth quarter of 1960 whether to proceed with development of military communications satellites (this was done - the Strela series)
• GOSPLAN was to allocate budget beginning in 1961 for development of the systems set forth in the plan

However the May plan was approved as outlined. Therefore N-I design officially began as a result of the final government decree 715-296 of 23 June 1960 'On the Production of Various Launch Vehicles, Satellites, Spacecraft for the Military Space Forces in 1960-1967'

Design of the N-I

The same day that the decree was issued Korolev wrote to the Ministry of Defence, again trying to obtain support for a military orbital station (OS), on which a decision had been deferred to the end of the year. He pointed out that his design bureau had already completed a draft project, in which 14 work brigades had participated. Missions the station could accomplish included:

• Reconnaisance
• Combat operations against enemy spacecraft
• Strike against any point on earth
• Communications and relay functions
• Military applications studies
• Defence against enemy ballistic missiles
• Study of the space environment
• Study of the earth and planets
• Astronomical observations
• Weather observation
• Interorbital communications
• Study of the sun
• Biological research
• Radiation control studies

By this time Glushko had new data from the US on the use of N2O4 (nitrogen tetroxide) as an oxidiser. He told Korolev that he advised replacing both Lox/UDMH and Nitric Acid/UDMH with N2O4/UDMH in the three stages of the N1. N2O4 would improve the specific impulse by 13 seconds at sea level and 14-15 seconds at altitude in comparison with the previously considered propellant combinations. To utilise it an existing turbine design would have to be increased from 25,000 to 30,000 HP, powered by a closed cycle gas generator cycle, and an increase in chamber pressure from 260 atmospheres to 300. N2O4 was more stable than nitric acid, and cost 50 to 55 roubles per tonne. For fourth stage applications, Glushko recommended use of a 10 tonne engine burning hydrogen peroxide and pentaborane. Although extremely difficult to handle and toxic, the propellants would increase the specific impulse by 54 seconds compared to nitric acid/UDMH, 40 seconds compared toN2O4/UDMH, and 25 seconds compared to Lox/Kerosene. Korolev was not at all receptive to use of any of these propellants, still preferring Lox/Kerosene.

By March 1961 four design bureaux were working on development of rocket engines for the N-I and N-II. Glushko and Kuznetsov were competitively developing engines (RD-250 and NK-15) for the N-I. Isayev and Lyulka were working on advanced Lox/LH2 engines for later N-I upper stage applications. Glushko and Bondaryuk were designing new nuclear engines using LH2 propellant for the N-II.

Glushko really saw the adoption of the N2O4/UDMH propellant combination as the answer to problems he had experienced with combustion instability and chamber cooling in the four-chamber RD-111 engine developed for Korolev's GR-1 ICBM. As was the case with the R-7, Glushko was unable to solve the problems and finally resorted to four smaller chambers operating from a single turbopump. This scheme provided problems of its own, however - difficulties in synchronising the thrust of the four chambers. By using N2O4/UDMH, a combustion chamber 280 to 580 degrees less than that of Lox/Kerosene would be obtained, greatly lessening these problems and allowing faster development.

Korolev had nothing but contempt for Glushko by this point, going back to his belief that it was Glushko's denunciation of him in 1937 that landed him in the Gulag, in the death-mines of Kolyma. Glushko had failed to solve combustion problems with the RD-105 engine, forcing the use of a four-chamber design in the RD-107 and RD-108 - chambers little larger than those on the V-2. Glushko had refused to solve the vernier rocket design for the R-7, forcing Korolev to do it. Glushko had been unable to expediently provide an upper stage engine for the R-7, forcing Korolev's own bureau to develop the S1.5400. Again with the R-9 engines, Glushko could not solve the problem of producing stable combustion in a large chamber.

In developing the S1.5400 Korolev's team demonstrated the higher performance that could be achieved with a closed-cycle engine. Glushko refused to consider this for a Lox/Kerosene RD-250 - it would only increase the already unmanageable chamber pressures and temperatures. Therefore Korolev turned to Kuznetsov's design bureau. Kuznetsov's OKB had originally been founded to exploit German engineers and develop the gigantic turboprop engines of the Tu-95 Bear bomber. But with assistance from Korolev's team he promised he could learn the technology. Kuznetsov had good relations with Korolev and was conveniently located in Samara, the same town where R-7 production was underway and N-I production was planned. Kuznetsov was willing to attempt to produce the higher-efficiency closed cycle engine that Glushko believed was impossible with the Lox/Kerosene propellants.

