The Rocket and Satellite Research Panel, established in 1946 as the V-2 Upper Atmosphere Research Panel and renamed the Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel in 1948, together with the American Rocket Society proposed a national space flight program and a unified National Space Establishment. The mission of such an Establishment would be nonmilitary in nature, specifically excluding space weapons development and military operations in space. By 1959, this Establishment should have achieved an unmanned instrumented hard lunar landing and, by 1960, an unmanned instrumented lunar satellite and soft lunar landing. Manned circumnavigation of the moon with return to earth should have been accomplished by 1965 with a manned lunar landing mission taking place by 1968. Beginning in 1970, a permanent lunar base should be possible.

NACA established a Special Committee on Space Technology to study the problems of space flight. H. Guyford Stever of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was named Chairman. On November 21, 1957, NACA had authorized formation of the Committee.

The Stever Committee, which had been set up on January 12, submitted its report on the civilian space program to NASA. Among the recommendations:

• A vigorous, coordinated attack should be made upon the problems of maintaining the performance capabilities of man in the space environment as a prerequisite to sophisticated space exploration.
• Sustained support should be given to a comprehensive instrumentation development program, establishment of versatile dynamic flight simulators, and provision of a coordinated series of vehicles for testing components and subsystems.
• Serious study should be made of an equatorial launch capability.
• Lifting reentry vehicles should be developed.
• Both the clustered- and single-engine boosters of million-pound thrust should be developed.
• Research on high-energy propellant systems for launch vehicle upper stages should receive full support.
• The performance capabilities of various combinations of existing boosters and upper stages should be evaluated, and intensive development concentrated on those promising greatest usefulness in different categories of payload.

A Working Group on Lunar Exploration was established by NASA at a meeting at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Members of NASA, JPL, Army Ballistic Missile Agency, California Institute of Technology, and the University of California participated in the meeting. The Working Group was assigned the responsibility of preparing a lunar exploration program, which was outlined: circumlunar vehicles, unmanned and manned; hard lunar impact; close lunar satellites; soft lunar landings (instrumented). Preliminary studies showed that the Saturn booster with an intercontinental ballistic missile as a second stage and a Centaur as a third stage, would be capable of launching manned lunar circumnavigation spacecraft and instrumented packages of about one ton to a soft landing on the moon.

Roy W. Johnson, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), testified before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics that DOD and ARPA had no lunar landing program. Herbert F. York, DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering, testified that exploration of the moon was a NASA responsibility.

At the second meeting of the Research Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight, held at the Ames Research Center, members presented reports on intermediate steps toward a manned lunar landing and return.

Bruce T. Lundin of the Lewis Research Center reported to members on propulsion requirements for various modes of manned lunar landing missions, assuming a 10,000-pound spacecraft to be returned to earth. Lewis mission studies had shown that a launch into lunar orbit would require less energy than a direct approach and would be more desirable for guidance, landing reliability, etc. From a 500,000 foot orbit around the moon, the spacecraft would descend in free fall, applying a constant-thrust decelerating impulse at the last moment before landing. Research would be needed to develop the variable-thrust rocket engine to be used in the descent. With the use of liquid hydrogen, the launch weight of the lunar rocket and spacecraft would be 10 to 11 million pounds.

If the earth orbit rendezvous concept were adopted, using Saturns to launch Centaurs for the lunar landing mission, nine Saturns would be needed to boost nine Centaurs into earth orbit for assembly to attain escape from earth orbit; three more Centaurs would have to be launched into earth orbit for assembly to accomplish the lunar orbit and landing; two additional Centaurs would be needed to provide for return and for the payload. The total of 14 Saturn/Centaur launches would be a formidable problem, not even considering the numerous complex rendezvous and assembly operations in space. The entire operation would have to be accomplished within two to three weeks because of the limitations on storing cryogenics in space.

Research would be needed on propulsion problems; on reliable, precisely controlled, variable-thrust engines for lunar landing; on a high-performance, storable-propellant, moon-takeoff engine; on auxiliary power systems; and on ground operations. Reduction of the ultimate payload weight was extremely vital, and more accurate information was needed on power and weight requirements for life support, capsule weight and size, and the exact scientific payload.

Lundin felt that a decision on whether to use the Saturn or Nova approach should be made as soon as possible since it would affect research and intermediate steps to be taken.

Meetings of the STG New Projects Panel to discuss an advanced manned space flight program.

The STG New Projects Panel (proposed by H. Kurt Strass in June) held its first meeting to discuss NASA's future manned space program. Present were Strass, Chairman, Alan B. Kehlet, William S. Augerson, Jack Funk, and other STG members. Strass summarized the philosophy behind NASA's proposed objective of a manned lunar landing : maximum utilization of existing technology in a series of carefully chosen projects, each of which would provide a firm basis for the next step and be a significant advance in its own right.

Each project would be an intermediate practical goal to focus attention on the problems and guide new technological developments. The Panel considered the following projects essential to the goal of lunar landing and return : a detailed investigation of the earth's radiation belts, recovery of radiation belt probes carrying biological specimens, an environmental satellite three men for two weeks, lunar probes, lunar reconnaissance (both manned and automatic), and lunar landing beacons and stores. The Panel recommended that work start immediately on an advanced recovery capsule that would incorporate the following features: reentry at near lunar return velocity, maneuverability both in space and in the atmosphere, and a parachute recovery for an earth landing. Kehlet was assigned to begin a program leading to a "second-generation" space capsule with a three-man capacity, space and atmospheric maneuverability, advanced abort devices, potential for near lunar return velocity, and advanced recovery techniques.

At its second meeting, STG's New Projects Panel decided that the first major project to be investigated would be the second-generation reentry capsule. The Panel was presented a chart outlining the proposed sequence of events for manned lunar mission system analysis. The target date for a manned lunar landing was 1970.

A House Committee Staff Report stated that lunar flights would originate from space platforms in earth orbit according to current planning. The final decision on the method to be used, "which must be made soon," would take into consideration the difficulty of space rendezvous between a space platform and space vehicles as compared with the difficulty of developing single vehicles large enough to proceed directly from the earth to the moon.

A study of the guidance and control design for a variety of space missions began at the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory under a NASA contract.

At the third meeting of STG's New Projects Panel, Alan B. Kehlet presented suggestions for the multimanned reentry capsule. A lenticular-shaped vehicle was proposed, to ferry three occupants safely to earth from a lunar mission at a velocity of about 36,000 feet per second.

In a memorandum to the members of the Research Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight, Chairman Harry J. Goett discussed the increased importance of the weight of the "end vehicle" in the lunar landing mission. This was to be an item on the agenda of the third meeting of the Committee, to be held in early December. Abe Silverstein, Director of the NASA Office of Space Flight Development, had recently mentioned to Goett that a decision would be made within the next few weeks on the configuration of successive generations of Saturn, primarily the upper stages, Silverstein and Goett had discussed the Committee's views on a lunar spacecraft. Goett expressed the hope in the memorandum that members of the Committee would have some specific ideas at their forthcoming meeting about the probable weight of the spacecraft.

In addition, Goett informed the Committee that the Vega had been eliminated as a possible booster for use in one of the intermediate steps leading to the lunar mission. The primary possibility for the earth satellite mission was now the first-generation Saturn and for the lunar flight the second-generation Saturn.

At a NASA staff conference at Monterey, Calif., officials discussed the advanced manned space flight program, the elements of which had been presented to Congress in January. The Goddard Space Flight Center was asked to define the basic assumptions to be used by all groups in the continuing study of the lunar mission. Some problems already raised were: the type of heatshield needed for reentry and tests required to qualify it, the kind of research and development firings, and conditions that would be encountered in cislunar flight.

Members of STG would visit NASA Centers during April to define the tasks and request assistance. STG representatives were directed to maintain contact with the Centers and try to identify gaps in the technology. STG was also assigned the responsibility for preparing a first draft of specifications for a lunar spacecraft.

