LK-700 Credit - © Mark Wade Media Gallery

The LK-700 was Chelomei's direct-landing alternative to Korolev's L3 manned lunar landing design. It would have used the monster UR-700 booster to send a crew of three on a direct flight to the lunar surface and back. Although Korolev's N1-L3 design was selected in 1964 for the manned lunar landing, work on the UR-700/LK-700 continued in parallel at a low level.

Chelomei's TsKBM began work on the UR-700 launch vehicle for manned lunar landing missions in 1962. Variants were studied with 70 to 175 metric tons payload, and rocket stages of various thrust levels, including nuclear stages. The conclusion was reached that a direct lunar landing would require a payload of 130 to 170 metric tons. Initial LK-700 spacecraft designs were derived from the 'Raketoplan' family of manned modular space vehicles. Although Korolev's N1-L3 design was selected in 1964 for the manned lunar landing, the project quickly encountered delays and weight growth. A revised UR-700/LK-700 design was presented on 16 November 1966 to an expert commission headed by Keldysh as an alternative to Korolev/Mishin's N1-L3 lunar lander project. Although Chelomei had lined up the support of Glushko, and Mishin was in a weak position after Korolev's death, Keldysh managed to ensure that the N1-L3 continued. However continued design work on the LK-700, the UR-700 booster, and development of the RD-270 engine were authorized. Chelomei took a sound conservative design approach (i.e. no docking required, no cryogenics) with the capability for evolutionary later improvement (propellant utilization system, 'hot' backup engines). The design directive documents were signed by Chelomei on 21 July 1967.

Development of the LK-700 manned lunar landing spacecraft was undertaken in accordance with decree 1070-363 of the Soviet Ministers and Central Committee of the Communist Party on 17 September 1967 and MOM decree 472 of 28 September 1967. Study index number 4855CC by TsNIIMASH in 1966 showed that any development of improved versions of the N1 would be practically equivalent to design and qualification of a new rocket, while the UR-700 modular approach allowed a range of payloads without requalification. The UR-700/LK-700 combination could support the DLB lunar base better, as well as Venus/Mars manned flybys and Mars landing expeditions.

It was planned that a total of 16 prototype articles of the LK-700 would be built for: component qualification test, dimensional fit test, static test, functional mock-up, ECS test, thermal test, module interface test, landing gear trials, antenna deployment test, SAS launch escape system test, impact and sea recovery trials, engine test, heat shield trials, and crew training.

A total of five ship-sets of UK-700/LK-700 flight articles were to be built. Two unmanned flights were to be followed by three manned flights.

Project plan was as follows:

• October-November 1968: Beginning of serious engineering work requiring external financing
• October 1968 to January 1973: Engineering design and drawing release
• 2nd Quarter 1969: Selection of cosmonaut training group
• 4th Quarter 1969: Completion of prototype article design
• 2nd Quarter 1970: Completion of flight article design
• Beginning 1971: Completion of LK-700 prototype tests
• April 1971 to April 1973: Flight crew training
• November 1971: Delivery of first LK-700 fight article. Subsequent deliveries in April, July, October 1972 and January 1973
• October 1971: Delivery of first UR-700 launch vehicle. Subsequent deliveries n February, May, August, November 1972.
• May 1972: First UR-700/LK-700 unmanned launch. Subsequent unmanned launches in November 1972 and April 1973
• April 1973: First manned UR-700/LK-700 launch. Subsequent manned flights in August and October 1973.

• Dosimetric measurements of space radiation
• Micrometeoroid environment
• Solar and cosmic radiation
• Surveys of the lunar surface, including landing site selection, development of a selenographic co-ordinate system, establishment of navigation parameters
• Measurement of the magnetic field of the moon
• Mineralogical survey of the surface
• Passive seismic observations
• Lunar surface temperatures
• Gravitational field measurement and variations
• Solar plasma
• Televised scientific observations
• Gamma spectrometer reading of the chemical composition of the surface
• Residual magnetic pole
• Laser reflector position observations

Following initial LK-700 landings the LKE Lunar Expeditionary Complex would be delivered to the surface. This would permit long duration investigations of the surface and a much wider range of research. Precision landings in support of the LKE and lunar base would use Ye-8 Lunokhods equipped with radio homing beacons. The complex would be delivered in two to three UR-700 launches:

• Launch 1: Heavy Unpiloted Station - a one-way flight to deliver a __ metric ton lunar station to the surface.
• Launch 2: LK-700 spacecraft with crew. The LK-700 would provide return transportation and was capable of being placed in dormant mode for a month.
• Launch 3: Lunar laboratory / Heavy Lunokhod would be landed to provide mobility for surface expeditions.

