Korolev, 1946 Credit - © Mark Wade Media Gallery

Personal: Male. Born in Zhitomir, Ukraine.

Korolev created the first Soviet rockets and spacecraft. He was portrayed for years as a legendary, iconographic figure that single-handedly was responsible for the early Soviet victories in the space race. He was singularly responsible for creating the first long range ballistic missiles, the first space launchers, the first artificial satellite, and putting the first man in space. His premature death led to his name and accomplishments being made public, while those of other chief designers of rockets and satellites remained secret. This resulted in an exaggerated perception that he occupied a uniquely central position in rocketry and spaceflight. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the lives and roles of other important figures in Soviet became known in great detail. In the process a more balanced view of Korolev became possible.

Korolev’s story was inextricably bound up in the deep passions and resentments of the three titans of Soviet space rocketry - Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, Vladimir Nikolayev Chelomei, and Valentin Petrovich Glushko. Each had his own patrons in the Kremlin hierarchy and Politburo. Each had been deeply scarred and mishandled by the Soviet system. Each was very sure that his technical and management approach was superior. The depth of their passions in their struggle for ascendancy can scarcely be imagined.

Korolev was born to a Russian literature teacher in the town of Zhitomir in the Ukraine. He was fascinated with aircraft at an early age and became a pilot. At the age of 17 he had designed his first glider, the K-5. After attending the Kiev Polytechnic Institute, he went on to the Moscow Higher Technical University (MVTU). There he was involved in design and construction of an increasingly ambitious series of gliders, culminating in the SK-4, designed for record duration flights in the stratosphere. He became interested in the possibilities of rocket-propelled aircraft and in September 1931, together with Tsander, founded the Moscow rocketry organisation GIRD (Group for Investigation of Reactive Motion).

Similar efforts were underway abroad. In America the secretive Robbert Goddard had already flown his first liquid propellant rockets. In Germany the VfR (Verein fuer Raumschiiffahrt - Society for Spaceship Travel) was testing liquid fuelled rockets of increasing size. The VfR collapsed in 1933 as its members chose to leave the country or begin work for the Nazi government. The members that remained finally developed the A-4 (V-2) missile, the basis for all liquid fuel rockets to follow. In America the potential of his Goddard’s work was unrecognised. He finally had to close up his New Mexico test range and develop small auxiliary rockets for the Navy.

In Russia, GIRD was launching the Soviet Union’s first liquid-propelled rockets, the GIRD-9 and GIRD-10. GIRD lasted only two years before the military, seeing the potential of rockets, replaced it with the RNII (Reaction Propulsion Scientific Research Institute). Glushko was brought from Leningrad to head rocket engine design at RNII, while Korolev was in charge of airframes. They developed a series of rocket-propelled missiles and gliders during the 1930's, culminating in Korolev's RP-318, Russia's first rocket propelled manned aircraft, powered by Glushko's ORM-65 rocket engine.

Before the aircraft could make a rocket propelled flight, Korolev and Glushko were thrown into the Soviet prison system in 1938 during the peak of Stalin’s insane purges. Glushko was arrested on March 23. Korolev, denounced by Glushko, was arrested on June 7 and sentenced to ten years hard labour on 27 September. He spent On 10 July 1940 he was sentenced to work in the Kolyma gold mines, a virtual death sentence to the most dreaded part of the Gulag. However Stalin had recognised the importance of aeronautical engineers in preparing for the impending war with Hitler. A system of sharashkas (prison design bureaux) was set up to exploit jailed talent. Korolev was saved by the intervention of senior aircraft designer Sergei Tupolev, himself a prisoner, who requested his services in the TsKB-39 sharashka. In September 1940, his health already ruined, he was transferred to work at Tupolev’s bureau in Moscow. Korolev was not allowed to work on rockets except at night on his own time. His RP-318 had flown on 28 February 1940, without his involvement.