STG formulated preliminary guidelines by which an "advanced manned spacecraft and system" would be developed. These guidelines were further refined and elaborated; they were formally presented to NASA Centers during April and May.

Presentation by STG members of the guidelines for an advanced manned spacecraft program to NASA Centers.

Members of STG presented guidelines for an advanced manned spacecraft program to NASA Centers to enlist research assistance in formulating spacecraft and mission design.

To open these discussions, Director Robert R. Gilruth summarized the guidelines: manned lunar reconnaissance with a lunar mission module, corollary earth orbital missions with a lunar mission module and with a space laboratory, compatibility with the Saturn C-1 or C-2 boosters (weight not to exceed 15,000 pounds for a complete lunar spacecraft and 25,000 pounds for an earth orbiting spacecraft), 14-day flight time, safe recovery from aborts, ground and water landing and avoidance of local hazards, point (ten square-mile) landing, 72-hour postlanding survival period, auxiliary propulsion for maneuvering in space, a "shirtsleeve" environment, a three-man crew, radiation protection, primary command of mission on board, and expanded communications and tracking facilities. In addition, a tentative time schedule was included, projecting multiman earth orbit qualification flights beginning near the end of the first quarter of calendar year 1966.

In discussing the advanced manned spacecraft program at NASA Centers, Maxime A. Faget of STG detailed the guidelines for aborted missions and landing:

1. The spacecraft must have a capability of safe crew recovery from aborted missions at any speed up to the maximum velocity, this capability to be independent of the launch propulsion system.
2. A satisfactory landing by the spacecraft on both water and land, avoiding local hazards in the recovery area, was necessary. This requirement was predicated on two considerations: emergency conditions or navigation errors could force a landing on either water or land; and accessibility for recovery and the relative superiority of land versus water landing would depend on local conditions and other factors. The spacecraft should be able to land in a 30-knot wind, be watertight, and be seaworthy under conditions of 10- to 12-foot waves.
3. Planned landing capability by the spacecraft at one of several previously designated ground surface locations, each approximately 10 square miles in area, would be necessary. Studies were needed to assess the value of impulse maneuvers, guidance quality, and aerodynamic lift over drag during the return from the lunar mission. Faget pointed out that this requirement was far less severe for the earth orbit mission than for the lunar return.
4. The spacecraft design should provide for crew survival for at least 72 hours after landing. Because of the unpredictability of possible emergency maneuvers, it would be impossible to provide sufficient recovery forces to cover all possible landing locations. The 72-hour requirement would permit mobilization of normally existing facilities and enough time for safe recovery. Locating devices on the spacecraft should perform adequately anywhere in the world.
5. Auxiliary propulsion should be provided for guidance maneuvers needed to effect a safe return in a launch emergency. Accuracy and capability of the guidance system should be studied to determine auxiliary propulsion requirements. Sufficient reserve propulsion should be included to accommodate corrections for maximum guidance errors. The single system could serve for either guidance maneuvers or escape propulsion requirements.

Stanley C. White of STG outlined at NASA Centers the guidelines for human factors in the advanced manned spacecraft program:

1. A "shirtsleeve" spacecraft environment would be necessary because of the long duration of the lunar flight. This would call for a highly reliable pressurized cabin and some means of protection against rapid decompression. Such protection might be provided by a quick-donning pressure suit. Problems of supplying oxygen to the spacecraft; removing carbon dioxide, water vapor, toxic gases, and microorganisms from the capsule atmosphere; basic monitoring instrumentation; and restraint and couch design were all under study. In addition, research would be required on noise and vibration in the spacecraft, nutrition, waste disposal, interior arrangement and displays, and bioinstrumentation.
2. A minimum crew of three men was specified. Studies had indicated that, for a long-duration mission, multiman crews were necessary and that three was the minimum number required.
3. The crew should not be subjected to more than a safe radiation dose. Studies had shown that it was not yet possible to shield the crew against a solar flare. Research was indicated on structural materials and equipment for radiation protection, solar-flare prediction, minimum radiation trajectories, and the radiation environment in cislunar space.

Briefings on the guidelines for the advanced manned spacecraft program were presented by STG representatives at NASA Headquarters.

STG members, visiting Moffett Field, Calif., briefed representatives of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Flight Research Center, and Ames Research Center on the advanced manned spacecraft program. Ames representatives then described work at their Center which would be applicable to the program: preliminary design studies of several aerodynamic configurations for reentry from a lunar trajectory, guidance and control requirements studies, potential reentry heating experiments at near-escape velocity, flight simulation, and pilot display and navigation studies. STG asked Ames to investigate heating and aerodynamics on possible lifting capsule configurations. In addition, Ames offered to tailor a payload applicable to the advanced program for a forthcoming Wallops Station launch.

In a memorandum to NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan, Robert L. King, Executive Secretary of the Space Exploration Program Council (SEPC), reported on the status of certain actions taken up at the first meeting of the Council:

• Rather than appoint a separate Senior Steering Group to resolve policy problems connected with the reliability program, SEPC itself tentatively would be used. A working committee would be appointed for each major system and would and rely on the SEPC for broad policy guidance,
• Proposed rescheduling of the first Atlas-Agena 13 lunar mission for an earlier flight date was abandoned as impractical.

Members of STG presented the proposed advanced manned spacecraft program to Wernher von Braun and 25 of his staff at Marshall Space Flight Center. During the ensuing discussion, the merits of a completely automatic circumlunar mission were compared with those of a manually operated mission. Further discussions were scheduled.

STG members presented the proposed advanced manned spacecraft program to the Lewis Research Center staff. Work at the Center applicable to the program included: analysis and preliminary development of the onboard propulsion system, trajectory analysis, and development of small rockets for midcourse and attitude control propulsion.

Robert O. Piland, Head of the STG Advanced Vehicle Team, and Stanley C. White of STG attended a meeting in Washington, D. C., sponsored by the NASA Office of Life Sciences Programs, to discuss radiation and its effect on manned space flight. Their research showed that it would be impracticable to shield against the inner Van Allen belt radiation but possible to shield against the outer belt with a moderate amount of protection.

Three consultants presented their views: John R. Winckler of the University of Minnesota, a cosmic-ray physicist; Cornelius A. Tobias of the University of California, a radiologist specializing in radiation effects on cells and other human subsystems; and Col. John E. Pickering, Director of Research at the Air Force School of Aviation Medicine.

NASA Director of Space Flight Programs Abe Silverstein notified Harry J. Goett, Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center, that NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan had approved the name "Apollo" for the advanced manned space flight program. The program would be so designated at the forthcoming NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference.

The first NASA-Industry Program Plans Conference was held in Washington, D.C. The purpose was to give industrial management an overall picture of the NASA program and to establish a basis for subsequent conferences to be held at various NASA Centers. The current status of NASA programs was outlined, including long-range planning, launch vehicles, structures and materials research, manned space flight, and life sciences.

NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh L. Dryden announced that the advanced manned space flight program had been named "Apollo." George M. Low, NASA Chief of Manned Space Flight, stated that circumlunar flight and earth orbit missions would be carried out before 1970. This program would lead eventually to a manned lunar landing and a permanent manned space station.

Three follow-up conferences were planned: Goddard Space Flight Center in August (held in Washington, D.C.), the Marshall Space Flight Center in September, and Jet Propulsion Laboratory in October. Industry representatives would receive more detailed briefings on specific phases of the NASA program.

Name 'Apollo' selected by Silverstein. Conference with aerospace industry outlined NASA's plans for circumlunar and lunar flight.

In a memorandum to Abe Silverstein, Director of NASA's Office of Space Flight Programs, Harry J. Goett, Director of Goddard Space Flight Center, outlined the tentative program of the Goddard industry conference to be held on August 30. At this conference, more details of proposed study contracts for an advanced manned spacecraft would be presented. The requirements would follow the guidelines set down by STG and presented to NASA Headquarters during April and May. Three six-month study contracts at $250,000 each would be awarded.

