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Two primary propulsion system firings would have been accomplished and the descent stage of the LM would still be attached.
Slayton specified that EVA should consist of a crewman exiting through the LM forward hatch and making a thorough orbital check of the LM before reentering through the same hatch. He said EVA on AS-503 would provide:
- flight experience and confidence in LM environmental-control-system performance during cabin depressurization;
- flight confidence in the Block II International Latex Corp. pressure garment assemblies;
- orbital time-line approximation of cabin depressurization times, forward hatch operation, flight crew egress procedures, and LM entry following a simulated lunar EVA;
- visual inspection and photography of LM landing gear for possible damage during withdrawal from the S-IVB stage;
- external inspection and photography of the LM to record window and antenna contamination caused by SLA panel pyrotechnic deployment;
- inspection and photography of descent engine skirt and adjacent areas for evidence of damage from two descent propulsion system firings;
- inspection and photography of possible damage to the upper LM caused by the SM reaction control system during withdrawal;
- possible additional data regarding EVA metabolic rates, etc., as applied to the Block II pressure garment assembly; and
- additional orbital confidence in the portable life support system operational procedures.