In 1942, after Tupolev's team was evacuated to Omsk, Korolev was transferred to TsKB-16 in Kazan where he served as Deputy Director for Flight Testing (although still officially a prisoner). Here he was able to return to development of rockets for aircraft and missile propulsion. In November 1944 Korolev was given charge of a team of 60 engineers and required to provide a draft project for a Soviet counterpart to the V-2 within three days. The resulting two-stage design used Lox/Alcohol propellants and an autopilot for guidance. These designs evolved into the more refined D-1 and D-2 rockets with a 75 km range.

With the war over, the immense progress that the Von Braun team had made in rocketry became apparent. Provided nearly unlimited funds, the Germans had developed the 300 km range V-2 missile, which was a decade ahead of the Soviet designs. The Russian engineers that first inspected the recovered remains of a V-2 called it ‘that which cannot be’.

Stalin, fascinated with the technology, was quite annoyed that the Peenemuende team had gone over to the Americans and that American intelligence had managed to loot most of the V-2 factories and rockets, even in the Russian zone. Russian teams were sent seize available equipment and information as early as April 1945. Korolev was released from the Kazan sharashka and was in Germany from August 1945. At first he merely accompanying the team that salvaged what was left. He was present (under guard, outside the fence, while Glushko was part of the official delegation inside) at the British 'Operation Backfire' launch of a V-2 from Altenwaide on 15 October 1945. He interviewed dozens of V-2 engineers and technicians still in Germany.

On May 13, 1946 Stalin signed the decree beginning development of Soviet ballistic missiles. The Minister of Armaments, Dmitir Fedorovich Ustinov, was put in charge. In August 1946, the Scientific Research Institute NII-88 was established to copy the V-2 missile. Although not fully rehabilitated, Korolev's piercing personality and organisational abilities had clearly been impressive, and Ustinov personally appointed him Chief Constructor NII-88. Glushko was named head of GDL-OKB to design engines for Korolev's rockets. Following Korolev's selection, 234 German employees of the Mittelwerke V-2 factory were rounded up on the night of 22-23 October 1946 and sent to relatively good living conditions at Gordodomlya on Lake Seleger, between Moscow and Leningrad. Thus the jailed became the jailer. However until he had proved himself a master of rocket technology, Korolev would be forced to have his rocket designs considered in competition with those of Groettrup's German team.

The first task was to put the V-2 into production in Russia. This was a huge undertaking -- Russian manufacturing technology was equivalent to that of Germany at the beginning of the 1930's. Before this was even underway, a competition was held for design of an improved V-2. This R-2 was designed by Korolev in 1947-1948 in competition with Groettrup's G-1. When the State Commission evaluated the designs in December 1948, the G-1 was found the superior design. Korolev fought the decision for a long time, updating his R-2 design to include some of the G-1's features. Finally the decision was reversed and Korolev's design was accepted for test. State trials flights were conducted from 21 September 1949 to July 1951.

The next competition was for a quantum leap to a 3000 km range ballistic missile. The NTS (Scientific-Technical Soviet) of NII-88 met in plenary session on 7 December 1949 and subjected Korolev’s R-3 design to withering criticism. In general they preferred Groettrup's G-4/R-14 design to the same requirement. This assumed fewer technical advances in engine design but greater improvements in mass fraction reduction. After heated discussion, the Soviet approved further development of technology for the R-3, but not the missile itself.

With this decision Korolev finally caved in and adopted the German aerodynamic and engine solutions with fervour in his next designs. He put the R-3 on a slow track to oblivion. Following years of trade studies, approval came for development of an intercontinental rocket with a range of 7,000 km on 13 February 1953. Korolev used a modification of the German concept for an ICBM. What started out as Groettrup's 'cluster of G-4's' (G-5 / R-15) became the R-7 when Korolev conceived of a lengthened core sustainer stage. This would allow all engines to be ignited on the pad, eliminating the problems of air start in Groettrup's design.

The German team was aware of none of this. Members of the team began to be repatriated on 3 April 1951. By October 1951 they were completely isolated and work basically stopped. The last member of the group returned to Germany on 22 November 1953. Groettrup made it to West Germany and was debriefed by the CIA in 1957, but provided some deliberately false information and downplayed the importance of the German work in order to avoid Russian retribution. The full story did not come out until the end of the century.

