R-9 Media Gallery

ICBM developed by Korolev OKB using liquid oxygen/kerosene propellants. The Soviet military favoured storable propellants as advocated by Glushko and implemented by Yangel and Chelomei. Development of the R-9 was protracted and it was deployed in only very limited numbers between 1964 and 1974.

The R-9 represented Korolev's last attempt to develop a practical military missile and to prove the military worth of the non-toxic liquid oxygen/kerosene propellant combination. Initial design work was authorised in a decree of April 1958 calling for development of an ICBM with a launch mass under 100 tonnes as a practical replacement for the R-7. Solving these problems paradoxically led to his organisation wasting a huge amount of time and effort on this missile, which was only deployed in very limited numbers, at a time when resources were needed for manned, planetary, and lunar space programmes. On the other hand there was a synergy between the R-9 and the GR-1 and N1 rocket development programmes, which used the same propellants and engines.

The original design studies considered two alternative configurations -- the R-9A 8K75 with liquid oxygen/kerosene propellants (engines by Glushko and Kosberg), and the R-9V 8K76 with nitric acid/kerosene storable liquid propellants (engines by Isayev). The studies showed the clear performance advantages of the R-9A. The authority to proceed with development of this version was received on 13 May 1959 in the same resolution that instructed Yangel to start work in earnest on his competing storable-liquid R-16 ICBM. Project leader was Mishin, who would succeed Korolev after his death as head of the design bureau. The draft project for the pad-launched R-9 test missile, using RD-111 booster engines the primary Soviet engine designer, Glushko, was completed in October 1959. For the upper stage engine Korolev turned to the Kosberg bureau, transferring the technology developed by Korolev's staff for the R-7's vernier rockets. It was envisioned that the R-9 would be used to work out technical problems before moving on to the R-9A production model.

In order to provide a facility that could quickly fuel and launch a production missile using cryogenic liquid oxygen, a host of new technologies had to be mastered. Mishin developed new materials and machinery to precool the liquid oxygen to -210 deg C, then devised vacuum isolation storage systems that reduced boil-off losses during storage, transport, and fuelling operations by 500 times. The overall semi-automatic fuelling system was code-named Desna, and Desna-N pad-launched missile and Desna-V silo-launched missile variants were devised. Many other variants were studied, including the Dolina fully-automated hardened launch facility and a mobile system allowing the missile to be launched from a floating naval barge. Finally the Dolina, Desna-N (later renamed Romashka) and Desna-V systems were selected for parallel development for the production missile on 14 June 1960.

Development of the missile was protracted due to the deep antipathy that existed between Glushko, and Korolev. Korolev felt that Glushko was dragging his feet in development of the RD-111 cryogenic engine. In any case the engine suffered combustion instability problems and exploded on the test stand, delaying development.

Korolev tried to develop alternate sources. Turboprop engine maker Kuznetsov was recruited to learn the art of rocket engine development. Korolev planned for Kuznetsov's NK-9 to power the first stage of an alternate R-9M missile. However Kuzenetsov also encountered problems in producing the high-performance motors Korolev demanded using the liquid oxygen/kerosene propellant combination. In the end Korolev had to settle for Glushko's RD-111.

The Desna-N or Romashka pad-launched complex was built at LC-51 at Baikonur. It took 16 hours of preparation time to ready the missile in the operations hangar. Reaction time thereafter was two hours from the order to launch, with 21 minutes required to launch the missile after it was erected on the pad. Measures were found during service to reduce this time to five minutes. Trials launches were made from the complex from 9 April 1961 to 14 February 1963.

The Desna-V semi-automatic silo complex was built at LC-70 at Baikonur. Launches were conducted from 27 September 1963 to February 1964. The complex consisted of three silos, 25 m apart. A fuelled, radio-guided, silo-based missile had to go through ten minutes of auto-test time, then a five minute countdown to launch.

