American test pilot astronaut 1962-2004. Only astronaut to fly Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle. Ninth person to walk on the moon. Space speed record (11,107 m/s). Flew in space six times. 6 spaceflights, 34.8 days in space. Flew to orbit on Gemini 3 (1965), Gemini 10, Apollo 10, Apollo 16, STS-1, STS-9.

The remaining X-10's were expended as targets for Bomarc and Nike antiaircraft missiles. The X-10 flew out over the ocean, then accelerated toward the Cape at supersonic speed. A Bomarc A missile came within lethal miss distance. The X-10 then autolanded on the Skid Strip, but both the drag chute and landing barrier failed. The vehicle ran off the runway and exploded.

A participant remembers:

I live near the Cape on Merritt Island and have been here for about 41 years. I worked for the ARMA Corp that developed the Atlas Inertial Guidance System. I was in the Blockhouse at Complex 11 while a static test was performed on an Atlas Able on Complex 12. It did explode. Did it ever! After a couple of hours the six of us were allowed out of the blockhouse and saw all the damage to our complex...I had a tiny piece of that missile for a long time that somehow wound up on my person...labeled 9C.

The next Atlas Able would not fly until over a year later, using the Atlas D as the booster stage.

NASA Administrator Webb announced major organizational changes and top-level appointments to become effective November 1. The reorganization should provide a clearer focus on major programs and allow center directors to have a louder voice in policy making. The new appointments included the following Directors of major program offices: Ira H. Abbott, Office of Advanced Research and Technology; Homer E. Newell, Office of Space Sciences; D. Brainerd Holmes, Office of Manned Space Flight; and an as yet unnamed Director of Office of Applications Programs. Also, Thomas F. Dixon was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator; Abe Silverstein was named Director of the Lewis Research Center, and Robert R. Gilruth was chosen Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center.

Central Committee of the Communist Party and Council of Soviet Ministers Decree 1021-436 'On start of work on the N1 and GR-1' was issued. Following a review of the N1 project by an Academy of Sciences expert commission headed by Keldysh in July, this decree provided a detailed plan leading to a first launch by the end of 1965. Planning and drawing release for the GR-1 were completed by this date and the decree ordered test flights to begin in the third quarter of 1963. However development problems with the NK-9 engine resulted in continual delays. Finally in 1964 Korolev's GR-1 was cancelled and Yangel's R-36 was selected for the mission. This would deprive Korolev of a vital test-bed for flight test of the N1 engines.

A background briefing for the press regarding astronomy programs was held in Washington. Nancy Roman, who directed the agency's astronomy activities, disclosed that NASA was studying the feasibility of a manned orbiting telescope. Although the telescope would be designed to operate automatically, man would adjust its focus, collect film packets, and make any necessary repairs. The space agency had already invited members of the scientific community to propose astronomical studies suitable for use in space, and several NASA centers were performing related engineering support studies.

This was his last visit, just weeks before his overthrow. The Soviet leadership were shown the UR-100 and observed launches of the competing UR-200 and R-36. Khrushchev agreed with the decision to put the R-36 into production instead of Chelomei's UR-200. He felt he couldn't turn down Yangel a third time after approving Korolev's N1 instead of Yangel's R-56 and Chelomei's UR-100 instead of Yangel's R-26. Khrushchev decided to cancel Korolev's badly behind schedule R-9A, even though Smirnov and Ustinov insisted they wanted it in their arsenal (in May 1965, after Khrushchev's overthrow, this decision was reversed and the R-9A went into production).

Khrushchev also visited a secret space fair, with Korolev, Chelomei, Yangel, and Glushko presenting their rockets and spacecraft. Chelomei presented his UR-700 heavy lift design as an alternative to Korolev's N1. This presentation was a surprise to Ustinov and Dementiev. Khrushchev ordered Chelomei to prepare a draft proposal for the design. Chelomei hoped that 12 to 18 months later, when the UR-700 draft project would be completed, the fallacy of Korolev's N1 design would be apparent to all. Korolev's N1 plans were also reviewed and approved at the meeting.