In order to concentrate on development of the R-7, further IRBM development was spun off to a new design bureau in Dnepropetrovsk headed by Korolev's assistant, Mikhail Kuzmich Yangel. This was the first of several design bureaux that would be spun off from Korolev’s OKB-1 bureau once a new technology had been perfected.

The R-7 faced enormous development problems. Glushko’s RD-105/RD-106 rocket motors had seemingly insoluble combustion chamber instability problems. The weight of the thermonuclear warhead to be carried was increased from the 3 tonnes to 5.5 tonnes. The entire vehicle had to be scaled up proportionately, and this meant that Glushko’s troublesome single-chamber engines had to be replaced by the RD-107/-108 design, a cluster of four nozzles sharing common fuel pumps. This could assure stable combustion, but greatly increased the complexity of the booster, with a total of twenty main engines and sixteen vernier engines firing at lift-off, as opposed to five engines for the RD-105/106 approach. Korolev already had reason to be dissatisfied with Glushko's performance.

Korolev’s enormous drive and personal attention to detail overcame all obstacles. The R-7 was first successfully launched on 21 August 1957 and then orbited the first artificial earth satellite on 4 October 1957. The first operational satellite for the launcher was to have been the Zenit military photoreconnaissance satellite. Korolev, flushed after the success of Sputnik, instead advocated that manned spaceflight should have first priority. After bitter disputes, a compromise solution was reached. Korolev was authorised to proceed with development of a spacecraft to achieve manned flights at the earliest possible date. However the design would be such that the same spacecraft could be used to fulfil the military's unmanned photoreconnaissance satellite requirement. In November 1958 the Council of Chief designers approved the Vostok manned space program, in combination with the Zenit spy satellite program. The Vostok would put the first human being into space on 12 April 1961.

The next quantum leap was a launcher designed expressly for Soviet conquest of the planets. When the time came for the 75 tonne payload N1 rocket in the late 1950's, Korolev again turned to German work. The N1 was the direct aerodynamic descendent of the Groettrup G-2 and G-4. It incorporated all of the essential features of Groettrup's designs - the 85-degree slope cone, topped by a cylindrical fore body and a sharply spiked nose, and the use of upper stages of the conical vehicle as smaller launch vehicles (the N11 and N111 in the case of the N1). It was only the limitations of Soviet manufacturing technology that forced Korolev to adopt the spherical tank design of the N1 in place of the integral common-bulkhead tanks of the Groettrup vehicles.

As development and production of rockets and spacecraft became an increasing part of the Soviet industry, other chief designers set their sights on getting a piece of the pie. Chelomei was the country’s leading designer of cruise missiles. It was apparent that the ballistic missile, for which no defence could be developed for decades, would win out over the cruise missile as a weapon system. Chelomei was also anxious to be involved in the much more exciting area of space flight. When Korolev's R-7 experienced a long string of launch failures in the summer of 1957, Chelomei was quick to criticise Korolev and ask to be put in charge of the development. But the decisive event in getting a piece of the space action was Chelomei's hiring of Nikita Khrushchev's son, Sergei. This gave Chelomei sudden and immediate access to the highest possible patron in the hierarchy. He was rewarded with his own design bureau, OKB-52, in 1959. OKB-52 was immediately assigned several development projects in the explosion of military space and missile projects following the U-2 shoot down, the resulting collapse of the Geneva talks with Eisenhower, and Kennedy's accession to the presidency in the United States.

Kennedy had been partly elected on the basis of claims of a 'missile gap' with the Soviet Union. Russia's succession of Sputnik and Luna launches, combined with the bellicose claims of Khrushchev, created the public impression that Russia was far ahead of the United States in the fielding of unstoppable ICBM's and space weapons. In fact, Korolev's R-7, with its enormous launch pads, complex assembly and launching procedures, cryogenic liquid oxygen oxidiser, and radio-controlled guidance was a totally impractical weapon. The warhead ended up being overweight, giving it a range of only 6,800 km, barely enough to reach the northern United States. As a result, it would be deployed as a weapon at only eight launch pads at Tyuratam and Plesetsk, in the north of the country. More practical successors, Yangel's R-16 and Korolev's R-9, would not be available for years. The Eisenhower administration, thanks to the U-2 overflights, knew that the 'missile gap' did not exist, but in that curious logic that pertains to intelligence matters, would not tell the US public that it knew that the Soviet missile threat was virtually non-existent.