The Dolina prototype complex was built at LC-75 at Baikonur. This was a fully automatic hardened facility. The missile was prepared horizontally, and then automatically docked to the launch table and umbilical connections. There were two launch pads and one hardened command post (with propellant tanks, radio-guidance station, and control room) per complex. The first missile would take 150 minutes to ready for launch from the order to go, but the second would be ready nine minutes after the first bird had gone. After being moved out of the hardened preparation facility, the missile could be launched 20 minutes after being raised to a vertical position. 15 minutes of this delay being due to allow the inertial guidance system's gyros to spin up to 60,000 rpm and for platform alignment. Mishin's engineers wondered how the Americans managed to launch missiles with a two to three minute reaction time, until learning that US ICBM's inertial platforms were kept constantly powered up. Launches were made from LC-75 from 22 February 1963 to February 1964.

In all a total of 54 test launches were made of preproduction R-9's from 1961 to 1964. In the first 29 of this series, through the end of 1962, 13 were failures. Of the remaining 25 tests, 8 were failures. Some of these flights were part of 62 tests made aboard R-9, R-36, and UR-100 missiles of the radio-corrected guidance system developed by NII-885. Of 13 tests of production R-9A missiles from 1964-1966, 4 were failures. While the tests dragged on, Yangel's R-16 and Chelomei's UR-100 both entered service and were deployed in the hundreds.

On 24 October 1963 an R-9 was being prepared for launch in a Desna-V silo. Unknown to the 11 man launch crew, an oxygen leak in the fuelling system had raised the oxygen partial pressure in the silo from the 21% maximum allowed to 32%. Whie the crew was descending in a lift to the 8th level of the silo, a spark from an electrical panel created a fire in the explosive atmosphere, killing seven and destroying the silo. This happened on the same day as the Nedelin disaster three years earlier, and became the cosmodrome's 'Black Day'. Forever after no launches were attempted from Baikonur on October 24.

In the end, despite the poor test record, the R-9A, and Dolina, Romashka, and Desna-V complexes were accepted for military service. Series production was undertaken at Factory 1001 in Krasnoyarsk and another plant at closed site Krasnoyarsk-26. Construction of four launch pads for the R-9 began in 1962 at Maloye Usovo and Bolshoye Usovo as part of the Angara missile base near Plesetsk. Construction of another 23-28 launchers for the missile began in 1963-1964 at Kozelsk, Omsk, and Tyumen.

A full R-9A regiment was defined as three rockets divisions, one with a Romashka pad-launched complex, one with a Desna silo complex, and one with a Dolina complex. The first R-9A Romashka firing units became operational on 14 December 1964 at Kozelsk, and 15 December at Plesetsk. These were followed by the first silo unit at Kozelsk on 26 December. Further regiments were formed at Omsk and Tyumen. In services the launch complexes at Plesetsk and Baikonur served as reserve operational launchers. On 21 July 1965 the R-9A was officially accepted into service, four years behind its R-16 competitor. A total of only 27 operational launchers and 70 missiles were built, and they were mainly useful as bargaining chips in the Strategic Arms Limitation talks. Under the resulting SALT-1 treaty, the R-9 complexes were put on stand-by status in 1972, and demolished in 1974-1977.

The R-9 used aluminium-magnesium alloy for its propellant tanks. Turbine gases were used to pressurise the fuel tank, and gaseous oxygen for the liquid oxygen tank. The R-9's accuracy (90%) was 8 km in range and 5 km laterally using radio-update guidance during ascent. On autonomous inertial guidance only, this dropped to 20 km in range and 10 km laterally. The inertial navigation system was designed by Pilyugin using Ryazinsky gyroscopes, and two versions were developed, 8A2113 and 8A211M.

Another proposed variant of the R-9 was the 8K77, with vacuum-flask insulation of the oxygen tank aboard the missile, for instant reaction while being held in readiness for long periods. An alternate version with a heavier re-entry vehicle, 5 megaton warhead, and shorter range was developed as part of the program, but was not deployed.

OKB-1 Filial 2 at Krasnoyarsk-26 proposed a light ballistic missile based on the R-9, but this did not interest the Soviet authorities.