The Goddard Space Flight Center GSFC conducted its industry conference in Washington, D.C., presenting details of GSFC projects, current and future. The objectives of the proposed six-month feasibility contracts for an advanced manned spacecraft were announced.

These objectives were:

- To define a manned spacecraft system fulfilling STG guidelines
- To formulate a program plan for implementation
- To identify areas requiring long lead-time research and development effort
- To analyze the cost of providing the system.

Fixed-fee contracts were to be Jet to prime contractors only; several contracts would be let concurrently. The timetable was announced:

- August 30, 1960, industry familiarization;
- August 31-September 6, expression of interest to NASA;
- September 7, invitation to bidders' conference;
- September 12, bidders' conference at STG;
- October 10, proposals received;
- November 14, contracts awarded;
- May 15, 1961, contracts completed.

An STG briefing was held at Langley Field, Va., for prospective bidders on three six-month feasibility studies of an advanced manned spacecraft as part of the Apollo program. A formal Request for Proposal was issued at the conference.

Bidder's conference for circumlunar Apollo. Specification: Saturn C-2 compatability (6,800 kg mass for circumlunar mission); 14 day flight time; three-man crew in shirt-sleeve environment.

Charles J. Donlan of STG, Chairman of the Evaluation Board which would consider contractors' proposals on feasibility studies for an advanced manned spacecraft, invited the Directors of Ames Research Center, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Flight Research Center, Lewis Research Center, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center to name representatives to the Evaluation Board. The first meeting was to be held on October 10 at Langley Field, Va.

Members were appointed to the Technical Assessment Panels and the Evaluation Board to consider industry proposals for Apollo spacecraft feasibility studies. Members of the Evaluation Board were: Charles J. Donlan (STG), Chairman; Maxime A. Faget (STG) ; Robert O. Piland (STG), Secretary; John H. Disher (NASA Headquarters Office of Space Flight Programs); Alvin Seiff (Ames); John V. Becker (Langley); H. H. Koelle (Marshall); Harry J. Goett (Goddard), ex officio; and Robert R. Gilruth (STG), ex officio.

Contractors' proposals on feasibility studies for an advanced manned spacecraft were received by STG. Sixty-four companies expressed interest in the Apollo program, and of these 14 actually submitted proposals: The Boeing Airplane Company; Chance Vought Corporation; Convair/Astronautics Division of General Dynamics Corporation; Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc.; Douglas Aircraft Company; General Electric Company; Goodyear Aircraft Corporation; Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation; Guardite Division of American Marietta Company; Lockheed Aircraft Corporation; The Martin Company; North American Aviation, Inc.; and Republic Aviation Corporation. These 14 companies, later reduced to 12 when Cornell and Guardite withdrew, were subsequently invited to submit prime contractor proposals for the Apollo spacecraft development in 1961. The Technical Assessment Panels began evaluation of contractors' proposals on October 10.

The Technical Assessment Panels presented to the Evaluation Board their findings on the contractors' proposals for feasibility studies of an advanced manned spacecraft. On October 24, the Evaluation Board findings and recommendations were presented to the STG Director.

From 16 bids, Convair, General Electric, and Martin selected to conduct $250,000 study contracts. Meanwhile Space Task Group Langley undertakes its own studies, settling on Apollo CM configuration as actually built by October 1960.

NASA selected three contractors to prepare individual feasibility studies of an advanced manned spacecraft as part of Project Apollo. The contractors were Convair/Astronautics Division of General Dynamics Corporation, General Electric Company, and The Martin Company.

Representatives of the General Electric Company, The Martin Company, and Convair/Astronautics Division of General Dynamics Corporation visited STG to conduct negotiations on the Apollo systems study contracts announced on October 25. The discussions clarified or identified areas not completely covered in company proposals. Contracts were awarded on November 15.

STG held a meeting at Goddard Space Flight Center to discuss a proposed contract with MIT Instrumentation Laboratory for navigation and guidance support for Project Apollo. The proposed six-month contract for $100,000 might fund studies through the preliminary design stage but not actual hardware. Milton B. Trageser of the Instrumentation Laboratory presented a draft work statement which divided the effort into three parts: midcourse guidance, reentry guidance, and a satellite experiment feasibility study using the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory. STG decided that the Instrumentation Laboratory should submit a more detailed draft of a work statement to form the basis of a contract. In a discussion the next day, Robert G. Chilton of STG and Trageser clarified three points:

1. The current philosophy was that an onboard computer program for a normal mission sequence would be provided and would be periodically updated by the crew. If the crew were disabled, the spacecraft would continue on the programmed flight for a normal return. No capability would exist for emergency procedures.
2. Chilton emphasized that consideration of the reentry systems design should include all the guideline requirements for insertion monitoring by the crew, navigation for aborted missions, and, in brief, the whole design philosophy for manned flight.
3. The long-term objective of a lunar landing mission should be kept in mind although design simplicity was of great importance.

A joint briefing on the Apollo and Saturn programs was held at Marshall Space Flight Center MSFC, attended by representatives of STG and MSFC. Maxime A. Faget of STG and MSFC Director Wernher von Braun agreed that a joint STG-MSFC program would be developed to accomplish a manned lunar landing. Areas of responsibility were: MSFC launch vehicle and landing on the moon; STG - lunar orbit, landing, and return to earth.

Milton B. Trageser of MIT Instrumentation Laboratory transmitted to Charles J. Donlan of STG the outline of a study program on the guidance aspects of Project Apollo. He outlined what might be covered by a formal proposal on the Apollo spacecraft guidance and navigation contract discussed by STG and Instrumentation Laboratory representatives on November 22.

The first technical review of the General Electric Company Apollo feasibility study was held at the contractor's Missile and Space Vehicle Department. Company representatives presented reports on the study so that STG representatives might review progress, provide General Electric with pertinent information from NASA or other sources, and discuss and advise as to the course of the study.

The Martin Company presented the first technical review of its Apollo feasibility study to STG officials in Baltimore, Md. At the suggestion of STG, Martin agreed to reorient the study in several areas: putting more emphasis on lunar orbits, putting man in the system, and considering landing and recovery in the initial design of the spacecraft.

Convair/Astronautics Division of the General Dynamics Corporation held its first technical review of the Apollo feasibility study in San Diego, Calif. Brief presentations were made by contractor and subcontractor technical specialists to STG representatives. Convair/Astronautics' first approach was oriented toward the modular concept, but STG suggested that the integral spacecraft concept should be investigated.

The MIT Instrumentation Laboratory submitted a formal proposal to NASA for a study of a navigation and guidance system for the Apollo spacecraft.

The Manned Lunar Landing Task Group (Low Committee) set up by the Space Exploration Program Council was instructed to prepare a position paper for the NASA Fiscal Year 1962 budget presentation to Congress. The paper was to be a concise statement of NASA's lunar program for Fiscal Year 1962 and was to present the lunar mission in term of both direct ascent and rendezvous. The rendezvous program would be designed to develop a manned spacecraft capability in near space, regardless of whether such a technique would be needed for manned lunar landing. In addition to answering such questions as the reason for not eliminating one of the two mission approaches, the Group was to estimate the cost of the lunar mission and the date of its accomplishment, though not in specific terms. Although the decision to land a man on the moon had not been approved, it was to be stressed that the development of the scientific and technical capability for a manned lunar landing was a prime NASA goal, though not the only one. The first meeting of the Group was to be held on January 9.

At the first meeting of the Manned Lunar Landing Task Group, Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Director of the Office of Space Flight Programs Abe Silverstein, and Director of the Office of Advanced Research Programs Ira H. Abbott outlined the purpose of the Group to the members. After a discussion of the instructions, the Group considered first the objectives of the total NASA program:

1. the exploration of the solar system for knowledge to benefit mankind; and
2. the development of technology to permit exploitation of space flight for scientific, military, and commercial uses.