Nevertheless, having been elected on the basis of the existence of such a threat, and having selected the former general manager of General Motors, Robert McNamara, as his Secretary of Defence, Kennedy felt impelled to plunge into a massive program of ICBM construction. Evidently unable to think in terms of smaller numbers due to his motor industry background , McNamara chose the nice round figure of 1,000 ICBM's as a goal. The existing Atlas and Titan designs were too expensive to operate in such large numbers. Therefore the Minuteman program, already begun under Eisenhower, was expanded to provide a low-maintenance solid-fuelled missile that could be produced and cheaply operated in vast quantities.

The Russians, shocked into being drawn into an expensive arms race involving a thousand missiles as opposed to a few hundred, began development of equivalents. Korolev was tasked to build a solid-fuelled counterpart of the Minuteman, the RT-2. This new technology weapon encountered technical problems and was never fielded in any significant numbers. Khrushchev asked Chelomei to build a less risky, small liquid fuelled missile, the UR-100. This became the Soviet equivalent to the Minuteman, being built in the thousands and making Chelomei the leading rocket manufacturer in Russia. Yangel was to continue development of his R-16 into the R-36 'city-buster' missiles, which the Pentagon held up as an enormous threat during the three decades to come (although they never felt impelled to duplicate it by simply deploying more of the equivalent Titan 2).

Chelomei's ascendancy coincided with a huge technical dispute between Korolev on the one hand and Glushko on the other. Glushko had decided to quit developing rocket engines using cryogenic liquid oxygen. The use of hypergolic (self-igniting), storable oxidiser and fuel combinations had enormous operational advantages. The propellants could be put in the missile's tanks and stored for long periods. Such rockets, once fuelled, were available at any time for launch. Rockets using cryogenic liquids had to be loaded just before the launch, since the liquid oxygen quickly boiled off at normal temperatures. If a launch was delayed for more than a couple of hours, launchers using cryogenic liquids had to be defuelled, and refuelled again for the next attempt, leading typically to a one day recycle time before the next launch could be attempted. The drawback of the storable propellants was that they were typically very toxic and dangerously corrosive. They had to be handled very carefully in special chemical protection gear. In the case of spills, accidents, or booster explosions, a dangerous cloud of toxic gas was created and the surrounding area contaminated.

Glushko (and Chelomei, Yangel, and Makeyev) felt that the operational advantages of storable propellants outweighed the safety issues. Korolev did not, and insisted in using liquid oxygen and kerosene propellants even in missile applications. The rift was complete during development of Korolev’s R-9 ICBM. Glushko only provided engines to Korolev's specifications under direct orders from the Soviet leadership. Korolev turned to Nikolai Kuznetsov's bureau, whose previous experience had been in turboprop engines, to develop engines for the later R-9 versions and the new N1 space launcher. The Soviet military sided with Glushko - it only deployed 54 of Korolev's R-9 missiles, as against 380 of Yangel's R-16 and 800 of Chelomei's UR-100 (and it should be noted, the Americans selected toxic storable propellants for their Titan 2 rocket, the French for the Ariane, and the Chinese for the Long March).

None of this gained Korolev any friends in the military. They had contributed huge sums to his R-5, R-7 and R-9 programs and he had not produced any weapons of military usefulness. Their Zenit military reconnaissance satellite, begun in 1956, was deferred after Korolev's intervention, in favour of the Vostok manned spaceflight program. He was using missiles developed with their money for the purpose of exploring outer space. While it certainly provided positive propaganda for the Communist system, it was not contributing to the security of the Soviet state.

Each chief designer therefore became identified with powerful patrons in the cliques of the Kremlin hierarchy. Korolev, and his deputy Mishin, had in their employ Yuri Semenov, the son-in-law of Politburo ideology chief Andrei Kirilenko. Glushko and Yangel, by virtue of their production of the missiles that the military actually wanted, earned the patronage of Dmitri Ustinov. Chelomei had his direct conduit to Khrushchev.