Manufacturer: Korolev. Launches: 69. Failures: 26. Success Rate: 62.32%. First Launch Date: 1961-04-09. Last Launch Date: 1969-12-15. Launch data is: incomplete. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). Liftoff Thrust: 1,378.500 kN (309,899 lbf). Total Mass: 80,500 kg (177,400 lb). Core Diameter: 2.68 m (8.79 ft). Total Length: 26.50 m (86.90 ft). Standard warhead mass: 1,100 kg (2,400 lb). Maximum range: 16,000 km (9,000 mi). Number Standard Warheads: 1. Standard warhead yield: 1,650 KT. Standard warhead CEP: 5.00 km (3.10 mi). Alternate warhead mass: 2,100 kg (4,600 lb). Maximum range with alternate warhead: 12,500 km (7,700 mi). Number Alternate Warheads: 1. Alternate warhead yield: 5,000 KT. Alternate warhead CEP: 5.00 km (3.10 mi). Boost Propulsion: Liquid rocket, Lox/Kerosene. Boost engine: RD-111. Cruise Propulsion: Liquid rocket, Lox/Kerosene. Cruise engine: RD-0106. Guidance: Inertial+radio update. Maximum speed: 25,920 kph (16,100 mph). Total Number Built: 130. Total Development Built: 60. Total Production Built: 70.

Version using storable propellants and Isayev engines. Studied but rejected prior to start of development.

Boost Propulsion: Liquid rocket, Nitric acid AK-27I/Kerosene TM-185. Boost engine: S5.3M. Cruise Propulsion: Liquid rocket, Nitric acid AK-27I/Kerosene TM-185.

Version with vacuum-isolated liquid oxygen tanks to provide capability to hold ready for instant launch. Studied but never developed.

Boost Propulsion: Liquid rocket, Lox/Kerosene. Cruise Propulsion: Liquid rocket, Lox/Kerosene.

Silo-launched version, silo hardened to 15-30 atmospheres overpressure.

Alternate silo-launched version, silo hardened to 15-30 atmospheres overpressure.

Manufacturer: Korolev. Total Mass: 80,000 kg (176,000 lb). Core Diameter: 2.68 m (8.79 ft). Total Length: 24.18 m (79.33 ft). Span: 2.68 m (8.79 ft).

Improved version with Kuznetsov engines in first and second stages. Development undertaken, but cancelled in favour of basic version with RD-111/RD-0106 engines.

Boost Propulsion: Liquid rocket, Lox/Kerosene. Boost engine: NK-9. Cruise Propulsion: Liquid rocket, Lox/Kerosene. Cruise engine: NK-9V.

Pad-launched version.

Liftoff Thrust: 1,385.000 kN (311,360 lbf). Total Mass: 100,000 kg (220,000 lb).

• Stage Number: 1. 1 x Stage: R-9A Stage 1. Gross Mass: 61,600 kg (135,800 lb). Empty Mass: 4,000 kg (8,800 lb). Thrust (vac): 1,595.830 kN (358,757 lbf). Isp: 311 sec. Burn time: 108 sec. Isp(sl): 269 sec. Diameter: 2.68 m (8.79 ft). Span: 3.30 m (10.80 ft). Length: 14.79 m (48.52 ft). Propellants: Lox/Kerosene. No Engines: 1. Engine: RD-111. Other designations: 8K77 Blok A. Payload 3,500 kg. Range 13,000 km. Accuracy (90%) 8 km in range and 5 km in dispersion with radio guidance; 20 km / 10 km with inertial guidance. Empty mass estimated.

• Stage Number: 2. 1 x Stage: R-9A Stage 2. Gross Mass: 15,900 kg (35,000 lb). Empty Mass: 2,500 kg (5,500 lb). Thrust (vac): 304.000 kN (68,341 lbf). Isp: 330 sec. Burn time: 140 sec. Diameter: 2.68 m (8.79 ft). Span: 2.68 m (8.79 ft). Length: 9.40 m (30.80 ft). Propellants: Lox/Kerosene. No Engines: 1. Engine: RD-0106. Other designations: 8K77 Blok B. Empty mass estimated. Developed into Molniya/Soyuz second stage.

Summer 1958 - Launch Vehicle: R-12, R-16, R-9.