The later DLB lunar base would require 80 metric tons per year of payload delivered to the surface starting in 1975, followed by 150 metric tons per year after 1980. Versions of the UR-700/LK-700 could handle this more easily than modifying the N1.

Lunar versions of the Almaz OPS would be placed in lunar orbit to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the surface using manned assistance. The OPS would also be used as a command post to co-ordinate the work of lunar surface operations and organize rescues in the case of emergencies on the surface.

Although mock-ups were built, no financing for full scale development was forthcoming by the required October 1968 date. By then it was apparent, that barring some disaster with an Apollo spacecraft, the moon race was lost. Kremlin interest in supporting such projects waned.

Following the explosion of the first N1 in January 1969, Pilyugin was called to a meeting at the Kremlin. Chelomei was again proposing the use of his UR-700/LK-700 in the place of the N1-L3, and a flight to Mars using an even larger version of the launch vehicle. Afanasyev was preparing a decree along these lines. Pilyugin refused to participate in this 'adventure'.

Nevertheless Chelomei's bureau continued to study the design until 1974, when the project was finally and definitively suppressed with the cancellation of the N1 and the lunar base projects.

Technical Description

The RKS Rocket-Space System was designed for direct landing on the moon without docking in earth or lunar orbit. It consisted of:

• LK-700 spacecraft
• UR-700 launch vehicle
• Launch complex for the UR-700
• Technical positions which would take factory-completed modules and conduct assembly and check-out operations before moving them to the pad for launch
• Command-tracking system
• Crew landing and rescue system
• Crew recovery system

• The direct landing scheme would allow development of a simpler and more reliable lunar expedition system, while allowing landings at any point over 88% of the visible surface of the moon and a much wider launch window for a given mission energy. No docking was required. The N1-L3 / Apollo lunar orbit rendezvous technique limited sustained lunar surface operations to a small region around the lunar equator (due to the one month lunar period of rotation, other locations would have to wait two weeks before the companion spacecraft in lunar orbit came over the landing site again).

• N2O4 / UDMH storable propellants used universally in all stages of the launch vehicle and spacecraft.

• High reliability would be obtained in all portions of the system by minimizing the number of parts.

• Earliest possible date for the landing would be achieved by using proven systems, requiring a minimum of new hardware development. Minimum modifications of existing UR-100 and UR-500 engines were used in the upper stages. Use of the same equipment in all stages of the launch vehicle and spacecraft wherever possible.

• Crew of no less than two for the initial mission in order to provide mutual support during lunar surface operations. A crew of three would be possible on later missions after a better launch vehicle propellant utilization system was put into operation.

• All elements of the system would be completed, tested, and certified flight ready in the factory before being shipped to the launch site. No requirement for construction facilities at the launch site.

• The design would have reserve capacity to allow a range of propellant loading. This meant that a wider range of launch windows, landing sites, and flight trajectories would be available without having to redesign the launch vehicle and spacecraft. Later a wider range of landing points, return times, and so on were possible by a heavier vehicle (with completely fuelled tanks) or by adding propellant cross-feed features (topping up the central ascent stage tank with residual propellant from the lateral landing stage tanks).

• Safety of the crew was assured throughout the mission through use of double or triple redundant systems and the use of the next rocket stage in the series for maneuvers in case of the failure of a lower stage

• The complex could be easily adapted for a wide range of missions. For example, the launch vehicle payload could be increased by stretching the propellant tanks. This would allow addition of an airlock and lunar surface shelter to the lander for extended exploration missions. Other possibilities were a stretched re-entry capsule for increased number of crew, and transport variants.