In his pursuit of his dream of manned conquest of space, Korolev divested himself of all peripheral activities. He had already passed tactical and sea-launched missiles to Makeyev, storable propellant long range missiles to Yangel, and communications and navigations satellites to Reshetnev. Korolev finally obtained approval for a Soviet manned lunar lading program in August 1964. In order to concentrate on achieving a moon landing, the remaining ‘perhipheral’ work of OKB-1 were spun off to others: solid propellant rockets to Nadiradze; military satellites to Kozlov in Samara; lunar and planetary probes to Babakin at Lavochkin. The overthrow of Khrushchev two months later put Chelomei out of favour and allowed Korolev to gather into his hands all manned space projects.

Korolev, despite a lack of enthusiasm in the Soviet hierarchy and a budget a fraction of the Americans, continued to engineer space triumphs. In 1964 and 1965 modifications of the Vostok were used to orbit the first multi-crew spacecraft and for the first space walk. But it was nearly the last hurrah. In 1965 the Americans began their Gemini manned space flights and began to dismantle the Soviet lead in space. Korolev’s own projects were approved but required a continuous battle for resources against the higher-priority ballistic missile programs.

Korolev was diagnosed with cancer some time in 1965 but kept it a secret from his colleagues. In January 1966 he checked into a Moscow hospital. The Minister of Health himself elected to conduct the colon surgery – not his area of expertise. It all went horribly wrong, and Korolev died on the operating table. His untimely death at 59 was a huge blow to the Soviet space program. His successor, Mishin, did not have the necessary talents and standing to push Korolev’s moon project through to a successful conclusion. Just two weeks after Korolev’s death his Luna 9 probe soft-landed on the moon and sent back the first close-up views of the surface. It was the last significant Soviet space first.

Korolev’s talents were immense vision, enthusiasm and energy that motivated his co-workers and subordinates. His personal attention to detail ensured that critical equipment was of the highest quality and that manned space flights were safely conducted. He had to be enormously persistent and convinced of the rightness of his views to push his projects forward against immense opposition and competition.

But these qualities became less appropriate as the projects increased in number and scope. Korolev’s refusal to compromise on technical issues resulted in alienation of other chief designers, most notably Glushko, forcing him to lose years of time developing new sources of rocket engines. The Americans required the resources and expertise of four major contractors to develop the Saturn V booster and the Apollo spacecraft. Korolev was attempting to do the same within a single industrial enterprise. He left his successor, Mishin, with a seemingly impossible task. Then again, had he lived a few more years in good health, perhaps he could have beat the Americans to the moon…and gone on to Mars, one improvised step at a time…

23 March 1938 - Glushko arrested by Soviet secret police.. The leading Soviet rocket engine designer is arrested in one of Stalin's purges. Under interrogation he denounces Korolev and two others.

The booster launched into a beautiful clear sky, and it could be followed by the naked eye for four minutes after launch. The third stage reached earth parking orbit, but the fourth stage didn't ignite. It was at first believed a radio antenna did not deploy from the interior of the stage, and it did not receive the ignition commands. Therefore the Soviet Union has successfully orbited a record eight-tonne 'Big Zero' into orbit. The State Commission meets two hours after the launch, and argues whether to make the launch public or not, and how to announce it. Glushko proposes the following language for a public announcement: 'with the objective of developing larger spacecraft, a payload was successfully orbited which provided on the first revolution the necessary telemetry'. Korolev and the others want to minimize any statement, to prevent speculation that it was a reconnaissance satellite or a failed manned launch. Kamanin's conclusion - the rocket didn't reach Venus, but it did demonstrated a new rocket that could deliver an 8 tonne thermonuclear warhead anywhere on the planet. The commission heads back to Moscow.

It was determined that the Venera fourth stage on the 4 February attempt failed ...more...

In the West, the failed Venera 4 launch is being analysed as an attempted manned flight. Some Italians claim to have picked up voices on radio from the satellite. Kamanin describes all of this as unfounded speculation -- the Soviet Union will not risk a man's life until two fully successful mannequin flights demonstrate safe recovery.