1. a manned landing on the moon with return to earth,
2. limited manned lunar exploration, and
3. a scientific lunar base.

Representatives of STG visited Convair Astronautics Division of the General Dynamics Corporation to monitor the Apollo feasibility study contract. The meeting consisted of several individual informal discussions between the STG and Convair specialists on configurations and aerodynamics, heating, structures and materials, human factors, trajectory analysis, guidance and control, and operation implementation.

J. Thomas Markley of the Apollo Spacecraft Project Office reported to Associate Director of STG Charles J. Donlan that an informal briefing had been given to the Saturn Guidance Committee on the Apollo program. The Committee had been formed by Don R. Ostrander, NASA Director of the Office of Launch Vehicle Programs, to survey the broad guidance and control requirements for Saturn. The Committee was to review Marshall Space Flight Center guidance plans, review plans of mission groups who intended to use Saturn, recommend an adequate guidance system for Saturn, and prepare a report of the evaluation and results during January. Members of STG, including Robert O. Piland, Markley, and Robert G. Chilton, presented summaries of the overall Apollo program and guidance requirements for Apollo.

Three of the Apollo Technical Liaison Groups (Trajectory Analysis, Heating, and Human Factors) held their first meetings at the Ames Research Center.

After reviewing the status of the contractors' Apollo feasibility studies, the Group on Trajectory Analysis discussed studies being made at NASA Centers. An urgent requirement was identified for a standard model of the Van Allen radiation belt which could be used in all trajectory analysis related to the Apollo program,

The Group on Heating, after consideration of NASA and contractor studies currently in progress, recommended experimental investigation of control surface heating and determination of the relative importance of the unknowns in the heating area by relating estimated "ignorance" factors to resulting weight penalties in the spacecraft. The next day, three members of this Group met for further discussions and two areas were identified for more study: radiant heat inputs and their effect on the ablation heatshield, and methods of predicting heating on control surfaces, possibly by wind tunnel tests at high Mach numbers.

The Group on Human Factors considered contractors' studies and investigations being done at NASA Centers. In particular, the Group discussed the STG document, "Project Apollo Life Support Programs," which proposed 41 research projects. These projects were to be carried out by various organizations, including NASA, DOD, industry, and universities. Medical support experience which might be applicable to Apollo was also reviewed.

Representatives of STG visited The Martin Company in Baltimore, Md., to review the progress of the Apollo feasibility study contract. Discussions on preliminary design of the spacecraft, human factors, propulsion, power supplies, guidance and control, structures, and landing and recovery were held with members of the Martin staff.

The Marshall Space Flight Center awarded contracts to the Douglas Aircraft Company and Chance Vought Corporation to study the launching of manned exploratory expeditions into lunar and interplanetary space from earth orbits.

NASA announced that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had been awarded a contract by the Marshall Space Flight Center to study the feasibility of refueling a spacecraft in orbit.

Members of STG met with representatives of the Convair Astronautics Division of the General Dynamics Corporation and Avco Corporation to monitor the progress of the Apollo feasibility study. Configurations and aerodynamics and Apollo heating studies were discussed. Current plans indicated that final selection of their proposed spacecraft configuration would be made by Convair Astronautics within a week. The status of the spacecraft reentry studies was described by Avco specialists.

NASA selected the Instrumentation Laboratory of MIT for a six-month study of a navigation and guidance system for the Apollo spacecraft.

At the first meeting of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, during the first session of the 87th Congress, Charles F. Ducander, Executive Director and Chief Counsel of the Committee staff, outlined a number of proposed subjects for study. One subject was the Air Force's interest in a three-man spacecraft similar to the Apollo spacecraft planned by NASA. A Committee staff member had been assigned to investigate this duplication of effort. On February 22, testifying before the Committee, Air Force Undersecretary Joseph V. Charyk stated that the Dyna-Soar program was a direct approach to manned military space applications. The Air Force interest in an Apollo-type spacecraft was part of the post-Dyna-Soar program, Charyk said.

Management personnel from NASA Headquarters and STG met to plan general requirements for a proposal for advanced manned spacecraft development.

William W. Petynia of STG visited the Convair Astronautics Division of General Dynamics Corporation to monitor the Apollo feasibility study contract. A selection of the M-1 in preference to the lenticular configuration had been made by Convair. May 17 was set as the date for the final Convair presentation to NASA.

At STG the Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Human Factors discussed the proposed outline for the spacecraft specification. Its recommendations included:

• NASA Headquarters Offices should contact appropriate committees and other representatives of the scientific community to elicit recommendations for scientific experiments aboard the orbiting laboratory to be designed as a mission module for use with the Apollo spacecraft.
• NASA should sponsor a conference of recognized scientists to suggest a realistic radiation dosage design limit for Apollo crews.

The Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Instrumentation and Communications met at STG and drafted an informal set of guidelines and sent them to the other Technical Liaison Groups:

• Instrumentation requirements: all Groups should submit their requests for measurements to be made on the Apollo missions, including orbital, circumlunar, and lunar landing operations.
• Television: since full-rate, high-quality television for the missions would add a communications load that could swamp all others and add power and bandwidth requirements not otherwise needed, other Groups should restate their justification for television requirements.
• Temperature environment; heat normally pumped overboard might be made available for temperature control systems without excessive cost and complexity.
• Reentry communications; continuous reentry communications were not yet feasible and could not be guaranteed. It was suggested that all Groups plan their systems as though no communications would exist at altitudes between about 250,000 feet and 90,000 feet.
• Vehicle reentry and recovery: if tracking during reentry were desired, it would be far more economical to use a water landing site along the Atlantic Missile Range or another East Coast site.
• Digital computer : the onboard digital computer, if it were flexible enough, would permit the examination of telemetry data for bandwidth reduction before transmission.
• Antenna-pointing information: the spacecraft should have information relative to its orientation so that any high-gain directive antenna could be positioned toward the desired location on earth.

The Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Structures and Materials discussed at STG the preparation of material for the Apollo spacecraft specification. It decided that most of the items proposed for its study could not be specified at that time and also that many of the items did not fall within the structures and materials area. A number of general areas of concern were added to the work plan: heat protection, meteoroid protection, radiation effects, and vibration and acoustics.

The Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Trajectory Analysis met at STG and began preparing material for the Apollo spacecraft specification. It recommended:

• STG should take the initiative with NASA Headquarters in delegating responsibility for setting up and updating a uniform model of astronomical constants.
• The name of the Group should be changed to Mission Analysis to help clarify its purpose.
• A panel should be set up to determine the scientific experiments which could be done on board, or in conjunction with the orbiting laboratory, so that equipment, weight, volumes, laboratory characteristics, etc., might be specified

In preparing background material for the Apollo spacecraft specification at STG, the Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Mechanical Systems worked on environmental control systems, reaction control systems, auxiliary power supplies, landing and recovery systems, and space cabin sealing.

At the second meeting of the Apollo Technical Liaison Group for Configurations and Aerodynamics at STG, presentations were made on Apollo-related activities at the NASA Centers: heatshield tests (Ames Research Center); reentry configurations (Marshall Space Flight Center); reentry configurations, especially lenticular (modified) and spherically blunted, paraglider soft-landing system, dynamic stability tests, and heat transfer tests (Langley Research Center); tumbling entries in planetary atmospheres (Mars and Venus) (Jet Propulsion Laboratory); air launch technique for Dyna-Soar (Flight Research Center); and steerable parachute system and reentry spacecraft configuration (STG). Work began on the background material for the Apollo spacecraft specification.