• Block 1 Translunar Injection Stage: This consisted of three identical stages clustered around the core. Total mass of 103,474 kg (three rocket stages of 34,491 kg each). Each stage was equipped with a 23,500 metric ton thrust Kosberg 11D23 engine.

• Block 11 Midcourse maneuver/lunar braking stage: Mass 32,226 kg (similar to the three Translunar injection stages clustered around it). 2,041 kg of propellant used for mid-course corrections prior to the start of the lunar braking maneuver. The remainder of the propellants were used to brake the spacecraft to 30 m/s at 4.3 km above the lunar surface, at which point this stage was jettisoned. This stage differed from the lateral Block 1 stages in having an engine unit for orientation of the assembly. It was equipped with a single Kosberg 11D23 main engine of 23.5 metric tons thrust, surrounded by three Isayev 11D416 engines of 1.67 metric tons thrust for midcourse maneuvers and orientation of the spacecraft during the braking maneuver.

• Block 111 Soft Landing Stage: Mass 3500 kg. The unique soft landing platform consisted of six landing gear, each equipped with long ski-like landing pads. This design could accommodate safe landings at vertical velocities of up to 5 m/s; lateral velocities of 2 m/s; and provide a level launch platform on 15 degree slopes. Before launch of the ascent stage special electric devices in each gear would level the platform.

• Block 1V Trans-earth injection / midcourse maneuver stage:: 11,670 kg (mass 2,675 kg without propellant). This stage, using the Block 11 as a launch platform, launched the VA return capsule onto the trans-earth trajectory. It also contained spacecraft avionics and life support systems not in the VA re-entry capsule. It was equipped with a single Isotov (Klimov) 15D13 main engine of 13.4 metric tons thrust, surrounded by three Isayev 11D416 engines of 1.67 metric tons thrust for soft landing on the moon and midcourse maneuvers.

• Block V VA Re-entry Capsule: Mass 3,130 kg. This 'gumdrop' Apollo-shaped capsule was similar to that developed by Chelomei for the LK-1 translunar spacecraft and TKS manned ferry. With a hypersonic lift to drag ratio of 0.35 the capsule could maneuver during re-entry at 11 km/ s to a landing on Soviet territory. Within the VA were the crew cabin, the drogue and main parachute systems, reaction control system for stabilizing the spacecraft during re-entry, and a separable heat shield. Two lunar spacesuits were stored in the cabin for donning prior to moonwalks. The cabin could be depressurized for two to four hours at a time. On the nose of the VA was a parabolic antenna for communications, television transmission to earth, and high rate telemetry transmission.

• Block V1 ADU abort tower. This solid propellant launch escape tower was available from 1.5 hours before launch to 193 seconds into the flight to pull the VA capsule away from the launch vehicle in case of a booster failure. During the first 120 seconds of flight, the ADU would pull the VA away from the booster without its heat shield. From 120 to 193 seconds, the heat shield would remain attached to the VA. At 193 seconds into the flight four explosive bolts separated the ADU from the VA and small solid rocket motors pulled it away from the booster. Thereafter aborts would use the LK-700's Block 1V engine. The abort system was developed by NIITI.

The mission profile for the typical Sea of Fertility 8.3 day mission with a crew of 2 was:

• Insertion of the 154,000 kg spacecraft into a 186 x 260 km earth parking orbit, orbital inclination 51.5 degrees. Five hours (3.75 revolutions) would be spent in parking orbit before the translunar injection maneuver. During this time the crew check out all systems, including the radio altimeter for the critical lunar landing maneuver. The KIK tracking stations conduct precision tracking to refine the orbit of the spacecraft and the data was uploaded to the spacecraft navigation system, which included a gyroscopic platform and a stellar orientation system. The restartable orientation engines of the Block 11 stage provide orientation and ullage for starting of the Block 1 stage. 3,000 kg of consumables were used during the parking orbit phase.

• Translunar injection maneuver of 3,170 to 3,185 m/s delta v. The starting mass of the spacecraft was 151,000 kg. After translunar injection, the three lateral stages of the Block 1 were jettisoned.