At 06:30 Keldysh gives the go-ahead for launch. There is good weather at the pad ...more...

The pace quickens leading to the first human spaceflight. Kamanin coordinates matters with Korolev and Voronin, and then discusses the ECS problems and cosmonaut landing issues with Dementiev. Plans are made for a meeting with Ustinov and Kozlov. In the evening a meeting of the General Staff is held. Decisions made: 1) Announce the name of the cosmonaut as soon as he is in orbit; 2) improve VVS support (aircraft, helicopters) needed to pick up the cosmonaut immediately after landing; 3) issue a formal letter to Moskalenko on rules for filming of the cosmonaut at the launch site; 4) organise an examination of the 11 cosmonauts not in the group of six now being prepared for flights.

The payload included life-support equipment and radio and television to relay information on the condition of the pilot. The flight was automated; Gagarin's controls were locked to prevent him from taking control of the ship. The combination to unlock the controls was available in a sealed envelope in case it became necessary to take control in an emergency. After retrofire, the service module remained attached to the Sharik reentry sphere by a wire bundle. The joined craft went through wild gyrations at the beginning of re-entry, before the wires burned through. The Sharik, as it was designed to do, then naturally reached aerodynamic equilibrium with the heat shield positioned correctly.

Gagarin ejected after re-entry and descended under his own parachute, as was planned. However for many years the Soviet Union denied this, because the flight would not have been recognized for various FAI world records unless the pilot had accompanied his craft to a landing. Recovered April 12, 1961 8:05 GMT. Landed Southwest of Engels Smelovka, Saratov.

Kamanin's account

At 04:50 Karpov and Nikitin get up, followed by Gagarin and ...more...

The entire Soviet leadership attended, including Malinovskiy, Grechko, Biryuov, ...more...

Kamanin has continued arguments over the reorganisation of VVS space units and the role of IAKM. Korolev has never supported a leading role for the VVS or Kamanin in the Soviet space program. He is complaining about the 'offences' of the VVS, Kamanin, and the cosmonauts. Korolev cites Gagarin's trauma and Titov's motor accidents. He believes cosmonauts should be selected only from OKB-1 engineers. He also believes the cosmonauts are wasting too much time on publicity tours. Vershinin and Keldysh are hearing all of these complaints.

The State Commission met again at 17:00, to decide whether to extend Popovich to a fourth day as well. Smirnov and Korolev have already discussed this with Khrushchev. It all right with them, and there are no technical reasons not to. But Popovich is much more active than Nikolayev, since he wasn't expecting a four day flight, and he has not conserved his resources as Nikolayev has. At 12:00 the spacecraft temperature was down to 11 deg C, with low humidity. Kamanin objects violently, and finally it is decided to ask the cosmonaut directly if he feels able to go for the extra day. Popovich, when contacted, immediately declares himself ready to go for an extra day and a 65 orbit mission. It is decided to study expected landing conditions for an extended mission and the physical condition of the cosmonaut before making a final decision.

Although Smirnov spoke of up to five Vostok flights in 1963, there were actually ...more...

• 7K spacecraft, capable of carrying three men into space and returning them to earth. The 5.5 tonne spacecraft has three modules, including the BO living module and the SA re-entry capsule
• 9K booster stage, with a fuelled mass of 18 tonnes. After docking with the 7K this is capable of boosting the combined spacecraft to earth escape velocity. The 9K is equipped with a 450 kgf main engine and orientation engines of 1 to 10 kgf. It will have 14 tonnes propellant when full loaded. Four sequential docking with a tanker spacecraft will be required to fill the tanks before the final docking with the 7K.
• 11K tanker, with a mass of 5 tonnes.

The system will conduct fuellings and dockings in a 250 km altitude parking orbit, and be boosted up to 400,000 km altitude on lunar flyby missions. The system will be ready in three years. Military variants proposed are the Soyuz-P and Soyuz-R. Each spacecraft will have 400 kg of automatic rendezvous and docking equipment. Manual docking will be possible once the spacecraft are within 300 m of each other.