A conference was held at Lewis Research Center between STG and Lewis representatives to discuss the research and development contract for the liquid-hydrogen liquid-oxygen fuel cell as the primary spacecraft electrical power source. Lewis had been provided funds approximately $300,000 by NASA Headquarters to negotiate a contract with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation for the development of a fuel cell for the Apollo spacecraft. STG and Lewis representatives agreed that the research and development should be directed toward the liquid-hydrogen - liquid-oxygen fuel cell. Guidelines were provided by STG:

• Power output requirement for the Apollo spacecraft was estimated at two to three kilowatts.
• Nominal output voltage should be about 27.5 volts.
• Regulation should be within +/- 10 percent of nominal output voltage.
• The fuel cell should be capable of sustained operation at reduced output (10 percent of rated capacity, if possible).
• The fuel cell and associated system should be capable of operation in a space environment.

STG completed the first draft of "Project Apollo, Phase A, General Requirements for a Proposal for a Manned Space Vehicle and System" (Statement of Work), an early step toward the spacecraft specification. A circumlunar mission was the basis for planning.

In initial study contracts, Martin proposed vehicle similar to the Apollo configuration that would eventually fly and closest to STG concepts. GE proposed design that would lead directly to Soyuz. Convair proposed a lifting body concept. All bidders were influenced by STG mid-term review that complained that they were not paying enough attention to conical blunt-body CM as envisioned by STG.

The final reports on the feasibility study contracts for the advanced manned spacecraft were submitted to STG at Langley Field, Va., by the General Electric Company, Convair Astronautics Division of General Dynamics Corporation, and The Martin Company. These studies had begun in November 1960.

The second draft of a Statement of Work for the development of an advanced manned spacecraft was completed, incorporating results from NASA in-house and contractor feasibility studies.

The Fleming Committee, which had been appointed on May 2, submitted its report to NASA associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., on the feasibility of a manned lunar landing program. The Committee concluded that the lunar mission could be accomplished within the decade. Chief pacing items were the first stage of the launch vehicle and the facilities for testing and launching the booster. It also concluded that information on solar flare radiation and lunar surface characteristics should be obtained as soon as possible, since these factors would influence spacecraft design. Special mention was made of the need for a strong management organization.

STG completed a detailed assessment of the results of the Project Apollo feasibility studies submitted by the three study contractors: the General Electric Company, Convair/Astronautics Division of the General Dynamics Corporation, and The Martin Company. (Their findings were reflected in the Statement of Work sent to prospective bidders on the spacecraft contract on July 28.)

1,000 persons from 300 potential Project Apollo contractors and government agencies attended the conference. STG pushed the conical CM shape, in defiance of Gilruth's preference for the competitive blunt body/lifting body designs. Scientists from NASA, the General Electric Company, The Martin Company, and General Dynamics/Astronautics presented the results of studies on Apollo requirements. Within the next four to six weeks NASA was expected to draw up the final details and specifications for the Apollo spacecraft.

NASA Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr., appointed members to the Source Evaluation Board to evaluate contractors' proposals for the Apollo spacecraft. Walter C. Williams of STG served as Chairman, and members included Robert O. Piland, Wesley L. Hjornevik, Maxime A. Faget, James A. Chamberlin, Charles W. Mathews, and Dave W. Lang, all of STG; George M. Low, Brooks C. Preacher, and James T. Koppenhaver (nonvoting member) from NASA Headquarters; and Oswald H. Lange from Marshall Space Flight Center. On November 2, Faget became the Chairman, Kenneth S. Kleinknecht was added as a member, and Williams was relieved from his assignment.

NASA invited 12 companies to submit prime contractor proposals for the Apollo spacecraft by October 9: The Boeing Airplane Company, Chance Vought Corporation, Douglas Aircraft Company, General Dynamics/Convair, the General Electric Company, Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, The Martin Company, North American Aviation, Inc., and Republic Aviation Corporation.

In the Statement of Work sent to each prospective bidder, three phases of the Apollo program were described:

Phase A:

Manned low-altitude earth orbital flights of up to two weeks' duration and unmanned reentry flights from superorbital velocities. The spacecraft designed for these missions should be capable of development for the lunar landing and return. The objectives of Phase A were to qualify the spacecraft systems and features for the lunar landing mission within the constraints of the earth orbital environment, to qualify the heat protection and other systems for the lunar mission through reentry tests from superorbital velocities, to study the physiological and psychological reactions and capabilities of human beings under extended periods in the space environment, to develop flight and ground operational techniques and equipment for space flights of extended duration, and to conduct experimental investigations to acquire information for the lunar mission. The Saturn C-1 would be used for Phase A missions.

Phase B:

Circumlunar, lunar orbital, and parabolic reentry test flights employing the Saturn C-3 launch vehicle for furthering the development of the spacecraft and operational techniques and for lunar reconnaissance.

Phase C:

Manned lunar landing and return missions using either the Nova class or Saturn C-3 launch vehicles and using rendezvous techniques for the purpose of lunar observation and exploration.

The contractor was to design and manufacture the command module, service module, and spacecraft adapter with associated ground support equipment, excluding the navigation and guidance system, research and development instrumentation, and scientific instrumentation; to design and manufacture the "test" spacecraft for use with Saturn C-1 research and development launch vehicles; to integrate the spacecraft modules and to integrate these modules with their ground support equipment and ensure compatibility of spacecraft with launch vehicle and with the ground operational support system; and to design and manufacture spacecraft mockups.

The contractor was to prepare the spacecraft for flight, man the systems monitoring positions in the ground operational support system, and support the operation of the overall space vehicle.

STG had prepared the Statement of Work, using both contractor and in- house studies. Included in the Statement of Work was a description of the major command and service module systems.

Guidance and control system

Navigation and guidance subsystem components:

- Stable platform

- Space sextant

- Radar altimeter

- Secondary inertial elements

- Computer

- Periscope

- Sun trackers

- Associated electronics

- Displays and controls

- Cabling

Stabilization and control subsystem to provide:

- Flight-path control during the thrusting period of atmospheric abort and stability augmentation after launch escape system separation

- Orientation, attitude control, and reentry stabilization and control during extra-atmospheric abort

- Stabilization of the spacecraft plus the final stage of the launch vehicle while in a parking orbit

- Stabilization and control during translunar and transearth midcourse flight

- Rendezvous and docking with the space laboratory module

- Attitude control for accomplishing landings and takeoffs from the moon and for entering and departing from lunar orbits

- Control requirements for reentry guidance

- Stabilization and control of the command module flight direction in the landing configuration, as well as the landing system suspension members

Vernier propulsion system

The system would be included in the service module to provide longitudinal velocity control not supplied by the reaction control system, mission propulsion system, or lunar landing module; and to furnish effective thrust-vector control during operation of the mission propulsion system. It would be pressure-fed, using storable hypergolic bipropellants.

Mission propulsion system

Representing the major portion of propulsion for translunar abort, lunar orbit injection and rejection, and velocity increment for lunar launch, the system would comprise a number of identical solid-propellant rocket motors and would be included in the service module.

Reaction control system

The system would provide attitude control, stabilization, ullage for the vernier propulsion system, and minor velocity corrections. For both the command and service modules, the system would be pulse-modulated, pressure-fed, and would use storable hypergolic fuel identical with that in the vernier propulsion system. The fuel tanks would be the positive expulsion type.

Launch escape system

During failure or imminent failure of the launch vehicle during all atmospheric mission phases, the system would separate the command module from the launch vehicle. The basic propulsion system would be a solid-fuel rocket motor with "step" or regressive burning characteristics.

Earth landing system

The system would consist of a ribbon drogue parachute and a cluster of three simultaneously deployed landing parachutes, sized so that satisfactory operation of any two of the three would satisfy the vertical velocity requirement. The command module would hang in a canted position from the parachute risers and be oriented through roll control to favor impact attenuation.

Structural system

In addition to fundamental load-carrying structures, the command and service modules would carry meteoroid protection, radiation protection inherent in the structure, and passive heat protection systems.