• Spacecraft mass now 50,526 kg. 2,041 kg of propellant and consumables were used in spacecraft orientation and two midcourse correction maneuvers during the 3.32 day coast to moon (coast time 6.3 days for an Ocean of Storms mission). The spacecraft was tracked from KIP stations in Yevpatoriya, Shchelkov, Ussuriysk, and Sary Shagan, for six to fourteen hours each day.

• Begin lunar braking maneuver using the Block 11 stage at an altitude of 200 to 500 km (depending on the landing site) above the lunar surface. Mass of spacecraft 48,485 kg at start of maneuver. The Block 11's 11D23 engine shut down when the radio altimeter indicates velocity of 30 m/s at 4.3 km above the surface. The Block 11 stage was jettisoned.

• The 11D416 engine of the LK-700 Block 111 lander stage ignites 4.3 km plus or minus 1 km above the lunar surface. Mass of the spacecraft was now 18,300 kg. 1176 kg of propellant were allocated for the final soft landing maneuver of about 120 seconds duration. During the maneuver the radio altimeter system was used to throttle the engine and keep the centre of mass of the spacecraft on the vertical. Mass landed on the moon 17,124 kg.

• Immediately after landing the crew checks out the spacecraft's systems and determine the precise position of the landing. The crew spends 12 to 24 hours on the surface, conducting two moonwalks of 2 to 2.5 hours duration each. On the surface scientific instruments were set up. 10 kg of lunar soil and movie film of the expedition were to be returned to earth with the crew.

• Trans-earth injection was conducted directly from the lunar surface, using the landing gear of the 3,500 kg Block 111 as a launch stand. The Block 1V stage's ascent maneuver consisted of 4 to 6 seconds vertical ascent at maximum thrust, followed by throttle-back; a further and 8 to 25 seconds (depending on landing site) of vertical climb; followed by a pitch-over to the velocity vector required for the return to earth. Total delta v was 2,740 to 2,840 m/s. Mass of the spacecraft on trans-earth trajectory was 5,805 kg. 4.0 days was spent on the earth return trajectory with two midcourse corrections planned.

• Re-entry into earth's atmosphere was on a hyperbolic trajectory with perigee of 50 km. The radio altimeter came into service again to update the spacecraft's position from 1,000 km to 250 km above the earth. The Block 1V stage separated at 150 km altitude after orienting the VA capsule at the correct angle for re-entry into the atmosphere at 100 km altitude. The VA used its hypersonic lift to drag ratio of 0.35 to limit G-forces on the crew during re-entry. The lift allowed it to vary its landing point from 6,000 to 11,000 km from the atmosphere entry point and from 300 km to the left or right of the ballistic course.

Crew Size: 2. Design Life: 14 days. Orbital Storage: 45 days. Length: 21.20 m (69.50 ft). Maximum Diameter: 2.70 m (8.80 ft). Span: 2.70 m (8.80 ft). Mass: 154,000 kg (339,000 lb). Main Engine: 8D423. Main Engine Thrust: 131.400 kN (29,540 lbf). Main Engine Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. Main Engine Isp: 326 sec. Spacecraft delta v: 9,061 m/s (29,727 ft/sec). Associated Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

• LK-700 VA.  Other Designations: Block V. Part of: LK-700. Class: Manned. Type: Spacecraft Module. Purpose: VA Re-entry Capsule.

  Crew Size: 2. Length: 2.50 m (8.20 ft). Basic Diameter: 2.70 m (8.80 ft). Maximum Diameter: 2.70 m (8.80 ft). Habitable Volume: 4.00 m3. Mass: 3,130 kg (6,900 lb). RCS Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. L/D Hypersonic: 0.35.

• LK-700 Block 1V.  Other Designations: Block 1V. Part of: LK-700. Class: Manned. Type: Spacecraft Module. Purpose: Trans-earth injection / midcourse manoeuvre stage.

  Main engine of 13,400 kgf and three engines for soft landing / midcourse maneuvers of 1,670 kgf each.