By March 1962, faced with Chelomei's favour with the military, Korolev made a detailed pitch for development of the N-I in the military context. This evolutionary program had a real chance of producing a mature launch vehicle for heavy applications.

Korolev proposed first to develop the N-II and N-III, based on the upper stages of the N-I. These would initially use the NK-9 engines developed for the R-9 and GR-1 rockets.

Step 1 would be the N-II, which would fulfil the GR-2 global rocket requirement in place of Chelomei's UR-500. It would have a gross lift-off mass of 750 tonnes, and deliver a 25 tonne payload to low earth orbit. It could also deliver a 25 megaton bomb from an under-the-radar orbital trajectory with an accuracy of 2 km. The N-11GR variant was an adaptation of the basic N-11, derived from the second and third stages of the N1 heavy booster. The GR-2 was to be a kind of enormous multiple-warhead FOBS (fractional orbit bombing system). Surrounding the top of the second stage of the rocket, like bullets in an enormous revolver, were six final stages derived from the 8K713 GR-1 last stage. Each stage had a 1,500 kg 2.2 MT nuclear warhead. The stages would separate from the main vehicle, and make violent manoeuvres using independent guidance systems to put each warhead in a different low 160 km altitude orbit. At the end of a 10,000 to 12,000 km journey along their separate orbital paths, the warheads would appear on US radar screens at the last moment with minimal warning. The total spread of the warheads would be 1800 km from left to right; two such global rockets could devastate America's major cities from coast to coast in an unstoppable first strike.

Step 2 Would be to develop the first stage of the N-I, which coupled with the already-tested N-II would provide a total lift-off mass of 2,100 tonnes and put 80 tonnes into low earth orbit. Missions for the N-I would included global reconnaissance, anti-satellite, antiballistic missile, interceptor spacecraft to rendezvous with, examine, and neutralise enemy satellites; and nuclear anti-satellites.

This programme could be conducted at minimum cost and risk. The NK-9 would be flight-tested by the end of 1963 in the improved R-9M ICBM. If the military could not afford construction of a new launch site, Korolev proposed that the N-II could be assembled in the existing R-7 MIK assembly hall and launched from the two R-7 launch pads at Baikonur, LC-1 and LC-31. Using this cut-rate approach the N-II could be developed for 2 million roubles and provide real confidence that the N-I would be successful. Korolev promised that if a prompt go-ahead was received the N-I would make a first flight by the end of 1964 or the beginning of 1965.

Despite this appeal, which set forth a programme which could have discovered and eliminated the problems the N-I encountered later, the military did not support it. Chelomei was given go-ahead on 24 April 1962 to develop the UR-500 rocket for the GR-2 requirement.

Korolev's next attempt to win military support for development of the N-I was his fantastic 'Orbitalniy Poyas' (OP -Orbital Belt) scheme of 20 April 1962. Anticipating Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative by 25 years, he painted a picture of an invincible Soviet space force patrolling the heavens. Two to three large N-I launched military manned stations would control a constellation of strategic assets. Geosynchronous nuclear-powered satellites would provide secure communications. Piloted reconnaissance spacecraft would surprise the enemy, observing military preparations without warning. The orbital stations would provide continuous observations of the territory of the imperialist block. They would control combat sputniks, manoeuvrable anti-satellites that would control the heavens from altitudes of 300 to 2,000 km. Using docking methods, the stations would be remanned, providing fresh crews to control anti-ballistic missile interceptors in 150 to 100 km orbits and to deploy separately targetable warheads at a variety of altitudes.

There is not evidence the military was any more impressed with this justification than those previously put forth.

In parallel with the formal N1 draft project, since 1961, the Yangel and Chelomei bureaux had been developing alternate designs (Yangel's was designated R-56 and Chelomei's was the UR-700). Both used clustered 4 m diameter rocket stages. Both advocated each stage be equipped with a single large Glushko engine using toxic storable propellants and with a thrust of 450 to 550 tonnes. Such stages could be built in factories in Moscow or Dniepropetrovsk and shipped on the existing Soviet rail system to Baikonur. There they would be joined together but no actual metal fabrication work would have to be carried out. This approach was used with success for the smaller R-7 and Proton launch vehicles. Dynamic testing of scale models by TsNIIMASH indicated the clustering of large numbers of stages was feasible.