Crew systems

Included were:

- Three couches, the center one stowable

- Support and restraint systems at each duty station

- Shock mitigation devices for individual crew support and restraint systems

- Pressure suits for each crewman

- Sleeping area

- Sanitation area

Environmental control system

To provide a shirtsleeve environment in the command module, the system would consist of:

- Cabin atmosphere - an oxygen-nitrogen mixture stabilized at 7.0 psia

- Removal of carbon dioxide by lithium hydroxide

- Removal of noxious gases by activated charcoal and a catalytic burner

- Heat-exchanger water-separation system for control of temperature and humidity

- Potable water from the fuel cells

- Controls for pressure, humidity, and temperature

Electrical power system

The system would be composed of nonregenerative hydrogen-oxygen Bacon- type fuel-cell batteries carried, with their fuel supply, in the service module; silver-zinc primary batteries required during reentry and postlanding carried, with their associated fuel, distribution, and control equipment, in the command module.

Communication and instrumentation system

Communication subsystems:

- Deep-space communication

- Telemetry

- VHF transmitter and receiver

- Intercommunication system

- Near-field transceiver

- Television

- C-band transponder

- Altimeter and rendezvous radar

- Minitrack beacon

- HF/VHF recovery subsystem

- Antennas

Instrumentation subsystem:

- Sensors

- Data disposition (telemetry and onboard recorders)

- Subsystem calibration

- Auxiliary instrumentation (clock, cameras, telescope)

Scientific equipment

The equipment was unspecified but would be fitted into ten cubic feet and weigh 250 pounds.

In addition to the description of the major command and service module systems, the Statement of Work outlined the general concepts of the lunar landing module and space laboratory module.

Lunar landing module

The basic systems comprised :

Lunar touchdown system to arrest impact, support the spacecraft during its period on the moon, and provide a launching base

Guidance and control, provided by the command and service modules

Main propulsion system, for translunar velocity control and the gross velocity decrement required for lunar landing, using liquid-hydrogen - liquid-oxygen propellant

Terminal propulsion system, to provide propulsion and attitude reaction control to perform the terminal descent maneuver, including hovering and translation

Structural system, to meet the same requirements as specified for the command and service modules

Space laboratory module

The module would be used in earth orbital flights for special experiments. It would provide its own power supply, environmental control system, etc., without demand on the command and service module systems and could support two of the three Apollo crewmen except for their food and water.

The MIT Instrumentation Laboratory and NASA completed the work statements for the Laboratory's program on the Apollo guidance and navigation system and the request for quotation for industrial support was prepared.

Ralph Ragan of the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory, former director of the Polaris guidance and navigation program, in cooperation with Milton B. Trageser of the Laboratory and with Robert O. Piland, Robert C. Seamans, Jr., and Robert G. Chilton, all of NASA, had completed a study of what had been done on the Polaris program in concept and design of a guidance and navigation system and the documentation necessary for putting such a system into production on an extremely tight schedule. Using this study, the group worked out a rough schedule for a similar program on Apollo.

STG appointed members to the Technical Subcommittee and to the Technical Assessment Panels for evaluation of industry proposals for the development of the Apollo spacecraft.

NASA selected MIT's Instrumentation Laboratory to develop the guidance-navigation system for Project Apollo spacecraft. This first major Apollo contract was required since guidance-navigation system is basic to overall Apollo mission. The Instrumentation Laboratory of MIT, a nonprofit organization headed by C. Stark Draper, has been involved in a variety of guidance and navigation systems developments for 20 years. This first major Apollo contract had a long lead-time, was basic to the overall Apollo mission, and would be directed by STG.

STG requested that a program be undertaken by the U.S. Navy Air Crew Equipment Laboratory, Philadelphia, Penna., to validate the atmospheric composition requirement for the Apollo spacecraft. On November 7, the original experimental design was altered by the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC). The new objectives were:

• Establish the required preoxygenation time for a rapid decompression (80 seconds) from sea level to 35,000 feet.
• Discover the time needed for equilibrium (partial denitrogenation) at the proposed cabin atmosphere for protection in case of rapid decompression to 35,000 feet.
• Investigate the potential hazard associated with an early mission decompression - i.e., before the equilibrium time was reached, preceded by the determined preoxygenation period.
• Conduct any additional tests suggested by the results of the foregoing experiments.

STG held a pre-proposal briefing at Langley Field, Va., to answer bidders' questions pertaining to the Request for Proposal for the development of the Apollo spacecraft. 14 companies (Boeing, Vought, Douglas, GD, Goodyear, Grumman, Lockheed, Martin, McDonnell, Radio Corp, Republic, STL) attended. The winning bidder would receive contract for CSM (but not LM, if any) and integrate spacecraft with launch vehicle.

STG appointed members to the Business Subcommittee and to the Business Assessment Panels for evaluation of industry proposals for the development of the Apollo spacecraft.

Representatives of STG and NASA Headquarters visited the Instrumentation Laboratory of MIT to discuss the contract awarded to the Laboratory on August 9 and progress in the design and development of the Apollo spacecraft navigation and guidance system. They mutually decided that a draft of the final contract should be completed for review at Instrumentation Laboratory by October 2 and the contract resolved by October 9. Revisions were to be made in the Statement of Work to define more clearly details of the contract. Milton B. Trageser of the Laboratory, in the first month's technical progress report, gave a brief description of the first approach to the navigation and guidance equipment and the arrangement of the equipment within the spacecraft. He also presented the phases of the lunar flight and the navigation and guidance functions or tasks to be performed. Other matters discussed were a space sextant and making visual observations of landmarks through cloud cover.

Richard H. Battin published MIT Instrumentation Laboratory Report R-341, "A Statistical Optimizing Navigation Procedure for Space Flight," describing the concepts by which Apollo navigation equipment could make accurate computations of position and velocity with an onboard computer of reasonable size.

Representatives of STG visited the Instrumentation Laboratory of MIT for the second monthly progress report meeting on the Apollo spacecraft guidance and navigation contract. A number of technical topics were presented by Laboratory speakers: space sextant visibility and geometry problems, gear train analysis, vacuum environmental approach, midcourse guidance theory, inertial measurement unit, and gyro. The organization of the Apollo effort at the Laboratory was also discussed. A preliminary estimate of the cost for both Laboratory and industrial support for the Apollo navigation and guidance system was presented: $158.4 million through Fiscal Year 1966.

Five Bidding Teams: GD/Avco; GE/Douglas/Grumman/STL; McDonnell/Lockheed/Hughes/Vought; Martin/North American

Officials of STG heard oral reports from representatives of five industrial teams bidding on the contract for the Apollo spacecraft: General Dynamics/Astronautics in conjunction with the Avco Corporation; General Electric Company, Missile and Space Vehicle Department, in conjunction with Douglas Aircraft Company, Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, and Space Technology Laboratories, Inc.; McDonnell Aircraft Corporation in conjunction with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Hughes Aircraft Company, and Chance Vought Corporation of Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.; The Martin Company; and North American Aviation, Inc.

Written proposals had been received from the contractors on October 9. The presentations were made in the Virginia Room of the Chamberlain Hotel at Old Point Comfort, Va. Following the reports, 11 panels, under the direction of the Business and Technical Subcommittees, began studying the proposals. The Panels established were: Systems Integration; Propulsion; Flight Mechanics; Structures, Materials, and Heating; Human Factors; Instrumentation and Communications; Onboard Systems; Ground Operational Support Systems and Operations; Technical Development Plan; Reliability; and Manufacturing. The Technical Assessment Panels completed their evaluation October 20 and made their final report to the Technical Subcommittee on October 25. The Technical Subcommittee made its final report to the Source Evaluation Board on November 1.

Robert G. Chilton of STG gave the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory new information based on NASA in- house studies on the Apollo spacecraft roll inertia, pitch and yaw inertia, and attitude jets.

David G. Hoag, MIT, personal notes, October 1961.