  Mass: 11,670 kg (25,720 lb). RCS Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. Main Engine Thrust: 180.540 kN (40,587 lbf). Main Engine Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. Main Engine Propellants: 8,995 kg (19,830 lb). Spacecraft delta v: 2,804 m/s (9,199 ft/sec).

• LK-700 Block 111.  Other Designations: Block 111. Part of: LK-700. Class: Manned. Type: Spacecraft Module. Purpose: Soft Landing Stage.

  Mass: 3,500 kg (7,700 lb). RCS Propellants: N2O4/UDMH.

• LK-700 Block 11.  Other Designations: Block 11. Part of: LK-700. Class: Manned. Type: Spacecraft Module. Purpose: Midcourse manoeuvre/lunar braking stage.

  Differed from the lateral Block 1 stages in having an engine unit for orientation of the assembly. Main engine of 23,500 kgf and three engines for soft landing / midcourse maneuvers of 1,670 kgf each.

  Mass: 32,226 kg (71,046 lb). RCS Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. Main Engine Thrust: 279.580 kN (62,852 lbf). Main Engine Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. Main Engine Isp: 326 sec. Spacecraft delta v: 3,000 m/s (9,800 ft/sec).

• LK-700 Block 1.  Other Designations: Block 1. Part of: LK-700. Class: Manned. Type: Spacecraft Module. Purpose: Translunar Injection Stage.

  Three identical stages of 34,491 kg each clustered around the core.

  Mass: 103,474 kg (228,121 lb). Main Engine Thrust: 691.300 kN (155,410 lbf). Main Engine Propellants: N2O4/UDMH. Main Engine Isp: 326 sec. Spacecraft delta v: 3,185 m/s (10,449 ft/sec).

• 1962 January 1 - UR-700 launch vehicle for manned lunar landing missions. - Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

  Chelomei's TsKBM began work on the UR-700. The conclusion was reached that a direct lunar landing would require a payload of 130 to 170 tonnes. Initial LK-700 spacecraft designs were derived from the 'Raketoplan' family of manned modular space vehicles. Korolev's N1-L3 design was selected in 1964 for the manned lunar landing, but the UR-700 would surface again when the N1 encountered delays.

• 1962 January 1 - Development of RD-270 engine begun - Program: Lunar L3. Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

  The RD-270 engine was proposed for Chelomei's UR-700 and Yangel R-56 lunar landing launchers in competition to Korolev N1. The RD-270 was in the same class as the F-1 engine developed for America's Saturn V launch vehicle, but burned storable but toxic propellants.

• 1964 November 1 - Korolev's admits that N1 cannot attain payload needed for single-launch mission - Program: Lunar L3. Launch Vehicle: N1, UR-700, R-56.

  Korolev speaks privately to Chertok. Kozlov has told him it will be impossible to build an N1 with the 93 tonne payload capability until the fourth flight article. The L3 concept was still the same as in the August decree - 2 cosmonauts aboard the LOK orbiter, one aboard the LK lander. Korolev asks Chertok to take 800 kg out of the weight budget for the L3. Chertok informs him that they are already 500 kg over the August budget. This is still without all the unknowns of the automated lunar landing being solved.Additional Details: Korolev's admits that N1 cannot attain payload needed for single-launch mission (51153).

• 1964 October 31 - UR-700 project cancelled - Program: Lunar L3. Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

  Following the August decree that gave the circumlunar project to Chelomei and the lunar landing project to Korolev, further work on development of the UR-700 by Chelomei was cancelled. However development of the RD-270 engine was continued and Chelomei continued to do UR-700 design studies.

• 1964 September 24 - Khrushchev visits Baikonur - Flight: Voskhod 2. Launch Vehicle: UR-100, UR-200, UR-700, R-26, R-36, R-56, R-9, N1.