• Khrushchev conceives of use of silos for Soviet long range missiles Nation: USSR. Khrushchev independently conceived of the idea of storing and launching ballistic missiles from subterranean silos. He called Korolev to his dacha in the Crimea. Korolev told him his idea was not feasible. He then called Barmin and Yangel. Barmin said he would study the idea. Yangel remained silent. Some time later Khrushchev’s son saw a drawing of the same concept in a US aerospace magazine. He informed his father, who ordered immediate crash development of the first generation of Soviet missile silos.References: 539.

• R-9 and R-16 development measures approved. Nation: USSR. Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 'On start of dedicated work on the R-9 and R-16 ICBMs' was issued. References: 474.

• Development of Silo-Launched IRBM's and ICBM's approved. Nation: USSR. State Committee for Defence Technology (GKOT) Decree 'On creation of shaft units (silos) for the R-12, R-14, R-16, and R-9 missiles' was issued. References: 474.

• Venera preparations Nation: USSR. Spacecraft: Mars 2MV-2, Vostok. Korolev plans three launches between 20 January and 14 February, but clearly his teams are not ready to accomplish this. There was insufficient testing of the Object V Venera spacecraft before it was shipped from OKB-1 to the cosmodrome. OKB-1 is trying to finish Object V on site, at the same time preparing the next Vostok 3KA and an R-9 ICBM for launch. Object V is not ready, the ability of its systems to function at long ranges and periods of time on the voyage to Venus are suspect. In Kamanin's opinion, it is diverting the crews from the higher priority manned and military projects.References: 376.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). The R-9 launch went normally, from the launch pad adjacent to that from which Yuri Gagarin would be launched three days later, in view of the cosmonauts. References: 98, 376, 445, 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. References: 759.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Pitsunda Conference - Decision to start design of UR-500 and N1 lunar boosters Nation: USSR. The Soviet leadership attends a secret exhibition of Soviet rocket technology in a sporting hall at Pitsunda, on the Black Sea. The Chief Designers offer competing designs. It is decided that the R-16, R-9, UR-200, UR-500, and N1 will go forward. Yangel's R-56 is rejected.Additional Details: Pitsunda Conference - Decision to start design of UR-500 and N1 lunar boosters(27080). References: 539.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. In a test of nuclear fratricide and ABM effectiveness, an R-5M (some sources say an R-12) launched a live thermonuclear warhead toward Semipalitinsk/Sary Shagan which was detonated at an altitude of 150 km. Two R-9 ICBM's were launched minutes earlier, timed to pass through the zone of the explosion. Both missiles guided to the planned impact zone without apparent ill-effect. This high altitude test was designed to test electromagnetic pulse effects on electronics, especially ABM system radars and incoming 'friendly' ICBM's.References: 98, 1270.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi). References: 744.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• Silo explosion kills 7 at Baikonur Nation: USSR. On 24 October 1963 an R-9 was being prepared for launch in a silo at LC-70. Unknown to the 11 man launch crew, an oxygen leak in the fuelling system had raised the oxygen partial pressure in the silo from the 21% maximum allowed to 32%. Whie the crew was descending in a lift to the 8th level of the silo, a spark from an electrical panel created a fire in the explosive atmosphere, killing seven and destroying the silo. This happened on the same day as the Nedelin disaster three years earlier, and became the cosmodrome's 'Black Day'. Forever after no launches were attempted from Baikonur on October 24.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• State trials missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Joint flight trials launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Joint flight trials launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Joint flight trials launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Joint flight trials launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Joint flight trials launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Operational missile test Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Joint flight trials launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Operational Test mission Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• Khrushchev visits Baikonur Nation: USSR. Spacecraft: Voskhod, Berkut, LK-700. Flight: Voskhod 2. This was his last visit, just weeks before his overthrow. The Soviet leadership were shown the UR-100 and observed launches of the competing UR-200 and R-36. Khrushchev agreed with the decision to put the R-36 into production instead of Chelomei’s UR-200. He felt he couldn’t turn down Yangel a third time after approving Korolev’s N1 instead of Yangel’s R-56 and Chelomei’s UR-100 instead of Yangel’s R-26. Khrushchev decided to cancel Korolev’s badly behind schedule R-9A, even though Smirnov and Ustinov insisted they wanted it in their arsenal (in May 1965, after Khrushchev’s overthrow, this decision was reversed and the R-9A went into production).