An Apollo Egress Working Group, consisting of personnel from Marshall Space Flight Center, Launch Operations Directorate, and Atlantic Missile Range, was formed on November 2. Meetings on that date and on November 6 resulted in publication of a seven-page document, "Apollo Egress Criteria." The Group established ground rules, operations and control procedures criteria, and space vehicle design criteria and provided requirements for implementation of emergency egress system.

Representatives of MSC and NASA Headquarters visited the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory to discuss clauses in the contract for the Apollo navigation and guidance system, technical questions proposed by MSC, and work in progress. Topics discussed included the trajectories for the SA-7 and SA-8 flights and the estimated propellant requirements for guidance attitude maneuvers and velocity changes for the lunar landing mission. Presentations were made on the following subjects by members of the Laboratory staff: the spacecraft gyro, Apollo guidance computer logic design, computer displays and interfaces, guidance computer programming, horizon sensor experiments, and reentry guidance.

Bid ratings: Martin 6.9; GD 6.6; North American 6.6; GE 6.4; McDonnell 6.4

The original Apollo spacecraft Statement of Work of July 28 had been substantially expanded, including a single-engine service module propulsion system using Earth-storable, hypergolic propellants.

The requirements for the spacecraft navigation and guidance system were defined:

- Control of translunar injection of the spacecraft and monitoring capability of injection guidance to the crew both for direct ascent and for injection from an earth parking orbit.

- Data and computation for mission abort capability en route to the moon and for guidance to a point from which a safe lunar landing could be attempted.

- Guidance of the command module to a preselected earth landing site after safe reentry.

- Guidance for establishing lunar orbit and making lunar landings; mission abort capability from the lunar landing maneuver.

- Control of launch from the lunar surface into transearth trajectory by both direct ascent and from lunar parking orbit.

- Rendezvous in earth orbit between the spacecraft and space laboratory module or other space vehicle.

Components of the navigation and guidance system now clearly identified were:

- Inertial platform

- Space sextant

- Computer

- Controls and displays

- Electronics assembly

- Chart and star catalog

- Range or velocity measuring equipment for terminal control in rendezvous and lunar landing

- Backup inertial components for emergency operation

The stabilization and control system requirements were revised:

- Roll control as well as flight path control during the thrusting period of atmospheric abort and stability augmentation after launch escape system separation

- Stabilization of the spacecraft and the lunar injection configuration while in earth parking orbit

- Rendezvous and docking with the space laboratory module or other space vehicle

- Attitude control and hovering for lunar landings and launchings and for entering and leaving lunar orbit

Basic components of the stabilization and control system were defined:

- Attitude reference

- Rate sensors

- Control electronics assembly

- Manual controls

- Attitude and rate displays

- Power supplies

A single-engine service module propulsion system would replace the earlier vernier and mission propulsion systems. The new system would be capable of

- Abort propulsion after jettison of the launch escape system

- All major velocity increments and midcourse velocity corrections for missions prior to the lunar landing attempt

- Lunar launch propulsion and transearth midcourse velocity correction.

Earth-storable, hypergolic propellants would be used by the new system, which would include single- or multiple-thrust chambers with a thrust- to-weight ratio of at least 0.4 for all chambers operating (based on the lunar launch configuration) and would have a pressurized propellant feed system.

The reaction control systems for the command and service modules would now each consist of two independent system, both capable of meeting the total torque and propellant requirements. The fuel would be monomethylhydrazine and the oxidizer would be a mixture of nitrogen tetroxide and nitrous oxide.

The parachute system for the earth landing configuration was revised to include two FIST-type drogue parachutes deployed by mortars.

The command module structure was specified: a ring-reinforced, single- thickness aluminum shell pressure vessel separated from the outer support structure of relatively rigid brazed or welded sandwich construction. The ablative heatshield would be bonded to this outer structure.

Service module structure was also detailed: an aluminum honeycomb sandwich shell compatible with noise and buffet and with meteoroid requirements. The structural continuity would have to be maintained with adjoining modules and be compatible with the overall bending stiffness requirements of the launch vehicle.

The duties of the three Apollo crewmen were delineated :

- Commander

- Control of the spacecraft in manual or automatic mode in all phases of the mission

- Selection, implementation, and monitoring of the navigation and guidance modes

- Monitoring and control of key areas of all systems during time-critical periods

- Station in the left or center couch

Co-Pilot

- Second in command of the spacecraft

- Support of the pilot as alternative pilot or navigator

- Monitoring of certain key parameters of the spacecraft and propulsion systems during critical mission phases

- Station in the left or center couch

Systems Engineer

- Responsibility for all systems and their operation

- Primary monitor of propulsion systems during critical mission phases

- Responsibility for systems placed on board primarily for evaluation for later Apollo spacecraft

- Station in the right-hand couch.

During launch, reentry, or similar critical mission phases, the crew would be seated side by side. At other times, at least one couch would be stowed.

One crew member would stand watch during noncritical mission phases at either of the two primary duty stations. Areas for taking navigation fixes, performing maintenance, food preparation, and certain scientific observations could be separate from primary duty stations. Arrangements of displays and controls would reflect the duties of each crewman. They would be so arranged that one crewman could return the spacecraft safely to earth. All crewmen would be cross-trained so that each could assume the others' duties.

Radiation shielding for the crew would be provided by the mass of the spacecraft modules.

A description of crew equipment was added:

- The couch for each crewman would give full body and head support during all normal and emergency acceleration conditions. It would be adjustable to permit changes in body and leg angles and would be so constructed as to allow crewmen to interchange positions and to accommodate a crewman wearing a back or seat parachute. A restraint system would be provided with each couch for adequate restraint during all flight phases. Each support and restraint system would furnish vibration attenuation beyond that needed to maintain general spacecraft integrity. This system would keep crew vibration loads within tolerance limits and also enable the crew to exercise necessary control and monitoring functions.

- Pressure suits would be carried for extravehicular activity and for use in the event of cabin decompression.

- The spacecraft would be equipped with toilet facilities which would include means for disinfecting the human waste sufficiently to render it harmless and unobjectionable to the crew. Personal hygiene needs, such as shaving, the handling of nonhuman waste, and the control of infectious germs would be provided for.

- Food would be dehydrated, freeze-dried, or of a similar type that could be reconstituted with water if necessary. Heating and chilling of the foods would be required. The primary source of potable water would be the fuel cells. In addition, sufficient water would have to be on board at launch for use during the 72-hour landing requirement in case of early abort. Urine would not have to be recycled for potable water.

Emergency equipment would include:

- Personal parachutes

- Post-landing survival equipment: one three-man liferaft, food, location aids, first aid supplies, and accessories to support the crew outside the spacecraft for three days in any emergency landing area. In addition, a three-day water supply would be removed from the spacecraft after landing; provision for purifying a three-day supply of sea water would be included.

The crew would be furnished "shirtsleeve" garments,lightweight cap, and exercise and recreation equipment.

Medical instrumentation would be used to monitor the crew during all flights, especially during stressful periods of early flights, and for special experiments to be performed in the space laboratory module and during extravehicular activity and lunar exploration. Each crewman would carry a radiation dosimeter.

The environmental control system would comprise two air loops, a gas supply system, and a thermal control system.

One air loop would supply the conditioned atmosphere to the cabin or pressure suits. The other would remove sensible heat and provide cabin ventilation during all phases of the mission including postlanding.

The primary gas supply would be stored in the service module as supercritical cryogenics. The supply would be 50 percent excess capacity over that required for normal metabolic needs, two complete cabin repressurization, a minimum of 18 airlock operations, and leakage. Recharging of self-contained extravehicular suit support systems would be possible.

Thermal control would be achieved by absorbing heat with a circulating coolant and rejecting this heat from a space radiator. During certain mission modes, other cooling systems would supplement or relieve the primary system.

Water collected from the separator and the fuel cells would be stored separately in positive expulsion tanks. Manual closures, filters, and relief valves would be used where needed as safety devices.