  This was his last visit, just weeks before his overthrow. The Soviet leadership were shown the UR-100 and observed launches of the competing UR-200 and R-36. Khrushchev agreed with the decision to put the R-36 into production instead of Chelomei’s UR-200. He felt he couldn’t turn down Yangel a third time after approving Korolev’s N1 instead of Yangel’s R-56 and Chelomei’s UR-100 instead of Yangel’s R-26. Khrushchev decided to cancel Korolev’s badly behind schedule R-9A, even though Smirnov and Ustinov insisted they wanted it in their arsenal (in May 1965, after Khrushchev’s overthrow, this decision was reversed and the R-9A went into production).

  Khrushchev also visited a secret space fair, with Korolev, Chelomei, Yangel, and Glushko presenting their rockets and spacecraft. Chelomei presented his UR-700 heavy lift design as an alternative to Korolev’s N1. This presentation was a surprise to Ustinov and Dementiev. Khrushchev ordered Chelomei to prepare a draft proposal for the design. Chelomei hoped that 12 to 18 months later, when the UR-700 draft project would be completed, the fallacy of Korolev’s N1 design would be apparent to all. Korolev’s N1 plans were also reviewed and approved at the meeting.

  Over the two days, Khruschev witnessed five launches of rockets by Korolev, Yangel, and Chelomei, all of them successful. Gagarin and Belyayev explained the Vykhod spacecraft to him, and Leonov donned a spacesuit and demonstrated how he would exit into open space form the inflatable airlock and return thereafter. All went very well.

  This was the last time Khrushchev saw the chief designers of the Soviet rocket industry. Despite his support for them not one of them visited him in his retirement.

• 1965 October 20 - Draft project work on UR-700/LK-700 approved. - Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

  Ministry of General Machine Building (MOM) Decree 'On approval of work on the draft project of the UR-700/LK-700 lunar complex' was issued.

• 1966 December 28 - Almaz and LK-700 development status - Program: Almaz, Lunar L1, Lunar L3. Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

  Kamanin accompanies 17 generals and other officers of the VVS in a tour of Chelomei's OKB-52. Chelomei spends five hours personally acquainting the visitors with his bureau's space technology capabilities. It was the first in-depth meeting Kamanin and Vershinin have had with Chelomei, despite meeting with him occasionally since 1961. They have mainly interacted with Korolev and now Mishin.

  The expansion of Chelomei's facility has been enormous, and the in the quality of the rockets and spacecraft the influence of the higher standards of the aviation industry is obvious. The meticulous project planning, the high quality of the hardware, the intricate finishing of details - all are significantly better than at OKB-1. The UR-100, cancelled UR-200, and UR-500 missiles are exhibited.

  Chelomei has designed the UR-700 heavy booster based on the proven UR-100 and UR-500 technology. The design was reviewed favourably by an expert commission, but no resolution authorizing its development and production was forthcoming. The development of Korolev's N1 has already consumed hundreds of millions of roubles, and the leadership will not authorise a similarly expensive parallel project. The Saturn V has a payload of 130 tonnes to a 200 km orbit, the N1 95 tonnes, but the UR-700 would beat both with a 145 tonne payload. The technology of the N1 was frozen 5-6 years ago, and there is no growth in the design. By contract, the UR-700 uses the latest technology and its modular design would allow easy growth to more powerful versions.

  It is tragic for Soviet Union that Smirnov and Ustinov supported Korolev rather than Chelomei. It is true that Chelomei's manned boost-glide vehicle never got off the drawing board, and he has had only limited success developing umanned satellites. His primary task now is development of the Almaz military space station. The visitors closely examine the Almaz mockup and Kamanin concludes it is a good multipurpose spacecraft.

  The first Almaz station is expected to be launched within a year. Crews of three will be rotated every two months. Metal is already being cut for the first station. Perhaps it will be launched that soon, but Kamanin has no confidence that by 1967-1968 the experience will exist for keeping each crew in space for two months. The crews will probably have to be changed more frequently.

  Three years ago Chelomei was charged by the Central Committee and Council of Ministers with developing and flying a manned circumlunar spacecraft. But Korolev was able to take this project away from Chelomei after the fall of Khrushchev. This was a pyrrhic victory for the state - it resulted in a delay of two years in the project. Chelomei and OKB-52 continued development of his lunar spacecraft quietly, on their own risk. Kamanin finds it a pleasure to familiarise himself with Chelomei's LK-700 manned spacecraft and to sit in its crew seat. He finds Chelomei's spacecraft to be considerably simpler, more reliable and more fully thought out and developed than OKB-1's L3. Unfortunately, Chelomei's spacecraft is designed only for direct flight to the moon. It has a mass of 45 tonnes, which means it can only be orbited by a booster in the class of the N1 or UR-700.

