George M. Low, MSC Deputy Director, would succeed Shea as ASPO Manager. Changes were to be effective April 10. References: 16.

• Investigate design and test of the spacecraft structures
• Investigate design and test of the landing and parachute systems
• Investigate design and test of the orientation and guidance systems
• Study the performance of the tracking, communications, and flight ground control systems
• Investigate design and test of the launch system
• Analyse the contents of the Mir-3 flight data recorder, telemetry, and space-to-earth communications
• Review the design and as-built documentation for the spacecraft, subsystems, training program, flight plan, and the on-board flight log

• The likely cause of non-deployment of the primary parachute on Soyuz 1 was insufficient drag force created by the drogue chute to pull it out of the container (the drogue needs to produce 3 tonnes of force, but tests show only 1.1 to 1.8 tonnes of force are being produced at an ambient pressure of 0.67 atmospheres)
• The reliable operation of the reserve parachute and the drogue parachute at the same time was never demonstrated in trials. The chance of them getting tangled was actually very likely.

• Remove the reserve parachute and have a system of two main parachutes, with landing possible even if one of the main chutes does not deploy
• Develop through extensive actual testing reliable inflation of the drogue chute
• Add controls to allow manual parachute deployment by the crew, with appropriate cockpit instruments
• Increase the jettison time of the heat shield from 60.7 seconds to 100 seconds after parachute deployment to allow the full interval for operation of the automatic landing system.