  Khrushchev also visited a secret space fair, with Korolev, Chelomei, Yangel, and Glushko presenting their rockets and spacecraft. Chelomei presented his UR-700 heavy lift design as an alternative to Korolev’s N1. This presentation was a surprise to Ustinov and Dementiev. Khrushchev ordered Chelomei to prepare a draft proposal for the design. Chelomei hoped that 12 to 18 months later, when the UR-700 draft project would be completed, the fallacy of Korolev’s N1 design would be apparent to all. Korolev’s N1 plans were also reviewed and approved at the meeting.

  Over the two days, Khruschev witnessed five launches of rockets by Korolev, Yangel, and Chelomei, all of them successful. Gagarin and Belyayev explained the Vykhod spacecraft to him, and Leonov donned a spacesuit and demonstrated how he would exit into open space form the inflatable airlock and return thereafter. All went very well.

  This was the last time Khrushchev saw the chief designers of the Soviet rocket industry. Despite his support for them not one of them visited him in his retirement.References: 376.

• N1 development issues Nation: USSR. Program: Lunar L3. Spacecraft: Luna E-6, LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK. There were two camps on the N1-L3 control systems. One group was within OKB-1, and had developed the systems for the Vostok and Zenit spacecraft, under the personal oversight of Korolev. They stressed the maximum quality and reliability in their systems. The second group had worked with Pilyugin, and had designed the systems for the Mars, Venus, Luna E-6 probes, the R-9, RT-1, RT-2, and GR-1 missiles; and piloted spacecraft. Their design emphasis was on maximum usability and output. Pilyugin had been named chief designer of the control system for the N1-L3.Additional Details: N1 development issues(51154). References: 367.

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• R-9A ICBM accepted into military service. Nation: USSR. Decree 'On adoption of the R-9A in shaft and surface variants into armaments' was issued. References: 474.

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Soviet design bureaux reorganised and renamed. Nation: USSR. Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Soyuz 7K-OK, Soyuz 7K-L1. Decree 'On renaming OKB-1 as TsKBEM and OKB-52 as TsKBM' was issued. In 1966 Afanasyev reorganised the military industrial complex. OKB-1 was redesignated TsKBEM. Sergei Osipovich Opakhin was made First Deputy within the new organization.

  However within TsKBEM there were no relative priorities for the projects competing for resources. The R-9 and RT-2 ICBM's, the orbital, circumlunar, and lunar orbiter versions of Soyuz, the LK lunar lander, the N1 booster -- all were 'equal'. It seemed folly to be pursuing the orbital ferry version of the Soyuz when no space station had to be funded. But it was felt flying the spacecraft would solve reliability questions about the design, so it was pursued in parallel with the L1 and L3 versions.References: 367, 474.

• N1 two-launch moon scenario proposed Nation: USSR. Program: Lunar L3, Lunar L1, Soyuz. Spacecraft: LK, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Soyuz 7K-OK, Soyuz 7K-L1, Soyuz 7K-LOK, Molniya-1. Bushuyev proposed a two launch variation on Korolev's single-launch scheme. The increased-payload version of the N1 with six additional engines was not planned to fly until vehicle 3L. 1L and 2L were to be technology articles for ground test with only the original 24 engine configuration. At that time the first Apollo test flight was planned by the end of 1966, and the US moon landing no later than 1969. The Soviets expected the first test of their LK lander in 1969, and concluded they could not expect to land a Soviet man on the moon until 1972.Additional Details: N1 two-launch moon scenario proposed(51158). References: 367.

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN. Apogee: 1,000 km (600 mi).

• Combat training launch Nation: USSR. Agency: RVSN.

• McDowell, Jonathan, Jonathan's Space Home Page, Harvard University, 1997-present. Jonathan McDowell's complete on-line listing of all objects orbited and over 20,000 rocket launches Accessed at: http://www.planet4589.org/jsr.html.

• Semenov, Yu. P., S P Korolev Space Corporation Energia, RKK Energia, 1994. ISBN: 1896522815. Dual English/Russian language picture book of the history of the Energia Corporation. Many unique photos and drawings of Korolev's rockets and spacecraft. Republished by Apogee books in 2000. More at amazon.com...