  Kamanin's general impression of OKB-52 is outstanding - the competence of its people, the order in the shops, and the quality of products. The production base at OKB-52 greatly resembles that of a contemporary aircraft plant. By comparison OKB-1 still shows vestiges of its origin as an ordnance factory. Improved contacts with Chelomei are agreed, and Kamanin promises to bring Vershinin and Rudenko to visit the plant in January. Kamanin sends Chelomei films of the Gemini 6, 7, 11 flights and the Apollo program as thanks for his hospitality.

• 1966 November 16 - Government go-ahead for N-1 use in lunar program - Program: Lunar L3. Launch Vehicle: N1, UR-700.

  Mishin's draft plan for the Soviet lunar landing was approved by an expert commission headed by Keldysh. The first N-1 launch was set for March 1968. At same meeting, Chelomei made a last ditch attempt to get his revised UR-700/LK-700 direct landing approach approved in its place. Although Chelomei had lined up the support of Glushko, and Mishin was in a weak position after Korolev's death, Keldysh managed to ensure that the N1-L3 continued. However continued design work on the LK-700, the UR-700 booster, and development of the RD-270 engine were authorised.

• 1966 September 17 - Competing lunar landing designs to be evaluated. - Launch Vehicle: N1, UR-700.

  Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) Decree 'On creation of a commission to compare the UR-700-LK-700 and the N1-L3' was issued.

• 1967 July 21 - Chelomei signs design documents for UR-700/LK-700 lunar expedition - Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

  Chelomei's TsKBM began work on the UR-700 launch vehicle for manned lunar landing missions in 1962. Chelomei took a sound conservative design approach (i.e. no docking required, no cryogenics).

• 1967 September 17 - LK-700 manned lunar landing spacecraft authorised - Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

  Development of the LK-700 manned lunar landing spacecraft was undertaken in accordance with decree 1070-363 of the Soviet Ministers and Central Committee of the Communist Party on 17 September 1967 and MOM decree 472 of 28 September 1967. Study index number 4855CC by TsNIIMASH in 1966 showed that any development of improved versions of the N1 would be practically equivalent to design and qualification of a new rocket, while the UR-700 modular approach allowed a range of payloads without requalification. The UR-700/LK-700 combination could support the DLB lunar base better, as well as Venus/Mars manned flybys and Mars landing expeditions. Work would continue through the mock-up stage until 1974.

• 1967 September 20 - Review of N1 progress. - Program: Lunar L3. Launch Vehicle: N1, UR-700.

  The booster was supposed to be launched by 1966, but there is no way it will be finished this year, and it is highly questionable it will even get off the ground in 1968. The N1 tanks are pressurised to 2 atmospheres, and can go up to three atmospheres in an emergency. In the enormous MIK assembly hall are three N1's - one 'iron bird' ground test model and two flight vehicles. The first roll out of the mock-up will take place in 1967, and the first launch attempt is still expected in 1968 (the first launch will not be attempted until the second and third stages complete stand tests. There is no test stand for the first stage, it will be fired for the first time in flight). An explosion would destroy the pad, requiring several years of repairs. There are two pads, but even that would not be a guarantee of the availability of the rocket due to the poor expected initial reliability. The N1 project is costing 10 billion roubles, not including considerable investment required by the military. To Kamanin the whole thing is a boondoggle, showing the necessity for development of lighter air-launched boosters. He believes there are many mistakes in design and construction, but Mishin, Pashkov, Smirnov, and Ustinov support these doubtful projects of Korolev and Mishin, instead of technically sound projects such as Chelomei's UR-700 or MiG's air-launched spacecraft. If Mishin thinks the current Proton/L1 reliability is only 0.6, then that of the completely unproved N1/L3 must be even less...