N-I Draft Project - 1962

The N-I draft project was completed on 16 May 1962. The design was defended before the other Chief Designers on 2 to 16 July 1962. And this is what the draft project said:

The three stage N-I was designed to support the following objectives:

• Placement of heavy spacecraft in low earth orbit for the purposes of research into the space environment; the origin and evolution of the planet Earth; solar radiation; the nature of gravity; physical observations of nearby planets; understanding the origin of organic life and the evolution of life on earth; etc.

• Circumnavigation of the moon with a crew of two to three men; entry into lunar orbit of robotic and crewed modules for study of the lunar surface

• Expeditions to the surface of the moon for the study of its soil, relief, inner structure, physical properties, and selection of a suitable site for a research base on the moon

• Establishment of a lunar base and regular traffic between the earth and the moon;

• Flyby of Mars and Venus and return to earth by a crew of two to three men

• Entry into orbit around Mars and Venus and return to earth of spacecraft with two to three men

• Delivery of expeditions to the surfaces of Mars and Venus and identification of sites for research bases

• Launch of automatic probes to the outer planets (Jupiter, Saturn, etc.)

• Establishment of manned and unmanned spacecraft in high and geosynchronous earth orbits, not obtainable by launch vehicles derived by ICBM's, for radio and television communications, earth resources, early warning, and meteorological purposes

• Deployment of heavy automatic and piloted military stations for high priority operations in earth orbit, including the capability of making evasive manoeuvres and deployment of large numbers of nuclear warheads or other military apparatus in low earth orbit

• Simultaneous launch from a single base of a large number of nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic and global orbital trajectories, with the assistance of multiple independently-guided final rocket stages atop the last stage of the N-I

• Construction of a launch vehicle of the highest possible payload

• Development of the national technical base to the highest possible degree

• Development of a family of smaller rockets using the same technology

After extensive study it was determined that the design objective of a single launch payload of 75 tonnes into a 300 km orbit best met the required payload masses for a variety of missions:

• Manned lunar orbiter

• Manned lunar landing, if used with Lox/LH2 upper stages

• Manned flyby of Mars and Venus

• Manned expeditions to orbits around Mars and Venus, utilising two N-I launches, docking in earth orbit, and nuclear electric propulsion for the spacecraft

Many trade studies were conducted comparing differing propellants and design layouts before settling on the configuration set forth in the draft project as the optimum design. These trade studies would be vital in defending the design before the expert commission against the attacks of Glushko. Propellant variants studied were:

• N1-K, the baseline, using Lox/Kerosene (TG-1) in all three stages
• N1-V1,V2,V3: Variants with Lox/LH2 stages. These later developments could reach 120 tonnes to 165 tonnes low earth orbit payloads needed for manned Mars expeditions.
• N1-D-A: Variant with storable N2O4/UDMH propellants. Other less energetic propellant combinations considered were OKA-50/UDMH, Nitric Acid (AK-27)/UDMH.

Conclusions were that the highest specific impulse was obtained from the Lox/Kerosene combination; and that highest tank mass was required for the N2O4, OKA-50, or AK-27 oxidisers. Use of N2O4/UDMH would result in a reduction in specific impulse of 17 to 21 seconds compared to Lox/Kerosene and a reduction in payload of 20 to 25%. Use of AK-27/UDMH would result in a 33 to 38% second reduction in specific impulse and a redaction in payload of 43 to 47%. Moreover the storable propellants would cost almost ten times more than lox/kerosene (2 million roubles per N1 launch versus 250,000 roubles). These considerations, plus the easier handling of Lox/Kerosene, confirmed the propellant selection. Lox/LH2 engines would not be available during the time scale of the initial project, but would be considered later for uprated versions of the launch vehicle.

Configuration variations considered were:

• N1-I - Packet rocket, as used for the R-7. Six strap-ons around an identical core with an upper stage. Two sub-types were considered: In the first, as in the R-7, the rocket would hang from the 'shoulder' of the strap-ons above the flame pit to minimise lower stage mass. The second, which was selected for further study, had the same layout, but the base of the rocket was mounted conventionally, free-standing on its base on the launch pad. This was the baseline design for comparison with the others.
• N1- II - Polyblock - a cluster of autonomous rocket stages, each consisting of two propellant tanks feeding individual engine sections. Loads would be carried through the individual stage structure, although the Blocks would be tied together to form a single unit. This was basically the same as the competing Chelomei UR-700 and Yangel R-56 layouts.
• N1-III - Polyblock - a cluster rocket, but with the loads transmitted through an external skin. The tanks would be unsupported and a common fuel system would feed the engines. This scheme was analogous to the American Saturn I first stage and Nova designs.
• N1-IV - Monoblock - large single stages, each with one oxidiser and one fuel tanks, using a common fuel system to feed the engines. This was analogous to the American Saturn V and the selected N-I configuration

All of the designs used 'hot start' stage ignition, requiring use of the familiar Warren truss open strut interstages.