Korolev still insists on an unguided landing and categorically rejects the use of wings. A parachute will deploy and slow the capsule to 10 m/s. Then a retrorocket will fire just before impact with the earth to provide a zero-velocity soft landing. Korolev still insists that spacesuits will not be carried for the crew. First test flight of the 7K, without docking, could not occur until the second half of 1964.

The Soyuz Complex consisted of three blocks (Soyuz A, equivalent to later Soyuz ...more...

A new problem arises -- the 'Go' light for the Block-E third stage won't illuminate on the control room console. It can't be determined if it is a failure of the stage or an instrumentation failure. It will take two to five hours to bring up the service tower and check out the stage. But if the rocket is left fuelled that long, regulations say it must be removed from the pad and sent back to the factory for refurbishment. In that case there can be no launch until August. Krylov and the State Commission would rather defer the launch to August. The last possible launch time is 17:00 in order to have correct lighting conditions for retrofire and at emergency landing zones. But Korolev, Tyulin, Kirillov, and Pilyugin have faith in their rocket, decide that the problem must be instrumentation, and recycle the count for a 17:00 launch.

The launch goes ahead perfectly at 17:00 - even all six UHF communications channels function perfectly. On orbit 4 Bykovskiy talks to Khrushchev from orbit and good television images are received from the capsule. Bykovskiy reports he can see the stars but not the solar corona. His orbit is good for eleven days.

At 12:15 Tereshkova is on the pad. Her pulse skyrockets to 140 aboard the elevator to the top of the rocket. 10 to 15 minutes later she is in the capsule and testing radio communications with ground control. There are no problems with the spacecraft or launch vehicle during the countdown - everything goes perfectly, just as it did on 12 April 1961 when Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space. Tereshkova handles the launch and ascent to orbit much better than Popovich or Nikolayev according to her biomedical readings and callouts. Kamanin feels reassured that it was no mistake to select her for the flight.

The launch of the first woman into space creates a newspaper sensation throughout the world. Direct orbit-to-orbit communications between Tereshkova and Bykovskiy are excellent. She talks to Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership soon thereafter. This was truly a great victory for Communism!

Many errors occurred in the entire landing sequences, including actions of the VVS recovery forces. The conditions of the cosmonauts were only reported several hours after their landings. Big crowds gathered at both landing sites. Bykovskiy spent the night in Kustan, then left on 20 June aboard an Il-14 for Kuibyshev. Tereshkova spent her first night in Karaganda, then flew in an Il-8 to Kuibyshev. Many congratulatory phone calls were received from the Soviet leadership. Korolev declared he had no longer had the time to personally direct Vostok flights and wanted to hand the spacecraft over to the military for operational use. He could then concentrate on development of the Soyuz and Lunik spacecraft.

It is reported that a lot of test stand work has been completed and is underway on closed ecological systems for recycling the air and water. One kilogram of chlorella algae can produce 27 kg of oxygen per day. Since each man will require 25 kg of oxygen per day, 2 kg of chlorella per crew member will be adequate. Therefore the problem of recycling the cabin atmosphere is considered already solved.

Food requirements per crew member are 2.5 to 3.0 kg/day, or about one tonne per year. It is expected that in two to three years development will be complete of a system that will recycle 80% of the food. A 150 kg device will produce 400 to 600 g of food per day, or 100 to 200 kg per year.

In a three hour meeting Korolev goes over his future flight plans for Vostok. The first flight will be unmanned, with a biological payload, in February or March 1964. The flight is to last 10 or 11 days and take the specimens up to 600 to 1000 km altitude, into the lower reaches of the Van Allen radiation belts. This will be followed by three cosmonaut flights of ten days with significant military and scientific experiments. A new ground control system will be installed and tested to handle all in-flight emergencies. A new autonomous on-board navigation system will be flight tested. Korolev wants the military to take over conduct of future Vostok flights - they are taking up to much of his time and nerves. He has told this repeated to Khrushchev and Brezhnev without result. Meanwhile Kamanin lobbies within the military hierarchy for the removal of Odintsev. It is decided that the matter will be taken up at the next meeting of the Military Soviet.