Metabolic requirements for the environmental control system were:

- Total cabin pressure (oxygen and nitrogen mixture): 7 +/- 0.2 psia

- Relative humidity: 40 to 70 percent

- Partial pressure carbon dioxide - maximum 7.6 mm Hg

- Temperature: 75 degrees F +/- 5 degrees F

The major components of the electrical power system were described more fully:

- Three nonregenerative hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell modules characterized by low pressure, intermediate temperature, Bacon-type, utilizing porous nickel, unactivated electrodes, and aqueous potassium as the electrolyte

- Mechanical accessories, including control components, reactant tankage, piping, etc.

- Three silver-zinc primary batteries, each having a normal 28-volt output and a minimum capacity of 3,000 watt-hours (per battery) when discharged at the ten-hour rate at 80 degrees F

- A display and control panel, sufficient to monitor the operation and status of the system and for distribution of generated power to electrical loads as required

The fuel cell modules and control, tanks (empty), radiators, heat exchangers, piping, valves, total reactants plus reserves would be located in the service module. The silver-zinc batteries anti electrical power distribution and controls would be placed in the command module.

Under normal operation, the entire electrical power requirements would be supplied by the three fuel cell modules operating in parallel. The primary storage batteries would be maintained fully charged under this condition of operation.

If one fuel cell module failed, the unit involved would automatically be electrically and mechanically isolated from the system and the entire electrical load assumed by the two remaining fuel cells. The primary batteries would remain fully charged.

If two fuel cell modules failed, they would be isolated from the system and the spacecraft electrical loads would immediately be reduced by the crew and manually programmed to hold within the generating capacities of the remaining fuel cell.

At reentry, the fuel cell modules and accessories would be jettisoned. All subsequent electrical power requirements would be provided by the primary storage batteries.

Each fuel cell module would have a normal capacity of 1,200 watts at an output voltage of 28 volts and a current density conservatively assigned so that 50 percent overloads could be continuously supplied. The normal fuel cell operating pressure and temperature would be about 60 psia and 425 degrees F to 500 degrees F respectively. Under normal conditions of operation, the specific fuel (hydrogen and oxygen) consumption should not exceed a total of 0.9 lb/kw-hr.

Self-sustaining operation within the fuel cell module should begin at a temperature of about 275 degrees F. A detection system would be provided with each fuel cell module to prevent contamination of the collected potable water supply.

The degree of redundancy provided for mechanical and electrical accessory equipment would be 100 percent.

The distribution portion of the electrical power system would contain all necessary buses, wiring protective devices, and switching and regulating equipment.

Sufficient tankage would be supplied to store all reactants required by the fuel cell modules and environmental controls for a 14-day mission. The reactants would be stored supercritically at cryogenic temperatures and the tankage would consist of two equal volume storage vessels for each reactant. The main oxygen and nitrogen storage would supply both the environmental control system and the fuel cells.

The communication and instrumentation system was further detailed:

- The equipment was to be constructed to facilitate maintenance byground personnel and by the crew and to be as nearly self-contained aspossible to facilitate removal from the spacecraft. Flexibility forincorporation of future additions or modifications would be stressedthroughout the design. A patch and programming panel would be includedwhich would permit the routing of signal inputs from sensors to anyselected signal conditioner and from this te any desired commutatorchannel. Panel design would provide the capability of"repatching" during a mission. The equipment and system shouldbe capable of sustained undegraded operation with supply voltagevariation of +15 percent to -20 percent of the normal bus voltage.

- A circuit quality analysis for each radiating electrical system would be required to show exactly how ranging, telemetry, voice, and television data modulated all transmitters with which they were used.

- The equipment and associated documentation would be engineered for comprehensive and logical fault tracing.

Components of the communication subsystem would include:

- Voice communication

- Telemetry

- Tracking transponders

- Television

- Radio recovery aids

- Antenna subsystems

- Radar altimeter (if required by the guidance system)

The instrumentation system would be required to detect, measure, and display all parameters needed by the crew for monitoring and evaluating the integrity and environment of the spacecraft and performance of the spacecraft systems.

Data would be transmitted to ground stations for assessment of spacecraft performance and for failure analysis. Information needed for abort decisions and aid in the selection of lunar landing sites would also be provided. The mission would be documented through photography and recording.

Included in the components of the instrumentation system were:

- Sensors

- Data disposition

- Tape recorders

- Panel display indicators

- Calibration

- Clock

- Telescope

- Cameras

In addition to the description of the major command and service module systems, the Statement of Work also included sections on the lunar landing module, space laboratory module, mission control center and ground operational support system, and the engineering and development test plan.

The propulsion system for the lunar landing module would now comprise a composite propulsion system: multiple lunar retrograde engines for the gross velocity increments required for lunar orbiting and lunar landing; and a lunar landing engine for velocity vector control, midcourse velocity control, and the lunar hover and touchdown maneuver. The lunar retrograde engines would use liquid-oxygen and liquid-hydrogen propellants. The single lunar landing engine would require the same type of propellant, would be throttleable over a ratio of +/- 50 percent about the normal value, and would be capable of multiple starts within the design operating life of the engine.

No additions or changes had been made in the space laboratory module systems description.

Overall control of all Apollo support elements throughout all phases of a mission would be exercised by the Mission Control Center. Up to the time of liftoff, mission launch activities would be conducted from the launch control center at Cape Canaveral. Remote stations would be used to support near-earth and lunar flights and track the command module during reentry.

Five major phases of a development and test plan were identified:

- Design information and development tests

- Qualification, reliability, and integration tests

- Major ground tests

- Major development flight tests

- Flight missions.

Despite an announcement at Martin on 27 November that they had won the Apollo program, the decision was reversed at the highest levels of the US government. NASA announced instead that the Space and Information Systems Division of North American Aviation, Inc., had been selected to design and build the Apollo spacecraft. The official line: 'the decision by NASA Administrator James E. Webb followed a comprehensive evaluation of five industry proposals by nearly 200 scientists and engineers representing both NASA and DOD. Webb had received the Source Evaluation Board findings on November 24. Although technical evaluations were very close, NAA had been selected on the basis of experience, technical competence, and cost'. NAA would be responsible for the design and development of the command module and service module. NASA expected that a separate contract for the lunar landing system would be awarded within the next six months. The MIT Instrumentation Laboratory had previously been assigned the development of the Apollo spacecraft guidance and navigation system. Both the NAA and MIT contracts would be under the direction of MSC.

NASA Administrator James E. Webb issued a statement on selection of the Apollo spacecraft contractor: "In the 1961 NASA decision to negotiate with North American Aviation for the Apollo command and service modules, there were no better qualified experts in or out of NASA on whom I could rely than Dr. Robert Gilruth, Dr. Robert C. Seamans, and Dr. Hugh L. Dryden. These three were unanimous in their judgment that of the five companies submitting proposals, and of the two companies that were rated highest by the Source Evaluation Board, North American Aviation offered the greatest experience in developing high-performance manned flight systems and the lowest cost.

"In the selection of North American Aviation, the work of the Source Evaluation Board was not rejected or discarded. It was used as the basis for a more extensive and detailed examination of all pertinent factors than the Board had performed at the time its report was presented to Dr. Gilruth, Dr. Seamans, Dr. Dryden and to me.

"At that point it became the responsibility of NASA's Associate Administrator, Dr. Seamans; its Deputy Administrator, Dr. Dryden; and its Administrator, myself, to take all steps necessary to determine whether the facts then available formed an adequate basis for our selection of a contractor. We decided in the affirmative and then proceeded to select the contractor the facts indicated offered the most to the government."

Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Deputy Administrator of NASA, prepared a memorandum to the file concerning the selection of North American Aviation as the CSM prime contractor. The memorandum, a seven-page document, chronologically reviewed the steps that led to the selection of North American and followed by about a month the statement of NASA Administrator James E. Webb in response to queries from members of the Congress.