Following analysis of the designs, the following were the results of the detailed design analysis:

The disadvantages of Variants I, II, and III were the large number of servicing ports, fuelling ports, and check inspection points. It was felt that the lower complexity and higher performance of the monoblock Variant IV outweighed the much greater number of train-car loads of parts necessary. The gores of the spherical propellant tanks and panels of the side walls would be built in the factory in Samara and only final assembly of the launch vehicle would be undertaken at the cosmodrome.

In the United States launch from coastal Cape Canaveral permitted the 10 m diameter Saturn IC and Saturn II stages to be shipped by barge from the factories to the launch site. No such possibility existed for Baikonur, in the arid steppes of Kazakhstan. Alternate launch sites were considered (and some space engineers wistfully hoped for a launch site on the balmy Black Sea) but Baikonur remained the only possibility. Due to the geography of the Soviet Union there was no other launch location with relatively uninhabited downrange areas for impact of spent rocket stages.

By this analysis the selection of lox/kerosene propellants and the monoblock configuration were justified in the draft project. Indirectly the problems of polyblock designs like those of Yangel and Chelomei were considered and attacked.

For the 75 tonne payload a gross lift-off mass of 2,000 to 2,300 tonnes would be required using only Lox/Kerosene propellants in all stages. It would be necessary to build a 150 tonne thrust closed-cycle rocket engine for use in the launch vehicle (at that time the largest rocket engine chamber built in Russia was 40 tonnes, open cycle). 24 NK-15/11D51 engines would be used in the first stage, 8 NK-15V/11D52 engines in the second stage, and 4 smaller NK-19/11D53 engines in the third stage. Development of engines in the 600 to 900 tonne thrust were studied but would have required development of new technologies and not been available during the project's time scale. A 150 tonne engine was well sized for use in the second stage and the clustering of large numbers of them in the first stage could be managed through use of the KORD control system (an elaborate automatic system that would monitor engine health, shut down any failing engine and its opposite number, allowing continued operation of the cluster until the required stage performance was reached).

From the N1 stages two smaller launch vehicles would be derived. The N11 would use versions of the second and third stages of the N1, together with the third stage of the GR-1. This would have a lift-off mass of 700 tonnes and a 20 tonne payload into low earth orbit. It was designed for the same missions as the Chelomei UR-500 Proton booster. The N111 would use derivatives of the third stages of the N1 and the second stage of Korolev's R-9 ICBM. This would result in a lift-off mass of 200 tonnes and a five tonne payload, allowing it to replace the R-7 derived Vostok and Soyuz boosters.

N-I Goes into Production

Despite intense criticism by Glushko, Keldysh and the rest of the expert commission supported the draft project. But the programme was still without an authorised mission. Following the approval of the draft project there was a more informal discussion between Khrushchev and the Chief Designers at the Soviet leader's estate at Pitsunda, on the Black Sea, in August. Korolev went over the heads of the military once again and pitched his giant military space station as a rationale for the project. At the conclusion of the meeting, Khrushchev ordered start of the project to put a 75 tonne manned platform with nuclear weapons into low earth orbit. The official decree authorising N-I production was issued on 24 September 1962 with first flight to occur in 1965. This set forth the first of a series of optimistic schedules for development of the launch vehicle. Completion of third stage tests was expected by the end of 1964, first and second stages by mid-1965, completion of all engine test stand runs by the first quarter of 1965, completion of the launch complex by the end of 1964, and first launch in 1965.

So after two years of struggle, Korolev finally had his authorisation in hand. But it turned out not to be enough. He had authorisation for the rocket, but no support from the military ranks for a payload for it to launch.

Barmin's GSKB SpetsMash was given responsibility for design and construction of the launch facilities. In March 1963 design work started on the N1 launch complex. The ground-breaking ceremony was held a year later and construction began of the N1 launch complex and assembly buildings

Continued in The N1 Story - Part 2