Over the two days, Khruschev witnessed five launches of rockets by Korolev, Yangel, and Chelomei, all of them successful. Gagarin and Belyayev explained the Vykhod spacecraft to him, and Leonov donned a spacesuit and demonstrated how he would exit into open space form the inflatable airlock and return thereafter. All went very well.

This was the last time Khrushchev saw the chief designers of the Soviet rocket industry. Despite his support for them not one of them visited him in his retirement.

The cause of the Ye-8-5 failure is found to be a valve that was stuck open after the first stage burn, resulting in the oxidiser boiling away in the vacuum of space. Tyulin inquires about the possibility of commanding the Ye-8-5 to conduct a series of manoeuvres and testing re-entry of the soil return capsule in the earth's atmosphere. An interesting concept, but the engineers have not planned for such an eventuality.

NII-2 MO, represented by Lt General Korolev and Chief Designer Savin present plans for their Svinets experiment. It will observe ICBM rocket plumes from space in order to aid design of anti-ballistic missile systems. They had asked Smirnov to conduct a solid propellant rocket launch in order to test the device properly, but he could only schedule a liquid propellant rocket launch. Kamanin had wanted this experiment to be conducted aboard Voskhod 3, but Smirnov has cancelled that mission as well - delaying Soviet ABM development, in Kamanin's view.

The members do not believe the three spacecraft and crews are ready for flight. They rate the availability of the actual spacecraft for training before the flight at 20 to 30%, while the trainers are being used at 200% of their rated capacity. The result is the cosmonauts can only train on the technical systems of the actual spacecraft after they have been delivered to the cosmodrome. The situation is even worse with the experimental equipment for the flights, which in some cases they do not see until they are at the cosmodrome. Unwilling to commit themselves, the commission bumps the decision whether to proceed up to the Politburo. Ustinov and Smirnov badly guide the whole space program, in Kamanin's view. The Politburo won't meet until 29 September -- he hopes the Russian bureaucracy can complete all the steps to approve the flights before the scheduled launch day!

Mishin's latest plan is land the L3 in the Indian Ocean after return from the moon, but Soyuz is not rated for swells over 3 to 4 balls. Also there is no money for the needed recovery forces. By comparison the Americans have made the sea their home. Their aircraft carriers give them control over 300 times more ocean area than the Soviet Union.

Positioned in geosynchronous orbit at 97 deg W in 1981-1983; 104 deg W in 1983; 97 deg W in 1983-1988; 99 deg W in 1988-1990; 97 deg W in 1990-1994; 71 deg W in 1994-1996 As of 31 August 2001 located at 125.63 deg E drifting at 0.458 deg W per day. As of 2007 Mar 9 located at 125.97W drifting at 0.561W degrees per day. Spacecraft engaged in practical applications and uses of space technology such as weather or communication (US Cat C).

Direct TV for continental US. Stationed at 89.0 deg W. Positioned in geosynchronous orbit at 89 deg W in 1995-1999 As of 5 September 2001 located at 88.96 deg W drifting at 0.003 deg W per day. The Telstar 4 (former Telstar 402R) satellite suffered a power failure on September 19 2003 and was a total loss. It was part of AT&T's satellite fleet, later sold to Loral Skynet by 2003 in the process of being sold to Intelsat. As of 2007 Mar 10 located at 116.15W drifting at 0.086W degrees per day.

Film-return reconnaisance satellite. Maneuvered on October 1 to a 213 x 330 km orbit. Believed to be an improved Yantar-4K1 with a longer lifetime - and given the code name 'Kobalt' previously applied to the defunct Yantar-4K2 system. When re-entry was commanded after only 107 days in orbit, there was speculation that problems had arisen with the satellite. Sources claimed the satellite had some kind of control problem, which was brought under control, and the two smaller film return capsules were successfully returned. But when the control problem reoccurred, it was decided to bring the main re-entry capsule down early. At retrofire, two objects were tracked as having separated from the spacecraft. Russian search teams were unable to locate the capsule after re-entry. Further launches of the satellite were put on hold until a State Commission could determine the causes of the failure.