• 1970 December 31 - UR 700/LK-700/RD-270 definitively cancelled. - Program: Lunar L3. Launch Vehicle: UR-700.

  Further development work on the RD-270 engine, UR-700 launch vehicle, and LK-700 lunar landing project are cancelled following the successful Apollo lunar landing.

• 1971 March 4 - N1/L3 Expert Commission - Program: Lunar L3. Launch Vehicle: N1, UR-700.

  Pushkin and Kuznetsov brief Kamanin on the results of the N1/L3 expert commission. They found that the N1/L3 is unreliable and that the design needs to be fundamentally re-examined. Therefore the Soviet Ministers and Central Committee passed a decree that the commission must determine by 1 May 1971 what to do with the lunar project. Kamanin's opinion: abandon the N1-L3, modify Chelomei's UR-700 design to replace it, and design a new lunar landing spacecraft for missions in 1974-1975. Mishin is afraid of such a solution. Kamanin believes that the commission, headed by Keldysh, will finally recommend continued development and flight of Mishin's bad booster and even worse spacecraft. It is true that the N1 design has been substantially reworked in the last 18 months, but Kamanin believes it to be fundamentally flawed and that nothing can make it reliable.

  After Mishin pushed his Indian Ocean recovery plan for the L3, the VVS insisted on sea trials of the capsule. These showed the cosmonauts had to get out within 30 to 35 minutes before the valves to the interior started leaking seawater. The L3 is also unsafe due to the EVA method of transfer to the LK of a single unassisted cosmonaut. The Krechet spacesuit is very bulky and unmanoeuvrable.

  Prague wanted Gagarin's widow for International Women's Day.since Tereshkkova couldn't go, but she wants no part of public appearances.

• Chertok, Boris Yevseyevich, Raketi i lyudi, Mashinostroenie, Moscow, 1994-1999.. ISBN: 5217024976. Russian language autobiography in four volumes of one of Korolev's chief assistants. NASA is in the process of translating the work - the pdf is for the first volume only, up to WW2. Accessed at: http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20050010181_2005010059.pdf. -right click to download pdfs! More at amazon.com...

• Baker, David, The History of Manned Spaceflight, Crown, New York, 1981. The best overview of America's manned space programs up to Skylab. Information and details not available anywhere else. Unfortunately out of print and difficult to locate.

• Siddiqi, Asif A, The Soviet Space Race With Apollo, University Press of Florida, 2003. ISBN: 0813026288. The definitive history of the Soviet manned space program in the 1960's to the early 1970's. Originally published as the the latter part of 'Challenge to Apollo' by NASA in 2000 as NASA SP-2000-4408. More at amazon.com...

• Yeteyev, Ivan, Operezhaya vremya, Ocherki, Moscow, 1999.. Collection of articles involving the life and works of Chief Designer Chelomei and the Khrunichev factory.

• Borisov, A, and Zhuravin, Yu, Novosti kosmonavtiki, "Alternativnaya Luna", No. 9/1999 page 75.

• Kamanin, N P, Skritiy kosmos, Infortext, Moscow, 1995. The diary of the Commander of the Soviet Cosmonaut Team in the 1960's - a source of great insights into the space program. Four volumes issued to date.

• Lebedev, Daniel B, Spaceflight, "Chelomei's Lunar Programme", 1993, Volume 35, page 228.

• Przybilski, Olaf, and Wotzlaw, Stefan, N-1 Herkules - Entwicklung und Absturz einer Traegerrakete, Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Raumfahrtausstellung e.V., 1996. Best account of the development of the N-1 rocket and the Soviet lunar program. In German.

• Afanasyev, I B, Neizvestnie korabli, Kosmonavtika, Astronomiya, Znanie, 12-91.. This basic monograph revealed for the first time the many cancelled Soviet manned space projects.

• Haeseler, Dietrich, Spaceflight, "Soviet Rocket Motors on View", 1993, Volume 35, page 40.

• Pesavento, Peter, Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, "An Examination of Rumored Launch Failures in the Soviet Manned Program", 1990, Volume 43, page 379.